1. IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Industrial Radiography Setting the Scene Richard van Sonsbeek HSQE Manager Applus RTD richard.vansonsbeek@applusrtd.com

2. IAEA Industrial Radiography A method of Non- Destructive Testing Radiation sources: Radioactive sources X-ray tubes Linear accelerators Location: Shielded enclosures / Radiation Bunkers In the field / customer site Onshore / offshore

3. IAEA Industries that apply RT / NDT Petrochemical Plants Transport Pipelines Power Generation Offshore industries Aerospace industries Military defense Marine industries Waste Management Automotive industries Manufacturing industries Transport industries | 3

4. IAEA Classification of “exposure devices” according to their mobility Class P Portable exposure container, designed to be carried by one or more persons. The mass of a Class P container does not exceed 50 kg. Class M Mobile, but not portable, exposure container designed to be moved easily by a suitable means provided for the purpose, for example a trolley. Class F Fixed, installed exposure container or one with mobility restricted to the confines of a defined working location, such as a shielded enclosure.

5. IAEA Categorization of “exposure devices” according to the way the source is exposed Category I The source is not removed from the exposure container for an exposure. The source is stored at the center of a block of shielding material. A portion of the shielding can be removed, or the shielding or source is moved to expose the source. Category II The source assembly is mechanically projected out of the container and travels along a guide tube projection sheath to the exposure head. The projection is hand or motor driven by the radiographer. The source assembly is usually moved by a cable.

6. IAEA Class P, Category I Exposure Device

7. IAEA Category II Exposure Device

8. IAEA Class P, Category II Exposure Device

9. IAEA Class M, Category II Exposure Device

10. IAEA Gamma Radiography Exposure Device

11. IAEA Relevant Standards ISO 3999 Radiation protection - Apparatus for industrial gamma radiography - Specifications for performance, design and tests IAEA-SSR-6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material ISO 2919 Radiation protection – Sealed radioactive sources – General requirements and classification IAEA SSG-11 SSG-11: Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography

12. IAEA Radioactive sources – Energy and Thickness

13. IAEA Radioactive Sources – Activities and Dose Rates

14. IAEA X-ray Radiography Equipment Typical specification: 300 kVp 6 mA Dosisrate (@ 1 m) 6 tot 20 Sv/h

15. IAEA X-ray crawler

16. IAEA Linear Accelerator WCNDT Durban 20 April 201216

17. Digital Radiography Radiographic image = x-ray image (film photography) RTR = Real Time Radiography = direct x-ray image | 17

18. RTD RAYSCAN Characteristics:  Real time  No crawler  Collimated beam  Lead shielded system | 18 High radiation safety!

19. Spoolbase Production Facility | 19

20. Landline | 20

21. IAEA Collimators

22. IAEA Diaphrams

23. IAEA Lead slabs

24. IAEA Site Radiography – Gamma Radiography Typical Stages during Normal Exposure 1. Storage of gamma source in storage facility 2. Movement of gamma source from store to vehicle 3. Transport of gamma source in vehicle to field location / client site 4. Movement of gamma source from vehicle to work site 5. Exposure(s) (after set up of equipment a) Wind-out (gamma source in guide tube)  Highest Dose Rate b) Exposure (gamma source in collimator) c) Wind-in (gamma source in guide tube)  Highest Dose Rate 6. Movement of gamma source from work site to vehicle 7. Transport of gamma source in vehicle to store 8. Movement of gamma source from vehicle to store 9. Go to 1. | 24

25. IAEA When using databases on individual doses, be aware that in general we are comparing… ApplesPears | 25 ≠ with

26. IAEA Differences in average dose per person Relatively high(er) doseRelatively low(er) dose Single disciplinary technicians (RT)Multi disciplinary technicians (RT, UT,.) Only RT technicians includedNon RT technicians included High workload (# films, # hours)Low workload (# films, # hours) “Mobile” radiography (less shielding)“Fixed” Radiography (more shielding) Thick objects testedThin objects tested High source strengthLow source strength High production requirementLow production requirement Exposure due to accidentNormal exposure | 26

27. IAEA Controlled Area 27

28. IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency A Snapshot of Current Practice of Occupational Radiation Protection in Industrial Radiography WGIR – ISEMIR Richard VAN SONSBEEK 1, John C. LE HERON 2, Gonzague ABELA 3, Francisco C.A. DA SILVA 4, Razak HAMZAH 5, Thomas A. LEVEY 6, Matthias PURSCHKE 7, Kamal SAHAIMI 8, Christian LEFAURE 9 1 Applus RTD; e-mail: richard.vansonsbeek@applusrtd.com 2 International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria; e-mail: J.Le.heron@iaea.org 3 EDF; Saint Denis, France; e-mail: gonzague.abela@edf.fr 4 Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; e-mail: dasilva@ird.gov.br 5 Malaysia Nuclear Agency; Kajang, Malaysia; e-mail: Razak_hamzah@nuclearmalaysia.gov.my 6 Acuren Group Inc.; Edmonton, Canada; e-mail: tlevey@acuren.com 7 German Society for Non-Destructive Testing (DGZfP); Berlin, Germany; e-mail: pm@dgzfp.de 8 CNESTEN, Rabat, Morocco, sahaimi@cnesten.org.ma 9 IAEA consultant; Paris, France; clefaureconsult@free.fr

