1. U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITY* Joan Johnson-Freese Naval War College Newport, RI April 23, 2007 * The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

2. Primary Considerations 2006 US National Space Policy 2006 US National Space Policy 2007 Chinese ASAT Test 2007 Chinese ASAT Test

3. Shaping the U.S. Security Perspective Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, also known as the Rumsfeld Commission, after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld. 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, also known as the Rumsfeld Commission, after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld. 1998 Commission on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, also known as the Cox Commission after its Chair, then California Congressman (Republican) Christopher Cox. 1999 Commission on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, also known as the Cox Commission after its Chair, then California Congressman (Republican) Christopher Cox. 1999 Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, also known as the Rumsfeld Space Commission, again after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld. 2000 Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, also known as the Rumsfeld Space Commission, again after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld. 2000

4. Threads of Policy from Commissions Missile Threat to the US (Missile Defense) Missile Threat to the US (Missile Defense) China Threat (Relating to Space Technology) China Threat (Relating to Space Technology) Inevitability that space will become a battle ground, therefore the U.S. would be remiss not to prepare for that. Inevitability that space will become a battle ground, therefore the U.S. would be remiss not to prepare for that. Because 95% of space technology is dual- use, and because restraint is not in the best interests of the U.S. – arms control explicitly rejected and a focus on technology implicitly supported. Because 95% of space technology is dual- use, and because restraint is not in the best interests of the U.S. – arms control explicitly rejected and a focus on technology implicitly supported.

5. Military Doctrine Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, published by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 2002, states that, “The United States must be able to protect its space assets and deny the use of space assets by its adversaries.” Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, published by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 2002, states that, “The United States must be able to protect its space assets and deny the use of space assets by its adversaries.” The 2004 U.S. Air Force Counterspace Operations Doctrine document states that, “US Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains space superiority. Space superiority provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack.” The 2004 U.S. Air Force Counterspace Operations Doctrine document states that, “US Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains space superiority. Space superiority provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack.”

6. 2006 National Space Policy “The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with this principle, ‘peaceful purposes’ allow U.S. defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests.” “The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with this principle, ‘peaceful purposes’ allow U.S. defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests.”

7. 2006 National Space Policy “The United States considers space systems to have the rights of passage through and operations in space without interference. Consistent with this principle, the United States will view the purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights.” “The United States considers space systems to have the rights of passage through and operations in space without interference. Consistent with this principle, the United States will view the purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights.”

8. Issues Is the difference from past policies tone or content? Is the difference from past policies tone or content? Ambiguities Ambiguities Do rights stated to accrue to the U.S. also accrue to other sovereign nations? Do rights stated to accrue to the U.S. also accrue to other sovereign nations? At least in the case of “rights of passage” – yes; to be guaranteed not by international law, but by force if necessary (capabilities)At least in the case of “rights of passage” – yes; to be guaranteed not by international law, but by force if necessary (capabilities) Reception outside the US Reception outside the US

9. Military Space Missions Space support (e.g. launch and satellite maintenance); Space support (e.g. launch and satellite maintenance); Force enhancement (capabilities to increase the advantages of the warfighter, such as precision guided munitions and C4); Force enhancement (capabilities to increase the advantages of the warfighter, such as precision guided munitions and C4); Space control (the ability to use space when needed and deny to the adversary); Space control (the ability to use space when needed and deny to the adversary); Force application (space weapons). Force application (space weapons).

10. China & the US The view of the heavens from Beijing and the view of the heavens from Washington are very different. From Beijing, the view is largely obscured by U.S. assets, assets still rapidly expanding in number, type and potential lethality. From Washington, the space assets which facilitate a strong and dynamic U.S. economy and the most powerful military in the world were placed in jeopardy on January 11, 2007 with the successful Chinese ASAT test. The view of the heavens from Beijing and the view of the heavens from Washington are very different. From Beijing, the view is largely obscured by U.S. assets, assets still rapidly expanding in number, type and potential lethality. From Washington, the space assets which facilitate a strong and dynamic U.S. economy and the most powerful military in the world were placed in jeopardy on January 11, 2007 with the successful Chinese ASAT test.

11. US Concerns About China Threat Cox Committee Report Cox Committee Report Shashoujian Shashoujian Taiwan Taiwan ASAT Test January 2007 ASAT Test January 2007

12. US Reaction to Chinese ASAT Test Tempered Tempered Admiral Fallon & General Cartwright: not surprising Admiral Fallon & General Cartwright: not surprising Delay in Statement from Beijing Complicated the Situation Delay in Statement from Beijing Complicated the Situation Space Arms Race? Space Arms Race? Calls for More Technology Development; More Emphasis on Space as a Security issue (Senator Kyl) Calls for More Technology Development; More Emphasis on Space as a Security issue (Senator Kyl)

13. Senator Kyl’s Suggestions* (not U.S. policy) Implement the 2001 Space Commission proposals [management and organization] Implement the 2001 Space Commission proposals [management and organization] Hold hearings to assure that the Chinese ASAT technology was not based on U.S. technology, shared or stolen Hold hearings to assure that the Chinese ASAT technology was not based on U.S. technology, shared or stolen Assure the military has access to operationally responsive space – meaning, the ability to launch and quickly activate--militarily useful satellites Assure the military has access to operationally responsive space – meaning, the ability to launch and quickly activate--militarily useful satellites Support the "Space-Based Test Bed," to include both kinetic and directed energy components to destroy missiles in their boost phase Support the "Space-Based Test Bed," to include both kinetic and directed energy components to destroy missiles in their boost phase Increase the budget for “space control” programs Increase the budget for “space control” programs Make “space security” a conservative priority again. Make “space security” a conservative priority again. *January 2007

14. Options Beyond Technology Reconstitution Reconstitution Decrease vulnerability due to reliance on technology (learn/remember other ways to fight) Decrease vulnerability due to reliance on technology (learn/remember other ways to fight) Include arms control in policy options Include arms control in policy options Encourage partnerships on peaceful uses of space Encourage partnerships on peaceful uses of space

15. Conclusions Space Security currently defined in primarily military terms Space Security currently defined in primarily military terms Policy currently focuses on technology fixes to perceived space security issues Policy currently focuses on technology fixes to perceived space security issues Space debate is being encouraged by those who feel that space security, in the U.S. and elsewhere, would be better served by use of broader policy options. Space debate is being encouraged by those who feel that space security, in the U.S. and elsewhere, would be better served by use of broader policy options.