1. Developments in Shipboard Survival Craft and Life Saving Appliances
Abdul Khalique
Principal Lecturer
Maritime and Offshore Safety
Joughin, R. W.
Deputy Director &
Head of Maritime Training
Gunter, J.
Senior Lecturer
Maritime and Offshore Safety

2. Developments?
At 1145 on September 13, the crew of the BP-operated tanker, British Cormorant was carrying out a drill with the rescue boat when one of the lines snapped injuring three crewmen on the ship and causing the rescue boat to capsize which deposited the six crewmen into the water.
The Coastguard rescue helicopter from Lee on Solent was scrambled and recovered six crewmen from the water and landed them at Bembridge on the Isle of Wight.  The helicopter then recovered a crewman to Queen Alexandra Hospital, Portsmouth with suspected spinal injuries from the ship.
The helicopter has undertaken a further visit to the ship and evacuated a further crewman to hospital.
British Cormorant FRB
The Bembridge RNLI lifeboat was requested to launch to recover the ship’s rescue boat, which has now been recovered for inspection.
The British Cormorant is at anchor at the Nab anchorage waiting to berth to discharge it’s cargo.
Lucy Tanner, Watch Manager, Solent Coastguard says: “The Coastguard rescue helicopter provided a swift recovery to the six crewmen in the water.
Fortunately all were wearing lifejackets which ensured that they all remained afloat and visible to the aircraft crew.”
Inspectors from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Marine accident Investigation Branch are now onboard the vessel to conduct an investigation into what happened.
Australia’s Transport Safety Board is carrying out an investigation into a similar incident which resulted in a fatality aboard LNG carrier British Sapphire, also operated by BP, on 16 May this year.

3. Lifeboat Drill
In June 09, 2009 at around 1400 hrs in calm sea state, AD22 launched its Starboard lifeboat with a crew compliment of 7 persons for a periodic sea trial test. The lifeboat was successfully launched and sailed for 20 minutes. At the conclusion of the test, the lifeboat was re-connected to the davit pendant lines for recovery and stowing. After doing a short load test out of the water, the boat was winched / hoisted by the crew. When the lifeboat was approximately 2 ft from stowing position, the aft pendant hook inadvertently released causing the lifeboat to swing on the foreword pendant, which also released causing the lifeboat to fall in the sea from a height of 65 ft. The investigation to determine the cause of the accidental release in progress. One person been declared dead upon arrival to the hospital, one in critical condition, and five with various injuries.

4. Lifeboats Accidents Jan 94 - Dec 09 (Source: MAIB)
Total
Fall wire failure 3
Hook mechanism failure 4
Launching procedural failure 14
Operator error 17
Other launch system failure 12
Unknown 28

5. Comparison with other accidents*
Deaths
Lifeboat Accidents Total 12
Entering Confined Spaces
Fall Overboard
Fires & Explosions 10
* Lang, J. S. (2001) Review of Lifeboat & Launching Systems’ Accidents, MAIB, UK.
Accident Date:
4/08/2006
Summary:
A gas bottle exploded in the lifeboat of a vessel during the process of charging it up from the Breathing Apparatus Air Compressor.
Incident consequences (potential or actual):
No details available.
Cause of accident or incident:
Activity Location:
Support vessel eg Supply, Standby
Activity Type:
Maintenance
Description:
The master of an 8-year old vessel was very seriously injured as he was in proximity of the lifeboat when a gas bottle exploded whilst it was being charged up with an air compressor. The bottle was quite old with different numbers/dates on it.
Specific Equipment:
Compressed air storage bottles