29. IAEA Background to ISEMIR Information System on Occupational Exposure in Medicine, Industry & Research There are some areas in medicine, industry and research where radiation uses can lead to significant occupational exposures Both in normal operations and in accident situations But detailed information at the operational level is lacking WCNDT Durban 20 April 201229

30. IAEA ISEMIR – the launch January 2009, for an initial 3 year period, to help improve occupational radiation protection in targeted areas 2 Working Groups, initially Interventional Cardiology, commenced Feb 2009 Industrial Radiography, commenced Jan 2010 WCNDT Durban 20 April 201230

31. IAEA 31 Working Group Industrial Radiography (WGIR) From left to right: Christian Lefaure, Francisco Da Silva, Kamal Sahaimi, Gonzague Abela, Richard van Sonsbeek, Matthias Purschke, A. Razak Hamzah, John Le Heron (Thomas Levey is not on the picture) WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

32. IAEA Composition of WGIR NameRegionStakeholder G. AbelaEuropeClient M. PurschkeEuropeNDT Society T. LeveyNorth AmericaOperating Company A. Razak HamzahAsiaTechnical Service Organization K. SahaimiAfricaTraining provider F. Da SilvaLatin AmericaTechnical Service Organization R. Van SonsbeekEuropeOperating Company J. Le HeronScientific SecretaryIAEA C. LefaureConsultantIAEA 32WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

33. IAEA 33 Objectives of our effort Keeping ALARA: 1. the dose due to normal exposure if normal exposure is justified! 2. the risk of exposure due to accidents (risk= chance X consequence of accident) WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

34. IAEA Agreed Mandate To draw an overview picture of the situation concerning occupational exposures and radiation protection of staff in Industrial Radiography (radiographers and other industry and client staff members) all over the world. To identify both good practices and shortcomings and define all types of actions (training, managerial, behavioural…) to be implemented for assisting the industry, clients, and regulatory bodies in avoiding exposures to accidents, and implementing the ALARA principle. To propose recommendations for harmonising monitoring procedures. To set up a system for regularly collecting occupational doses for these individuals and for dissemination of this information. 34WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

35. IAEA 35 WGIR conducted a world-wide survey to gain insight into the current practice of occupational radiation protection in industrial radiography respectively addressed to − Regulatory Bodies (Licensing bodies for radiation protection) − Operating Companies (Licensees) − Industrial Radiographers / Radiography Technicians (“Operators”) WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

36. IAEA 36 Subjects of questionnaires 1. qualifications and training of radiographers in radiation protection, 2. learning from incidents (accidents, near misses, deviations from normal operations), 3. systems and procedures in place for safe operation, 4. emergency preparedness and response, and 5. individual monitoring. The IAEA Specific Safety Guide on Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-11) was used to develop questions WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

37. IAEA Distribution of questionnaires OperatorCompanyRegulatory Body EnglishXXX GermanXX FrenchXX PortugueseXX SpanishXX DutchX RussianXX ChineseXX Questionnaires were translated in various languages Operator and Company questionnaires were distributed via the networks of the WGIR members NDT companies (Inter)national NDT societies Regulatory Body questionnaire was distributed by IAEA 37WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

38. IAEA 38 Responses to the questionnaires Operator Questionnaire Company Questionnaire Regulatory Body (RB) Questionnaire Number of operators Number of companies Number of countries Number of Companies Number of Countries Countries contacted Countries responded RBs contacted RBs responded Africa177374358 8 Asia- Pacific 4934733627133516 Europe1666016281349274927 Latin America 72173194205 5 North America 128332822233 Global4321513195291335514259 WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

39. IAEA Results and discussion For each questionnaire the responses to each item were consolidated in an Excel workbook Responses were statistically analyzed Various hypotheses on correlations between items were tested The following slides contain the main findings from the three questionnaires. 39WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

40. IAEA Qualifications and training of radiographers in radiation protection Initial radiation protection training appears to be well accepted and established 98% of operators had received RP training Refresher training was less well established 70% of RBs required refresher training 80% (60%) of companies offered refresher (practical) RP training Emergency response training is also less established 87% of operators had received emergency response training only 65% of operators had been involved in practical exercises 40WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

