1. Neefektivní mechanismus přijímacích řízení v České republice DANIEL MÜNICH Testováním ke kvalitě vzdělávání? Scio, 22. května, 2015, Praha

2. Rok 2005: Jedna přihláška na střední školu "Most children who had self-esteem and applied to schools they wanted made good choice. Nine out of ten children got admitted to school they have applied to. According to the analysis of the ministry, admission chances of children are not lowered by the mechanism and ministry is not preparing any reform.„ MF Dnes daily newspaper, September 22, 2005 in article "Změny v přijímačkách nebudou" [Admission scheme will not change].

3. Rok 2005: Jedna přihláška na střední školu "The rule of one application in the first round is stressful especially for parents. The major problem is that parents are not sure which schools will still have open slots in the second round for the case their child would fail in the first round, ….„ MF Dnes daily newspaper, November 28, 2005 in article "Strašák jedné přihlášky na SŠ zůstal i letos" [The nightmare of one application for upper-secondary school remained].

4. Non-market allocation of scarce resources & Mechanism Design

5. School Admission Typology (pupil’s preferences, schools’ priorities)

6. School Admission Mechanisms (Lottery, Dictatorship, Gale-Shappley, Top-trading-cycles)

7. Properties of matching justified envy pareto efficiency, strategy proofness

8. Matching Properties Justified envy: when student i prefers school s to her actual assignment while student j assigned to school s has lower priority at this school than student I Pairwise stability: elimination of all cases of justified envy in the final matching Strategy-proofness: if no applicant is misrepresenting her preferences Efficiency: if the resulting matching is Pareto-efficient, i.e. if no student can be made better off without making some other student worse off

9. None of the mechanisms has all the desirable properties, but the GS and the TTC have two out of three Mechanism Gale-Shapley (GS) mech. Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism The Boston mechanism The Czech mechanism Application Matching of medical interns to hospitals in the US From 2006 used instead of the Boston mechanism in the Boston area Matching of students to high schools in the NY area Matching of students to high schools in the Boston area until 2005 Matching of students to upper- secondary schools in the Czech Republic Strategy proof Pareto efficient Pair-wise stable    

10. One application in the CR = Ability Based Decentralized Admission = ABDA mechanism

11. SIMULACE

12. 4 schools Qualities: Q 1 >Q 2 >Q 3 >Q 4 >0 Capacities: C 1, C 2, C 3, C 4 C = C 1 + C 2 + C 3 + C 4 N = C= 1000 school applicants A i = A i + ε i Perceived and true qualification, perception error Objective function Π ij = Q j A i + ω ij {

13. Population of applicants Incomplete and imperfect information

14. Nash equilibrium strategy profile (NESP) strategy profile such that ex-ante each applicant prefers her current choice given choices of all others We compare resulting matching CZ vs. GS mechamism

15. Distribution of Students’ Qualifications Across Schools

16. True and Revealed School Preferences Across Students in the Czech Mechanism

17. True and Revealed Demand and School Capacities in The Czech Mechanism

18. Impact of Shifting Capacity from the Low to High Quality School on the Revealed Demand (150  499)

19. The Impact of Changing Perception Error Ratio on the Incidence of Preference Misrepresentation (Proportions of applicants admitted in the 1st round) (Proportions of applicants to truly preferred school) (Proportion of admitted to the same school) (Proportion of applicants to the same school) Czech mechanism Compare CZ and GS perception error ratio = r =   / 

20. The Impact of Changing Perception Error Ratio on the Misrepresentation of School Quality Demanded (Revealed/True quality demanded; pupils in quintiles of their true qualifications)

21. The Impact of Changing Perception Error Ratio on the Revealed / True Demand at Individual Schools

22. Policy implications Opodstatněná závist Stress Strategizování a výsledek přijetí – role informací a informovanosti – vliv sociálního zázemí Neefektivní alokace talentů Neefektivní řízení systému a konkurence

23. Rok 2005: Jedna přihláška na střední školu "Most children who had self-esteem and applied to schools they wanted made good choice. Nine out of ten children got admitted to school they have applied to. According to the analysis of the ministry, admission chances of children are not lowered by the mechanism and ministry is not preparing any reform.„ MF Dnes daily newspaper, September 22, 2005 in article "Změny v přijímačkách nebudou" [Admission scheme will not change].

24. .