1. Military Theory
Lsn 2 and 3

2. Agenda Key Theorists Principles of War Levels of War Strategy
Operations
Elements of Operational Design

3. Key Theorists
Sun Tzu
Jomini
Clausewitz
Mahan
Corbett
Douhet
Mitchell

4. Sun Tzu
Chinese military theorist circa B.C. who wrote The Art of War.
Significantly influenced Mao Zedong and subsequent writers on revolutionary warfare
Stressed the unpredictability of battle, the importance of deception and surprise, the close relationship between politics and military policy, and the high costs of war

5. Sun Tzu Emphasized the role of situational awareness
“So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”
Championed the bloodless victory
“One hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skillful. Seizing the enemy without fighting is the most skillful.”

6. Antoine-Henri de Jomini
Jomini ( ) was a Swiss military theorist who sought to interpret Napoleon
Published the Summary of the Art of War in 1838
Became the premier military- educational text of the mid-nineteenth century and greatly influenced Civil War generals
“Many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War in the other” (General J. D. Hittle)

7. Antoine-Henri de Jomini
As a product of the Enlightenment, Jomini sought natural laws to govern the conduct of war
Developed a very geometrical and scientific approach to war
Stressed the principle of concentration, the strategic value of interior lines, and the close relationship between logistics and combat
Interior lines are “those adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose them a greater force.”

8. Interior Lines
The benefits of interior lines could be gained either by central position or superior lateral communications
Interior
Lines
Exterior

9. Carl von Clausewitz Prussian officer born in 1780
Resigned his commission in 1812 and joined the Russian Army to fight Napoleon
Ideas on war were heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard von Scharnhorst
Died in 1831 and his wife published his On War in 1832

10. Carl von Clausewitz War is neither an art nor a science
It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by other means.
A form of social intercourse
War is like a wrestling match
It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”
But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between two independent wills.

11. Carl von Clausewitz
Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to rational policy
Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military, and the government”

12. Carl von Clausewitz
Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance, friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the abstract (the “fog of war”)
Argued one should focus his military efforts against the enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”)
Very important concept in modern American military doctrine

13. Albert Thayer Mahan US naval officer who lived from 1840 to 1914
Wrote The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,
Considered “sea power” to include the overlapping concepts of command of the sea through naval superiority and that combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces national “wealth and greatness”

14. Albert Thayer Mahan Advocated
“that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive”
“(1) Production; (2) Shipping: (3) Colonies and Markets– in a word, sea power”
Thought the Navy should be used offensively and that its principle object should be destruction of the enemy’s fleet
Destroying the enemy’s battle fleet would in turn cause his merchant fleet to find the sea untenable
To be effective, the fleet should not be divided and should be autonomous

15. Albert Thayer Mahan
Saw the Navy’s economic strangulation of France by blockade as the key to Britain’s defeat of Napoleon
“It was not by attempting great military operations on land, but by controlling the sea, and through the sea the world outside Europe,” that the British “ensured the triumph of their country.”
Critics argue that Mahan confused a necessary or important cause with the sufficient cause
The British Navy was important, but the Army and diplomacy also played key roles

16. Albert Thayer Mahan
Considered the navy to be a better instrument of national policy than the army
This was especially true for the United States which had “neither the tradition nor the design to act aggressively beyond the seas,” but at the same time had “very important transmarine interests which need protection”
Increasingly became an imperialist in order to gain control of the resources the US needed to best use its naval power

17. Julian Corbett
Mahan’s British contemporary and chief competitor as a naval theorist
Corbett stressed the limitations as well as the importance of naval power
He emphasized coordination between land and naval strategy rather than independent naval action
He rejected the invariable dominance of the offensive and focused on the dynamic relationship between the offensive and the defensive at sea

18. Julian Corbett
Although originally much less well-known than Mahan, Corbett gained increased prominence in post-Cold War American naval thought
Ideas became more relevant in an era in which the US Navy has no peer competitor and conducts more littoral operations than blue-water fleet-to-fleet actions

19. Giulio Douhet Italian air power theorist who lived from 1869 to 1930
Saw air power as a way for Italy to overcome its inherent weaknesses in manpower and natural resources
But to become the dominant weapon it could be, aircraft had to be freed from the control of ground commanders who did not understand the new capability
Advocated the creation of a separate air arm to be commanded by airmen

20. Giulio Douhet
Wrote “Rules for the Use of Airplanes in War” in 1912 but met resistance from his superiors who forced him to change references to the airplane as a “weapon” and instead consider it only a “device” to support the ground forces
Advocated the production of bombers
Soon became known as a radical and his methods for advancing the cause of airpower often worked at cross-purposes with his goals
His criticism of Italy’s conduct in World War I got him arrested and court martialed
In 1920 the verdict was overturned and Douhet was promoted to general, but instead of returning to active duty he focused on writing