6. FPDs Current Practices Unsafe Hooks Safe Hooks Simulated Drills
Off-Load Release Gear
On-Load Release Gear
Unsafe Hooks
Safe Hooks
Simulated Drills
In 1980, Norway’s foundering of the Alexander Kielland platform resulted in a loss of 123 lives. Four lifeboats were launched, but only one managed to release from the lowering cables. (A safety device did not allow release until the strain was removed from the cables.) As a consequence of Alexander Kielland incident, concerns related to off-load release gear were raised at IMO which later resulted in the mandatory fitting of on-load release gear to all new lifeboats. The objective was that the lifeboats could then be lowered into water with a capability to release both hooks simultaneously even with significant load on the falls.
However, when the design criteria were developed, a distinction was not made between ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ release gear. In practice, on-load release gear then became divided into two main categories on the basis of principle of operation. These are:
‘Unsafe hooks’ – in which the weight of the boat opens the hook when the release mechanism is activated.
‘Safe Hooks’ – the hook remains closed, even when bearing the weight of a fully laden boat and thus needs to be forced open.
In 2006, MSC made further ‘compulsory’ amendments to SOLAS Chapter III (Life Saving Appliances and Arrangements) to prevent accidents during drills. The significant feature of these amendments included the following recommendations:
For lifeboats lowered by means of fall wires – to carry out a simulated lowering/recovery without having any personnel in the boat and then lowering to the water with a minimum number of personnel.
For free-fall lifeboats – to conduct drills with the minimum number of personnel.
Under these new guidelines, for a typical drill scenario, once an empty davit launched lifeboat is lowered into water, the crew may utilise alternate means (another boat or a ladder) to board the lifeboat, release the hooks and then complete the exercise. Unfortunately, this practice not only results in a lack of confidence in the lifeboats as lifesaving equipment but also acts as a ‘disincentive’ to conduct drills due to more time, equipment and personnel being required.
FPDs
The objective for the use of FPDs is to mitigate the consequences of a lifeboat accident and to include arrangements such as those given below. However each solution has several issues related to it. The three arrangements that are currently in use include:
Locking Pin – Fitted through the side plates and hook of the release gear;
Preventer strops, pennants or chains fitted between the fixed structure on the boat and the falls (bypassing the release hook);
Trial unmanned lowering to ensure that the system operates safely before putting personnel in the boat (only valid for the actual movement of craft as the dynamics are altered when crew embarks the boat)
The issues related to points 1 and 2 above include
Not all manufacturers incorporate a pin arrangement in their design of hook release gear.
According to some manufacturers, retrofitting is not possible, as FPDs are not part of the design that has gone through the approval process. Moreover, any unauthorised modifications to either the lifting appliance or lifeboat by the manufacturer invalidates the approval, thus requiring it to be retested.
The release gear including the FPDs (if fitted), will need to be serviced by the original manufacturer. However, the manufacturer
may have ceased operations;
may not have authorised agents in all parts of the world;
Some manufacturers claim that their design of hook does not require fitting of FPDs owing to the fact that the davit and other ancillary equipment has not been designed and is therefore not tested for the shock loads that may result from activation of the FPD. The counter claim has been that the majority of accidents take place during drills or while performing maintenance on the lifeboats and davits, particularly in smaller ships. Therefore if the equipment was subjected to shock load as a result of a component failure, there is a greater chance that the subsequent damage will not be catastrophic or result in a loss of life since personnel can escape to safety – a situation much better than not having FPDs fitted.
Today, over 80 different types of hook and release systems are available in the world. In some cases, the manufactures have ceased to operate, resulting in the users obtaining locally manufactured parts or having service carried out by local suppliers. Consequently, the required maintenance standards are not fully met and accidents continue to happen. This further aggravates the situation thereby restricting users to rely solely upon their own judgment, due to a lack of direction or guidance for such cases.
FPDs

