1. Air Cargo Actors and WMD Proliferation EU threat - EU solutions Draft Presentation Centre de Conférences Internationales Paris, 16 July 2008 Counter-Illicit Trafficking Mechanism Assessment Project (CIT-MAP), SIPRI

2. “Some air cargo entities, straddling a grey market sector soliciting licit and illicit goods deliveries have garnered a reputation in parts of the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe and South West Asia for having a “no questions asked” policy.... [they] leave themselves open to exploitation by extremist groups....the practices employed by a number of air cargo entities could provide avenues for schemes involving the airborne delivery of WMD-type devices or substances consisting of nuclear, biological or chemical components.”

3. Air Cargo entities and WMD: two threats Assist the process of proliferation through the transportation of dual use technology, equipment and personnel. Used as a delivery platform or vehicle for a WMD-type device to facilitate an extreme event

4. Air Koryo aircraft have been used to smuggle weapons, cigarettes and other commodities In 1998 Air Koryo aircraft were used to fly technology, equipment and personnel from and to North Korea and Pakistan as part of a fissile material/ballistic missile arrangement Air Koryo Ilyushin 76, Source: Airliners.net, Air Transport Data Base (ATDB)

5. Air cargo transit hubs include those located in United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Libya, Central Asian states, Russian Federation and Ukraine

6. Air cargo network structures a result of globalisation State deregulation of administrative and legal barriers to international trade Air cargo networks involved in illicit flows have taken advantage of financial deregulation and a lack of inter- governmental monitoring They operate numerous front companies and use different off-shore locations and weak states to channel funds and base assets.

7. A non-governmental air cargo network: partial view Air Tomisko Jet Line International Aerolift GST Aero Aerocom Artic Group Asterias Pecotox Air Multiple companies in DRC, Congo Aeronord

8. EU solutions EU solutions based around the enforcement of regulations and information-sharing between member states and neighbouring states EU technical assistance missions, political dialogue and air safety regulation enforcement and blacklisting has achieved results EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) circulates watch list of air cargo companies Information-sharing remains in its early stages. Priority and resources could be given to focused information-sharing mechanisms between EU and certain states Prioritisation and resources would serve EU Security Strategy and a range of political instruments and actions associated with combating illicit flows