1. The SKB Spent Fuel Disposal Project – License Application
Olle Olsson
©SKB

2. Nuclear Sweden 10 (12) operating reactor units at 3 sites
~45 % electricity
12,000 tonnes of spent fuel
SFR; Final Repository for Short- lived Radioactive Waste
Clab; Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel
©SKB

3. Authorities and legislation
The Government
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
The Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste
Municipality
Environment Court
The Planning and Building Act
The Swedish Environment Code
The Nuclear Activities Act
The Financing Act
The Radiation Protection Act
©SKB

4. Funding of nuclear waste management in Sweden
Owners
Financing
SEK per kWh of nuclear electricity
Approx 43 billion SEK in 2010
Responsibility of the reactor owners Reviewed by SSM
©SKB

5. 40 years of development
Encapsulation plant and deep repository
Detailed characterization, repository construction
2011
Application to build a repository
Site investigations
2006
Application to build an encapsulation plant
2000
Feasibility studies
Canister Laboratory
Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory
1993
Methodology development
SFR in operation
Clab in operation
The government approves KBS-3 for the start-up of new reactors
The Nuclear Fuel Safety (KBS) Project starts
1984
m/s Sigyn in operation
1976
©SKB

6. The Swedish system Healthcare, industry and research
Final repository for short-lived radioactive waste
Final repository for spent nuclear fuel
High-level waste
Low and intermediate-level
waste
Nuclear power plant
Central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel and encapsulation facility
©SKB

7. License application submitted March 2011 for
Backfill
Spent Fuel Repository at Forsmark
Rock
Buffer
Canister
Typområden
1977–1985
Översiktsstudier
1990-tal
Förstudier
1993–2002
Encapsulation plant in Oskarshamn
©SKB

8. SKB is applying
To continue interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and reactor core components. The amount of spent nuclear fuel may reach a maximum of 8000 metric tons (calculated as uranium).
To construct and operate a facility (Clink) to store spent nuclear fuel and core components and for encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel. Capacity of approximately 200 canisters per year.
To construct and operate a facility for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste (construction material in the fuel assemblies)
Final disposal of the spent fuel that is currently stored in Clab and
future fuel that will arise from operating the ten reactors that currently have a permit to operate
Final disposal according to the KBS-3 method with vertical placement of the canisters (KBS-3V)
Water operations that are needed to build and operate the facilities
Storage for rock aggregate
©SKB

9. The legal framework Two laws The Environmental Code
The Nuclear Activities Act
Two nuclear facilities at two different sites
Two different Environmental courts
Submitted to the court in Stockholm
Evaluation of if the proposed facilities and activities meet the stated aims and are in accordance with legal requirements
©SKB

10. Strategic crossroads
A single coherent Environmental Code application for the entire final repository system that is processed at a single environmental court
The applications, 'top documentation', will offer a comprehensive − and not merely well-informed − intelligible description and overview of the operations being applied for and comprehensive argumentation for satisfying the requirements
A common EIA for the entire final repository system for all three applications
The safety reports will also be included in the Environmental Code application to the Environmental Court
Particularly central issues justify detailed background documentation and separate appendices for
Choice of method
Site selection
©SKB

11. The Nuclear Fuel Project and other work within SKB
Research
Technology development
Site investigations and modelling
Facility project planning
Final repository
Encapsulation facility
Environmental Impact Assessments
Dialogue and consultation
Safety analysis
Application documentation
©SKB

12. Stakeholder involvement Going from protests to dialogue
©SKB

13. Siting studies 1977-2009 ”Geology and society”3 4
Östhammar 5 6 7 8
Oskarshamn
Possible
feasible
bedrock
Study areas
1977–1985
Regional studies
1990s
Feasibility studies 1993–2002
Site investigations 2002–2009
©SKB

14. 3rd of June 2009 - SKB selects Forsmark for the repository for spent nuclear fuel
Photo composition of a repository for spent nuclear fuel at Forsmark
Main reason for selection of Forsmark:
Considerably better conditions for long term safety of a repository
©SKB

15. SKB has selected the KBS-3 method
Primary safety function: Complete containment
Secondary safety function: Retardation
©SKB

16. KBS-3-method development and verification SKB full-scale laboratories
Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory,
in operation since 1996
Canister Laboratory, in operation since 1998
Bentonite Laboratory, in operation since 2007
©SKB

17. Purposes of the SR-Site project
Role of SR-Site report in licence application:
To demonstrate that a KBS-3 repository at the Forsmark site is safe in the long term.
The main purposes of the SR-Site project were
To assess the safety, as defined in applicable Swedish regulations, of the proposed KBS-3 repository at Forsmark;
To provide feedback to design development, to SKB’s R&D programme, to detailed site investigations and to future safety assessment projects.
©SKB

18. General development of the reference evolution
Initial “transient” caused by excavation of host rock and construction and presence of repository.
Transients can be anything from years to thousands of years
Long-term evolution characterised by changes induced by the changing external conditions.
©SKB

19. General outcome of the analysis of the reference evolution
The outcome of the analysis of the reference evolution implies that
The vast majority of the 6,000 deposition positions will experience favorable mechanical, hydrogeological and chemical conditions throughout the one million year assessment period.
As a consequence, the vast majority of the 6,000 canisters are expected to maintain their containment capacity throughout the assessment period
However, canister failures cannot be entirely ruled out due to
Enhanced corrosion in deposition positions where advective conditions prevail after buffer loss due to erosion
Earthquake induced secondary shear movements in fractures intersecting deposition holes
Both are low probability phenomena
©SKB

20. Risk curves for the two contributing scenarios
Central conclusion A KBS-3 repository that fulfils long-term safety requirements can be built at the Forsmark site
The calculated risk for a final repository at Forsmark is below the regulatory risk criterion with a margin, even in a million year time perspective.
©SKB

21. Confidence in the conclusions in SR-Site
The reliance of the KBS-3 repository on
a stable and favourable geological environment at repository depth - mechanical stability, low groundwater flow rates and favourable groundwater composition, and
the use of sufficiently durable materials (copper and bentonite clay) for the engineered barriers
The understanding of the phenomena that affect long-term safety, resulting in a mature knowledge base
The understanding of the characteristics of the site through several years of surface-based investigations of the conditions at depth
The detailed specifications of the engineered parts of the repository and the demonstration of how components fulfilling the specifications are produced in a quality assured manner
©SKB

22. Licensing 2011-2015 (?) Five ”yes” are needed
The municipality of Oskarshamn
The Government
The municipality of Östhammar
The Environmental Court
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
Scientific community, environmentalists and other opinion formers
©SKB

23. From License application to deposition of canisters
Government
approval
Permit
Construction
Permit
Test operation
Permit
Operation
~15 years
Application
A-PSAR
PSAR
SAR 1
SAR 2
©SKB

24. The Nuclear Fuel programme
Licensing process
Start construction
Start operation
Safety Report
PSAR
SAR
Technology development
Industrialized design
Production system
Quality control system
Construction projects
Spent fuel repository
Encapsulation plant
2 y after construction initiation
4 years …
6 years…
©SKB

25. Challenges To manage the licensing process
To move from RD&D to industrialization
To further strengthen the scientific basis for the safety case
To keep and develop the public confidence
©SKB 25