7. WMA’s FPD Survey FPD Issues Questions
Yes No Q5
Are FPDs fitted to your Lifeboats/Davits?
37%
58%
FPD Issues
Not all manufacturers incorporate a pin arrangement
Retrofitting not possible.
The release gear including the FPDs to be serviced by the original manufacturer, who
may have ceased operations;
may not have authorised agents in all parts of the world;
Today, over 80 different types of hook and release systems are available in the world. In some cases, the manufactures have ceased to operate, resulting in the users obtaining locally manufactured parts or having service carried out by local suppliers. Consequently, the required maintenance standards are not fully met and accidents continue to happen. This further aggravates the situation thereby restricting users to rely solely upon their own judgment, due to a lack of direction or guidance for such cases.
North P & I (2009) Lifeboat Safety – Loss Prevention Briefing. North of England P & I Association. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK.
In 2009, the Warsash Maritime Academy (WMA) conducted a survey on the use of maintenance pennants, FPDs and their maintenance, together with awareness of seafarers about these devices (see Appendix 1). The survey found that 65% use maintenance pennants for securing lifeboats. Only 37% stated that the FPDs were used where as the other 58% did not use any form of FPDs and 5% of the participants did not reply, either because they were not aware of the existence of FPDs or they did not know how to use them. The most prominent of the reasons given for lack of use were that there were no flag state requirements for these to be fitted and that they would slow down the release of lifeboat in the event of an emergency.
Consequently, until proper hook design criteria with a standard for manufacture and timescale for replacement are agreed at IMO, FPDs are vital. To be of value and be accepted as a beneficial interim measure, there is clearly an acute need to raise awareness in their use.
*The replies to Q4 include - Black to black, Yellow to yellow, green in safe and stowed position and red on water, colour coded
** The replies to Q6 include - Painted yellow, hanging off pennants were used, yellow strop with shackles on both ends, Pins (freefall), Chain and Hook
*** The replies to Q7 include - Current procedure safe, not required and would slow down launching, Not fitted to ships served on, No requirements, Passenger tenders weights mean very large equipment required
**** The replies to Q8 include - Could have been labelled. FPD in some form should be made mandatory due to the potential of accidental release. Colour coded lugs. Fall preventers are better for safety but in the case of an emergency they are slower to get off.

8. XXL Lifeboats or Tender Boats
Current Practices
Off-Load Release Gear
XXL Lifeboats or Tender Boats
On-Load Release Gear
Unsafe Hooks
Safe Hooks
Simulated Drills
In 1980, Norway’s foundering of the Alexander Kielland platform resulted in a loss of 123 lives. Four lifeboats were launched, but only one managed to release from the lowering cables. (A safety device did not allow release until the strain was removed from the cables.) As a consequence of Alexander Kielland incident, concerns related to off-load release gear were raised at IMO which later resulted in the mandatory fitting of on-load release gear to all new lifeboats. The objective was that the lifeboats could then be lowered into water with a capability to release both hooks simultaneously even with significant load on the falls.
However, when the design criteria were developed, a distinction was not made between ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ release gear. In practice, on-load release gear then became divided into two main categories on the basis of principle of operation. These are:
‘Unsafe hooks’ – in which the weight of the boat opens the hook when the release mechanism is activated.
‘Safe Hooks’ – the hook remains closed, even when bearing the weight of a fully laden boat and thus needs to be forced open.
In 2006, MSC made further ‘compulsory’ amendments to SOLAS Chapter III (Life Saving Appliances and Arrangements) to prevent accidents during drills. The significant feature of these amendments included the following recommendations:
For lifeboats lowered by means of fall wires – to carry out a simulated lowering/recovery without having any personnel in the boat and then lowering to the water with a minimum number of personnel.
For free-fall lifeboats – to conduct drills with the minimum number of personnel.
Under these new guidelines, for a typical drill scenario, once an empty davit launched lifeboat is lowered into water, the crew may utilise alternate means (another boat or a ladder) to board the lifeboat, release the hooks and then complete the exercise. Unfortunately, this practice not only results in a lack of confidence in the lifeboats as lifesaving equipment but also acts as a ‘disincentive’ to conduct drills due to more time, equipment and personnel being required.
FPDs
The objective for the use of FPDs is to mitigate the consequences of a lifeboat accident and to include arrangements such as those given below. However each solution has several issues related to it. The three arrangements that are currently in use include:
Locking Pin – Fitted through the side plates and hook of the release gear;
Preventer strops, pennants or chains fitted between the fixed structure on the boat and the falls (bypassing the release hook);
Trial unmanned lowering to ensure that the system operates safely before putting personnel in the boat (only valid for the actual movement of craft as the dynamics are altered when crew embarks the boat)
The issues related to points 1 and 2 above include
Not all manufacturers incorporate a pin arrangement in their design of hook release gear.
According to some manufacturers, retrofitting is not possible, as FPDs are not part of the design that has gone through the approval process. Moreover, any unauthorised modifications to either the lifting appliance or lifeboat by the manufacturer invalidates the approval, thus requiring it to be retested.
The release gear including the FPDs (if fitted), will need to be serviced by the original manufacturer. However, the manufacturer
may have ceased operations;
may not have authorised agents in all parts of the world;
Some manufacturers claim that their design of hook does not require fitting of FPDs owing to the fact that the davit and other ancillary equipment has not been designed and is therefore not tested for the shock loads that may result from activation of the FPD. The counter claim has been that the majority of accidents take place during drills or while performing maintenance on the lifeboats and davits, particularly in smaller ships. Therefore if the equipment was subjected to shock load as a result of a component failure, there is a greater chance that the subsequent damage will not be catastrophic or result in a loss of life since personnel can escape to safety – a situation much better than not having FPDs fitted.
Today, over 80 different types of hook and release systems are available in the world. In some cases, the manufactures have ceased to operate, resulting in the users obtaining locally manufactured parts or having service carried out by local suppliers. Consequently, the required maintenance standards are not fully met and accidents continue to happen. This further aggravates the situation thereby restricting users to rely solely upon their own judgment, due to a lack of direction or guidance for such cases.
FPDs