21. Giulio Douhet
Douhet’s argument was that airpower added a third dimension that revolutionized warfare by granting new flexibility and initiative
The speed of aircraft and the vastness of the sky equaled offensive power
Considered airpower to be supreme
Without control of the air, all operations– land, sea, even air– were doomed
The appropriate target was not the enemy’s planes in the air but their airfields and air industry on the ground

22. Giulio Douhet
Saw airpower as being able to crush the enemy’s will to fight by destroying or neutralizing a country’s “vital centers”– those elements of society, government, and industry essential to the functioning of the state
It could do so without the need for the bloody commitment of ground forces that had made World War I so costly

23. Giulio Douhet Douhet recognized the importance of targeting
Aircraft could strike virtually anything but in order to be most forceful they should not attempt to strike everything
Instead, focus on the five basic target systems that Douhet considered the vital centers of a modern country
Industry, transportation infrastructure, communication nodes, and the will of the people
The will of the people was the most important target
Douhet did not advocate aircraft attacking or supporting ground forces; airpower was to be used strategically, not tactically

24. Billy Mitchell
Building on his World War I experience and relationships with British air marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard and, to a lesser extent, Douhet, Mitchell ( ) led the American charge for air force autonomy
Viewed “independent” air operations, such as strategic bombing, as more lucrative than simply supporting land or sea forces

25. Billy Mitchell
Argued that bombers could win wars by destroying an enemy’s war-making capability and will to fight, and that in so doing could yield a victory that was quicker and cheaper than one obtained by surface forces
The key to obtaining victory through airpower lay in establishing an autonomous air force, free of control by surface commanders and led by airmen possessing special expertise
Began calling for a separate air force in 1919

26. Billy Mitchell
Believed airpower could wreck an enemy’s will to fight by destroying his capability to resist and that capability was not the army or the navy but the nation’s industrial and agricultural base
Eliminating industrial production “would deprive armies, air forces and navies… of their means of maintenance.”
Did not necessarily want to attack civilians directly but to sever the population from the sources of production
Considered civilian will to be very fragile

27. Billy Mitchell Mitchell’s personality did not help him
Boundless ego, extremely driven, short of temper
“Mitchell tried to convert his opponents by killing them first.” (Hugh Trenchard)
Mitchell took his case to the American people with many of his writings appearing in popular magazines rather than military professional journals
Did not favor aircraft carriers, because, among other things, they represented naval air self-sufficiency which threatened his vision for a separate air force

28. Billy Mitchell
Mitchell’s vehemence toward the military bureaucracy reached a peak on Sept 5, 1925 when he blamed the crash of the Navy dirigible Shenandoah on the “in competency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration of the National Defense by the Navy and War Departments”
Two weeks later President Coolidge himself proffered court martial charges against Mitchell
He was found guilty on Dec 17 and retired from the service Feb 1, 1926
Mitchell’s message was carried on by more diplomatic advocates such as Hap Arnold and the Air Force became a separate branch of the US military in 1947

29. Principles of War

30. Principles of War
British military officer J. F. C. Fuller developed a list of principles based on the works of Clausewitz and Jomini for use by the British Army in World War I
The US Army modified them and published its first list in 1921
Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of force
Maneuver
Unity of command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity

31. Objective
When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. Commanders need to appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them.
Ensure that all actions contribute to the goals of the higher headquarters.
Example: The Emancipation Proclamation changed the Federal objective of the war from merely restoring the Union to also ending slavery.

32. Offensive
Offensive operations are essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary for success, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments.
Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation.
Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results; it is the essence of successful operations.
Example: Lee’s two invasions of northern territory represent offensive strategies.

33. Mass
Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the situation.
Time: applies the elements of combat power against multiple targets simultaneously
Space : concentrates the effects of different elements of combat power against a single target
Example: Grant had a huge advantage in mass over Lee toward the end of the war.

34. Economy of Force
Commanders never leave any element without a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all elements should have tasks to perform.
Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to achieve superiority in the decisive operation.
Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces.
Example: The South decided to make the west an economy of force theater in spite of the arguments of the Confederate Western Concentration Bloc (Beauregard, Longstreet, et al)

35. Maneuver
As both an element of combat power and a principle of war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of leadership, firepower, information, and protection as well.
Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly
Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with them.
Example: Chancellorsville represents the classic envelopment while Fredericksburg and Pickett’s Charge shows the costliness of the frontal attack.

36. Unity of Command
Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective.
Develops the full combat power of a force
Usually requires giving a single commander authority
Example: Grant and Porter cooperated as an army-navy team at Vicksburg.

37. Security
Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security protects and preserves combat power.
Does not involve excessive caution
Measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat
Example: Fears for the security of Washington influenced Lincoln’s decision-making during the Peninsula Campaign.

38. Surprise
Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary is unprepared.
It is only necessary that the enemy become aware too late to react effectively.
Contributions to surprise include speed, information superiority, and asymmetry.
Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea put the Confederates on the “horns of a dilemma” because Sherman’s true destination was unknown.