41. IAEA Learning from incidents Rate of occurrence of incidents in IR: Level of dissemination of lessons learned appears to be low 40% of NDT companies do not share learning with other organizations 41 Operator responsesCompany responses # per operator per 5 year # per company per 5 year # per operator per 5 year # per company per 5 year Accidents0.044.00.031.1 Near Misses0.16.20.051.8 Deviations0.629.30.051.8 WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

42. IAEA Systems and procedures in place for safe operations Systems and procedures should be in place for protecting the operator and the public Results of compliance inspection are perhaps the best indication of whether such systems and procedures are in place Compliance inspections are performed by NDT companies and regulatory bodies 42WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

43. IAEA Subjects of compliance inspections SubjectCompanyRegulatory Body Proper wearing of passive individual dosimeters95%98% Proper wearing and use of active individual dosimeters93%90% Proper use of survey meters95%96% Proper use of collimators90%88% Proper warning system at the work site93%98% Dose rate at the boundary of the work site within the limits set92%90% Proper use of alarm systems86%96% Proper training and qualifications of radiographers91%100% Operator knowledge of procedures88%96% Pre-operation specific equipment checks82%86% Equipment condition85%98% Emergency preparedness74%96% 43WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

44. IAEA Most common shortcomings Company compliance inspectionsRB compliance inspections 1.No proper use of collimators 2.Dose rate at the boundary of the work site above limits set 3.No proper use of survey meters 4.No pre-operation specific equipment checks being performed 5.Poor operator knowledge of procedures 1.No proper use of survey meters 2.No proper warning system to prevent entry to the work site 3.Poor emergency preparedness 4.No proper use of alarm systems 5.Dose rate at the boundary for the work site not within limits set 44 Results of the shortcomings perhaps reflect a different focus Company perhaps focusing on company procedures Regulatory body may have a focus on public protection WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

45. IAEA Emergency preparedness and response 45 Radiation sources used for industrial radiography purposes have high radiation outputs and are potentially very hazardous It is essential that systems are in place for emergency preparedness and response in particular an emergency plan for incidents with gamma radiography sources WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

46. IAEA Implementation of emergency plans Almost all regulatory bodies (98%) stated that they require NDT companies to have an emergency plan; 95% of NDT companies stated that they had an emergency plan; and over 90% of radiographers stated that their NDT company had an emergency plan for site radiography WCNDT Durban 20 April 201246

47. IAEA Emergency response equipment Only three-quarters of regulatory bodies required NDT companies to have emergency equipment However 90% of NDT companies stated that they had emergency equipment for site radiography primarily long tongs, shielding material, and an emergency or rescue container. WCNDT Durban 20 April 201247

48. IAEA Individual monitoring All RBs required personal monitoring with passive dosimeters 80% of RBs also required active dosimeters With at least audible alarms All Companies provided passive dosimeters 94% provided active dosimeters Almost all with at least audible alarms About two thirds also with visual alarms 48WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

49. IAEA Dose distribution The radiographer data are for 234 radiographers, the NDT company data are for nearly 3500 radiographers, and the regulatory body data are for over 16,000 radiographers Average dose Radiographer data: 3.4 mSv RB data: 2.9 mSv 49WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

50. IAEA Dose versus workload No correlation found Radiation protection in industrial radiography is not being effectively optimized Mean occupational dose per radiographic exposure 4.8 ± 2.3 μSv for all operators 2.9 ± 1.2 μSv for operators with workload > 100 exposures No effect on dose per exposure found with: level of NDT training type of sources being used, activity of sources, use of collimation, or incidence of events But limited data numbers 50WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

51. IAEA Conclusions (1 of 3) Initial radiation protection training for radiographers is reasonably well established, but there is room for improvement especially with respect to refresher training and practical emergency response training The frequency of occurrence of incidents (accidents, near missed and deviations) is not trivial, and methods such as better incident reporting, analysis, feedback and sharing lessons learned need to be better utilized 51WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

52. IAEA Conclusions (2 of 3) Collimators and diaphragms are not being used as often as they should be Survey meters are not as widely available as they should be Individual monitoring, as reported, is well established, with passive and, usually, active dosimeters. The establishment and use of investigation levels needs to be improve Warning systems to prevent entry to the work area during site radiography were not always as effective as desired. Better communication at the site is indicated 52WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

53. IAEA Conclusions (3 of 3) Emergency plans were widely prevalent, but there seemed to be some issues regarding specific training for radiographers with respect to emergencies Occupational doses received by radiographers varied considerably, with no correlation with radiographic workload 53 There is considerable scope for improvement in radiation protection WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

54. IAEA 54 Thank you!