9. New Passenger Ship Legislation
Prescriptive rules with a goal-setting regime that emphasised the use of ‘safety cases’
SAFEDOR Project – Enhance Safety through ‘innovation’
Oasis of the Seas – built on ‘Risk Based Design’ - it would have required 44 lifeboats with 150 person capacity
Titanic
Factors such as larger vessel capacities, the presence of disabled and elderly passengers and itineraries that now include sailing into remote regions of the world, have all combined to emphasise the need to protect the ship and its occupants for as long as possible until it can reach the safety of a port, or at least guarantee the presence nearby of rescuers in the event of an abandonment. Consequently, a lot of work has been carried out at IMO and elsewhere in recent years on improving vessel survivability and habitability and these have culminated in the ‘Safe Return to Port Regulations’. These came into force on 1 July 2010 for passenger ships of 120m or more in length, built on or after that date and having three or more main vertical fire zones. Under these regulations, in the case of flooding of any single watertight compartment, a vessel must be capable of returning to port under its own propulsion. If more than one compartment is flooded, the safe evacuation of the vessel will be required.
Under new passenger ship legislation, the Safe Return to Port Regulations require a number of essential systems to remain operational for a period of at least 3 hours in order to ensure an orderly evacuation. Performance standards for these systems include items such as internal and external communications, fire main and bilge pumping systems and emergency power.
With respect to an evacuation period, current SOLAS Regulations state that all survival craft on passenger vessels must be capable of being launched within a period of 30 minutes from the time that the abandon ship signal is given (Chapter III Regulation ), but as Mr W A O’Neill pointed out in a speech in 2000, “being ‘capable of being launched’ and actually removing the people are two different things” and the extended preparation time mentioned in the previous paragraph is a welcome addition to safety.
We have already seen how the size of the ‘Titanic’ made the application of the prescriptive lifesaving appliance rules in force at the time totally inappropriate and this is a good example of a case where regulations failed to keep pace with technological changes in the shipping industry. Ironically, the same thing could have occurred aboard the ‘Oasis of the Seas’ had the present prescriptive limit of 150 persons per lifeboat been applied. In this case, the ship would have had to be supplied with about 44 lifeboats and davits, which would clearly have been impracticable.