39. Simplicity
Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late.
Clear and concise plans cut down on misunderstandings
Example: Grant’s orders to Sherman in the Atlanta Campaign are classic in their simplicity and clarity.

40. Levels of War
Strategic
Operational
Tactical

41. Levels of War Strategic
Level at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives

42. Example: The Allies’ Strategic Objective for Europe in World War II
Combined Chiefs directed Eisenhower to “enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with other Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces”

43. Levels of War Operational
Level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operation
Link tactics and strategy

44. Example: Eisenhower’s Operational Objective at Normandy
Secure a foothold on the continent of Europe from which to support offensive operations against Germany

45. Levels of War
Tactical
Level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces

46. Example: Tactical Objectives of the Airborne Forces on D-Day
Secure exits from the beaches to allow the amphibious forces to move inland
Block German counterattack routes to protect amphibious forces

47. Strategy
Strategy is the pursuit, protection, or advancement of national interests through the application of the instruments of power
Instruments of power (DIME)
Diplomatic
Informational
Military
Economic

48. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)
champion aspirations for human dignity;
strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;

49. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)
ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and
transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

50. Strategy
Strategy is about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests
Strategy = Ends (objectives) + Ways (course of action) + Means (instruments)
Ways to employ means to achieve ends

51. Strategy: Confederates at Vicksburg
End
Deny Federal use of the Mississippi River
Way
Interdict river traffic at Vicksburg
Mean
Pemberton’s force at Vicksburg

52. Traditional Military Strategies
Attrition
The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel
Exhaustion
The gradual erosion of a nation’s will or means to resist
Annihilation
Seeks the immediate destruction of the combat power of the enemy’s armed forces

53. Operations
Campaigns are the operational extension of the commander’s strategy
They are a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space
Campaigns should be planned to adhere to the elements of operational design

54. Elements of Operational Design

55. Elements of Operational Design
Synergy
Simultaneity and depth
Anticipation
Balance
Leverage
Timing and tempo
Operational reach and approach

56. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Forces and functions
Arranging operations
Centers of gravity
Direct versus indirect
Decisive points
Culmination
Termination

57. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Synergy
Seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentrations in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties
Example: Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign relieved pressure on Lee outside of Richmond.
Simultaneity and depth
Place more demands on adversary forces than can be handled both in terms of time and space
Example: It was not until the end of the Civil War that Grant brought a grand strategy to the Federal effort that pressured the Confederacy and Lee simultaneously from all directions.

58. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Anticipation
Remain alert for the unexpected and opportunities to exploit the situation
Example: Grant failed to anticipate the Confederate attack at Shiloh and was surprised and defeated the first day.
Balance
Maintain the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness
Example: Trying to defend its entire territory proved impossible for the Confederacy and led it to develop an “offensive-defensive” strategy.

59. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Leverage
Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat power across all dimensions
Example: Grant’s numerical advantage allowed him to maintain constant pressure on Lee in
Timing and tempo
Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary
Example: The speed of Sherman’s March to the Sea thwarted any meaningful resistance.

60. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Operational reach and approach
The distance over which military power can mass effects and be employed decisively
Example: The superior Federal Navy allowed the North to blockade the South.
Forces and functions
Focus on defeating either adversary forces or functions, or a combination of both
Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea targeted Confederate functions of war-making ability and will at the same time Grant’s Overland Campaign targeted Lee’s forces.

61. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Arranging operations
Achieve dimensional superiority by a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations
Phases: Deter/engage, Seize initiative, Decisive operations, Transition
Example: Grant’s preliminary attempts, his maneuver, his assaults on Vicksburg, and ultimately the siege combined to produce a logical line of operation.
Centers of gravity
Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight
Destroying or neutralizing adversary centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory
Example: McClellan fought as if Richmond was the Confederate center of gravity rather than Lee’s army.

62. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Direct versus indirect
To the extent possible, attack centers of gravity directly, but where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength seek an indirect approach
Example: Longstreet unsuccessfully tried to convince Lee to threaten Washington or Baltimore by a turning movement rather than continuing the offensive at Gettysburg.
Decisive points
Usually geographic in nature, but can sometimes be key events or systems
Give a marked advantage to whoever controls them
Keys to attacking protected centers of gravity
Example: By securing the flank at Little Round Top, Chamberlain saved day for the Federals at Gettysburg.

63. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Culmination
Point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender or the defender no longer can preserve his force
Example: Lincoln was very frustrated that Meade did not pursue Lee after Gettysburg but decisive battles were elusive in the Civil War because of culmination.
Termination
Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the military force was committed, which then allows transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader goals
Example: The end of the Civil War led to Reconstruction.

64. Tactics
The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other
Technology has a big impact on tactics such as with the advent of the rifle, steam-powered ships, or the helicopter

65. Next
US Military Doctrine