1. Comparative Risk Analysis & Threat Adaptability: Civil Aviation and Biological Terrorism Comparative Risk Analysis & Threat Adaptability: Civil Aviation and Biological Terrorism November 2004 Terry O’Sullivan CREATE Homeland Security Center University of Southern California

2. Research Objectives: Analyzing Adaptation By closing (or impeding) one method of terrorism, we may increase the risk of another –Terrorists may find easier alternatives, or adapt tactics to new impediments –Alternatives might be even worse than the original threat Public Policy Countermeasures Allocation Decisions: –Comprehensive view of ALL possible risks –Terrorism is not the only security risk –“Dual Benefit” solutions may be among most cost- effective

3. Threats to Civil Aviation & Public Health: First Stage: Assessing Threat Risks –Proliferation of Weapons, Agents, Threats –Weapons/Threat Capabilities –Susceptibility to attack –Countermeasures to Reduce Susceptibility –Countermeasures to Improve Survivability Second Stage: Modeling Risks –Model threats using dynamic Bayesian structures –Assess the Probabilities of different modes of attack Later Stages: –Assess Economic Costs and Benefits of the Investments,

4. Possible Terrorist Goals Large-Scale Casualties Large-Scale Casualties Disruption of Travel, Gov’t, Lifestyle Disruption of Travel, Gov’t, Lifestyle Harm to Industries, Institutions Harm to Industries, Institutions Harm to Economy Generally Harm to Economy Generally Fear, Punishment and/or coercion Fear, Punishment and/or coercion

5. External Weapons Threats to Commercial Aviation

6. Commercial Aviation: Terrorist Attack Options Tactics External Weapons Hijack, maybe use as weapon Suicide Attack on Airplane Explosive on Plane MANPADSRPG/EtcMortarSniper Rifle Sabotage.50 Mach. Gun Air Attack Airport Ground Attack

7. Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG-7s) Afghan Mujahideen used against low-flying Soviet aircraft Afghan Mujahideen used against low-flying Soviet aircraft Could down civilian jet (taking off or landing) Could down civilian jet (taking off or landing) Could be lofted over airport perimeter fences Could be lofted over airport perimeter fences Night-vision capability Night-vision capability

8. Large Caliber Sniper Rifles A combination of long range & power (1.5 miles +) A combination of long range & power (1.5 miles +).50 cal. have been sold to.50 cal. have been sold to al Qaeda, IRA, Iraq (used against Coalition forces) Could target fuel tanks, passengers, pilots, down aircraft in worst case Could target fuel tanks, passengers, pilots, down aircraft in worst case Muhammad-Malvo scenario? Muhammad-Malvo scenario?

9. Man-Portable Aerial Defense Systems: MANPADS Missiles * Widely Proliferated: 500,000 to 700,000 have been produced since the 1960’s.

10. MANPADS: Causes for Concern Robust Black Market Robust Black Market Easily Transportable (e.g., in golf bag) Easily Transportable (e.g., in golf bag) 25- 35 pounds and are 4-5 feet in length No foolproof or comprehensive countermeasures No foolproof or comprehensive countermeasures Three main types: Three main types: Infrared Infrared Laser-riders Laser-riders Command Line of Sight (CLOS) Command Line of Sight (CLOS)

11. Russian Arms Manufacturer KBM Website

12. Previous Use of MANPADS  Large and Slower Moving Commercial Aircraft are Easy Targets. 25 documented instances of use of weapons against commercial aircraft, resulting in close to 1000 deaths. 25 documented instances of use of weapons against commercial aircraft, resulting in close to 1000 deaths.  Very Effective in Combat Zones. Using Stingers, Mujahideen rebels reportedly scored 269 aircraft kills out of the 340 heat-seeking missiles fired against Soviets Using Stingers, Mujahideen rebels reportedly scored 269 aircraft kills out of the 340 heat-seeking missiles fired against Soviets  No Documented Use in the US

13. 2003 Baghdad, Iraq Airport Attack on DHL Cargo Airliner

14. Possible Counter-Measures for MANPADS & Other Threats Reduce Attack Susceptibility  Pyrotechnic devices, Infrared (DIRCM)  Airport perimeter control, Security measures  “Controllable Enabling” of MANPADS weapons  Change in flight tactics (takeoff, landing)  Non-reflective/anti-infrared paints, gels  Designated “hardened” emergency airports Increasing Survivability: Attack and/or Safety Malfunction

15. Survivability Measures Can Provide Dual Benefits for Civil Aviation Threats Terror Attack and/or “Natural” Safety Malfunctions  Strengthening Airframe (Explosive decompression)  Key System Redundancies, isolating flight control linkages (new)  Fire Reduction Systems (Flight 800-type disaster?)  Cockpit Armor (increase survival in crash?)  Pilot Emergency Flying Training

16. Airline Industry Threat Susceptibility & Countermeasures Counter- measure Infra- red Laser Beam CLOSRPG Sniper Rifle Mach Gun Mortar FlaresX DIRCMX Anti-IR paint X Controllable Enabling XXX Flight Tactics XXXXXXX Emergency Airports XXXXXXX Airport Perimeter ???XXXX MANPADS Air AttackAir or Ground Only Ground

17. Airline Industry Threats Vs. Survivability Countermeasures Counter- measure Infra- red Laser Beam CLOSRPG Sniper Rifle Mach Gun Mortar Airframe Improvements XXXX??? Flight Control Links Isolated XXXXXX Fire Suppression Systems XXXXXXX Cockpit Armor XXXXXXX Emergency Flight Training XXXXXX MANPADS Air AttackAir or Ground Only Ground

18. Biological Security : Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Disease Threats

19. Critical Threat Variables: Biological Weapons Attacks Sidell at al., Janes Chem-Bio Handbook, 2nd ed. Agent Dispersal Method Delivery System Environmental Conditions Keys to Effective Bioweapons Attack

20. Critical Threat Variables: Naturally Occurring Disease Outbreaks Pathogen Transmission Method Delivery Mechanism Environmental Conditions Keys to Naturally Occurring Outbreak

21. Psychological Variables Related to Public Risk Perception: Smallpox vs. Anthrax vs. HPAI/Flu Panic Increase? SMALLPOX ANTHRAX BIRD FLU Highly Contagious X ? X ? X ? Large # Cases X ? X ? X ? X ? X ? Belief Not Curable X ? X High Mortality X ? X ? X ? X ? X ? No Drugs, Vaccines (no real treatment*) (no real X vaccine*) Own Doctors Don’t Know/Afraid X ? X ? X ? X ? X ?

22. Draft Model Critical Decisions Must be Made Within Complex Threat Environments

23. Conclusions Risk Analysis Modeling must simultaneously account for a plethora of possible threats Risk Analysis Modeling must simultaneously account for a plethora of possible threats Benefit-Cost calculations will improve with multiple-purpose, dual-benefit countermeasures to reduce risk(s) Benefit-Cost calculations will improve with multiple-purpose, dual-benefit countermeasures to reduce risk(s) Threats Analysis in many scenarios will include Psychological variables and Public as well as Expert Risk Assessments Threats Analysis in many scenarios will include Psychological variables and Public as well as Expert Risk Assessments Terrorists and Nature both adapt to “the best laid plans,” and Risks thus are dynamic Terrorists and Nature both adapt to “the best laid plans,” and Risks thus are dynamic