10. Future Developments Norsafe’s ‘Rescube’ - Capacity up to 300 persons
Code of Practice for the Evaluation, Testing and Acceptance of Prototype Novel LSA & Arrangements
Alternative design and arrangements for SOLAS Chapters II-1 and III (MSC.1/Circ.1212)
Norsafe’s ‘Rescube’ - capacity up to 330 persons - Typical construction size 20 x 7 x 6 m and estimated weight is approx 70t when fully loaded.
How it works : The Rescube is a lifeboat with three separate cubes reside that can rotate. Each cube has a capacity of 110 passengers. Each Rescube could be boarded from six different levels. Passengers would first enter the 'safe area' that would span these levels and they would therefore not be exposed to the open deck. They could then either be held in the safe area or asked to board the Rescube, where all passengers would be allocated a "comfortable" seat.
If a decision were made to evacuate the cruise ship, the free fall locks would be released and the Rescube would slide into a 35[degrees] position. When the boat is released into this position, the cube inside rotates so that the seats will be in a correct free fall position (leaning back slightly).
Another decision would then be needed to release the Rescube from the side of the cruise ship. The Rescube would then fall to the water--a distance of 10-15m on passenger vessels as opposed to 38m on offshore platforms--when it will go underwater completely before surfacing. Once it has surfaced it has diesel electric propulsion to manoeuvre it away from the cruise ship in distress.
Deck space galore: A major problem with cruise ships has always been the need to maximise on deck space therefore making the installation of enough conventional free fall lifeboats to accommodate all passengers a non starter. However, as the Rescube is able to carry 330 passengers things start to look more feasible, as well as having the combined advantage of being integrated into the side of the ship. "The yard just needs to provide a suitable slot with electrical power," he explained. "The slot needs to be behind a safe area (ie a firewall). We would then place the Rescube into the slot.
Current progress: The Rescube is still very much in the design stage, as "we are currently building 1:4 scale models, which are five metres in size. This provides an opportunity to see how the locks and cubes are working," explained Olsen. However he went on to say that there has already been a lot of interest from the IMO, major yards and shipowners.

11. Options for Lifeboat Release Gear
Fail to Safe
Float Free Capability of Lifeboats
Standardisation of Lifeboat Equipment and Design

12. Amendments to the LSA Code - Issues
Resistance or lack of support
Manufacturing time, approval from administrations, classification societies.
Delays in fitting to the ships
Training providers
Whilst these amendments are in draft phase and subject to discussion, a number of issues have already been discussed in relation to new design of hooks. These include:
Resistance or lack of support due to allegations of possible bias towards some manufacturers from others whose existing designs of release gear do not meet the new criteria;
Even if the design criteria is finalised at IMO, it may still require considerable time for the manufacturers to start production of new release gear which, in turn will require approval from administrations or classification societies. Finally, the ship operators may not be able to fit it instantly, resulting in another spell of delay.
The restrictions in b) above will also apply to the training providers training seafarers on Proficiency in Survival Craft and Rescue Boat courses as well as training for those already serving aboard ships.

13. Conclusions Means to reduce/eliminate accidents;
Develop new technology that will possibly replace lifeboats;
Persuade industry to achieve commonality in LSA;
Devise a set of unambiguous ‘standards’;
Improve the safety culture within the seafaring community.
Find ways and means to reduce and eliminate accidents involving the existing equipment;
Develop new technology that will possibly replace lifeboats altogether by suitable equivalent alternatives or if there are no alternatives, at least make the launching of existing survival craft - risk free;
Persuade industry and manufacturing companies to work together to improve safety and to achieve some degree of commonality in LSA and related safety equipment;
Devise a set of unambiguous ‘standards’ for equipment manufacturers as well as for operators to avoid a non-uniform approach leading to confusion;
Improve the safety culture within the seafaring community to encompass mandatory & satisfactory completion of IMO prescribed drills thereby boosting seafarer confidence in all aspects of equipment use.

14. Thank you!
Questions

15. Future Developments
Code of Practice for the Evaluation, Testing and Acceptance of Prototype Novel LSA & Arrangements
Alternative design and arrangements for SOLAS Chapters II-1 and III (MSC.1/Circ.1212)
Norsafe’s ‘Rescube’ - capacity up to 300 persons
Typical construction size 20 x 7 x 6 m and estimated weight is approx 70t when fully loaded.
Norsafe is currently testing a new idea that it hopes will be a new way of thinking about evacuation. The idea has been under discussion for five years now and is being formulated in response to IMO and industry concerns about evacuating vessels with as many as 4,000 passengers onboard.
The Rescube is a free-fall, totally enclosed lifeboat with a maximum capacity of 330 passengers and is bigger in weight and dimensions than other lifeboats. "Up until now there have been no free-fall lifeboats on passenger ships," said Thom Olsen from Norsafe, project manager for the Rescube, "and therefore we hope it will be a new way of thinking."
Olsen explained to SASI that the product is not only being designed with evacuation in mind, but also to provide a safe area whilst the crew of the vessel is fighting for control. According to Olsen the IMO has expressed an interest in forming regulations that would stipulate that 'safe areas' must be present onboard cruise ships. 'Safe areas' differ from already existing 'muster areas'--normally a canteen or similar which act as a designated meeting point--in that it must be a room protecting those within it from possible hazards and cannot be used for any other purpose but to act as a safe haven. Therefore it must be a strong room behind firewalls.
With regards to the Rescube, Norsafe is "trying to combine safety areas, with the rescue capsule," explained Olsen. He went on to explain that, should an incident occur, passengers could evacuate to a safe area behind a firewall and into the boarding area for the Rescubes, while the crew fought for control of the vessel. He anticipated that 90% of the time passengers would simply be held in this safe area and that it would not be necessary to evacuate the cruise ship, but pointed out that, "If the situation became more critical, within a couple of minutes you could be on the sea."
How it works
The Rescube is a lifeboat with three separate cubes reside that can rotate. Each cube has a capacity of 110 passengers. Olsen explained that smaller numbers are far easier to control and that there would be a member of the crew in each cube.
Each Rescube could be boarded from six different levels. Passengers would first enter the 'safe area' that would span these levels and they would therefore not be exposed to the open deck. They could then either be held in the safe area or asked to board the Rescube, where all passengers would be allocated a "comfortable" seat.
If a decision were made to evacuate the cruise ship, the free fall locks would be released and the Rescube would slide into a 35[degrees] position. When the boat is released into this position, the cube inside rotates so that the seats will be in a correct free fall position (leaning back slightly).
Another decision would then be needed to release the Rescube from the side of the cruise ship. The Rescube would then fall to the water--a distance of 10-15m on passenger vessels as opposed to 38m on offshore platforms--when it will go underwater completely before surfacing. Once it has surfaced it has diesel electric propulsion to manoeuvre it away from the cruise ship in distress.
Deck space galore: A major problem with cruise ships has always been the need to maximise on deck space therefore making the installation of enough conventional free fall lifeboats to accommodate all passengers a non starter. However, as the Rescube is able to carry 330 passengers things start to look more feasible, as well as having the combined advantage of being integrated into the side of the ship. "The yard just needs to provide a suitable slot with electrical power," he explained. "The slot needs to be behind a safe area (ie a firewall). We would then place the Rescube into the slot." According to Olsen, the Rescube could be made bigger or smaller depending on the dimensions of the vessel and the number of passengers and crew that would needed to be accommodated.
Current progress: The Rescube is still very much in the design stage, as "we are currently building 1:4 scale models, which are five metres in size. This provides an opportunity to see how the locks and cubes are working," explained Olsen. However he went on to say that there has already been a lot of interest from the IMO, major yards and shipowners.

16. 7.2 NORSAFE RESCUBE
In some respects, particularly regarding the potentially large numbers involved, the risks associated with evacuating an offshore installation are similar to those encountered in abandoning cruise ships or ferries. Although originally designed for the latter, the Norsafe Rescube28 is said to offer a ‘dry shod’ evacuation system that is accessible from a number of decks simultaneously, has a large capacity and is capable of operating/launching quickly.
While stowed the craft is designed to lie vertically within recesses in a vessel’s topsides with access provided to the interior of several decks. Once loaded the craft is partially launched by gravity davit until the correct attitude is achieved and thereafter free-falls to the water.
It is not known whether variants of the system are being designed for use offshore though it is conceivable that such a system may be positioned against the exterior of a temporary safe refuge (TSR) and be particularly useful where the TSR covers more than one deck.

19. Lifeboat Drill

20. Length x Breadth (m) TB/LB
XXL Life/Tender boats
Manufacturer
Length x Breadth (m)
Capacity
TB/LB
Fassmer, Germany
7.60 x 2.40
18/27
11.65 x 4.55
121/150
PESBO, Spain
10.68 x 3.92
70/110
12.40 x 4.90
120/150
Umoe-Schat Harding, Noway
11.92 x 4.70
16.7 x 5.6m
370 (Oasis of the Seas)