1. Kosovo War
Group 5

2. Topics 1. Historical Background 2. Key tipping points
3. Failures of the international community
4. Wheeler’s criteria

3. Historical Background

4. Historical Background
Capital: Pristina
Ethnic: 88% Albanians
7% Serbs
5% others
Area: 10,908 km2
Population: 1,733,872

5. Historical Background
Albanians Strive for Independence
Albanians opposed Serbia’s attempts to relocate Serbs into Kosovo
The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution: received substantially increased autonomy, including de facto veto power in the Serbian parliament.
The 1989 Serbia Constitution: limited Kosovo‘s autonomy.
1991: Albanians accounted for 90% of the population of Kosovo. Kosovo’s Albanian leaders attempted to break free from Serbia using non-violent resistance.
The government of Serb president: Slobodan Milosevic

6. Historical Background
Kosovo Conflict
: Yugoslav Army and Serbian forces and the people, for independence of Kosovo Albanian terrorist organization in Kosovo Liberation Army fighters.
1999: March 24 from June 10 was held over to NATO by the Allied Force operation.
Attacks in rural areas by a small, clandestine Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) formed by Kosovo Albanian radicals brought heavy retaliation by Serbian security forces; fighting across the Kosovo countryside through 1998 (killing most of the villagers which were attacked e.g. Dorenitsa) leaving 1,500 Albanians dead, 400,000 homeless by October.

7. Historical Background
President of Serbia and Yugoslavia. He served as the President of Socialist Republic of Serbia and Republic of Serbia from 1989 until in three terms and as President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000.
In 1999, NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, Milosevic was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in connection with the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
Slobodan Milosevic ( )

8. Tipping points and important decisions

9. beginning LDK( ) underground referendum 9.1991 Dayton negotiation 1995
UCK employed clandestine tactics during and finally launched an offensive in 1998

10. Reaction The Clinton Administration condemned Kosovars. 3.1998
UN Resolution

11. During the war NATO “we will act” 9.1998 UN Resolution 1199 23.9.1998
Kofi Annan’s report
NATO activation order for air strikes
October Agreement
UN Resolution
Breakdown of Paris talk

12. End of War NATO’s air strike 23.3.1999
EU-Russian peace plan and NATO-led multinational force
A big Russian-led debate on NATO’s lack of authorization of SC.

13. Failures of the International Community

14. Exclusion of Kosovo during the Dayton Agenda
1995-Dayton Agreement: peace accord between Bosnia and Herzegovina and former Yugoslavia
This agenda could have been an opportunity for the international community to bring up the problems in Kosovo and initiate an earlier start to preventing conflict

15. Lack of Conviction from the Contact Group
The Contact Group: group of nations (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) that had interest and influence in the Balkans.
The Contact Group, with significant military power, did not take any direct action, but only condemned both the Serbs and the UCK.

16. Lack of Media Coverage
There was not much media interest regarding the cases in Kosovo
It was mainly Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign minister Robin Cook who initiated the argument for Britain and the Alliance to prepare using force to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing.

17. Resolution 1199
The resolution demanded for cessation between FRY and Albanian leadership, but it was not backed up by military force
The resolution was not a big enough threat for preventing the conflict between the two groups.

18. NATO Bombing Escalated Serbian forces
Once NATO started bombing Serbian forces, ethnic cleansing was escalated.
….However, without NATO force, the Serbian force may have not stopped ethnic cleansing

19. NATO Bombing Targets
In order to avoid NATO causalities, the bombing was conducted from high air, making it difficult to accurately target Serbian forces.
NATO harmed not only Serbian forces, but also innocent civilians.

20. NATO was unable to restore peace
Even though NATO intervened and restored political rights to the Albanians, it was unable to restore peace and security to Serbs, who felt a great threat of revenge from the Albanians.

21. Lack of Assistance after intervention (Long-term Consequences )
There still remains tension between Kosovars and Serbs
Kosovo was under control of the international community from , yet its economy suffers from weak political institutions. Law, government corruption, unemployment, etc..

22. Wheeler’s Criteria

23. 1・Supreme Humanitarian Emergency
Yes
Over people killed

24. 2・Necessity, last resort
Yes
NATO tried to seek other measures to avoid use of force　→ October Agreement
Failure of October Agreement

25. Failure of October Agreement
Albanians were not involved in the October Agreement.
They were dissatisfied of the conditions
UCK continued attacking Serb forces
Serbs responded by killing civilians
Cease fire failed to hold

26. Failure of October Agreement
Peace talks in Rambouillet with Serbs and Albanians
Milosevic objected the proposal
Negotiation breaks down
Serbs start new round of ethnic cleansing
All options gone
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Last resort

27. 3・Proportionality No Limitations of air p.270
“Air power alone cannot stop paramilitary action”
– Gen. Wesley Clarke
International community reluctant to send ground troops after Somalia
Civilian casualty
Ineffectiveness of air strike, with Serbs hiding weapons

28. 4・Positive humanitarian outcome
short term
Yes
Although far bloodier than expected, saved millions of lives (p.274)
Kosovo gained independence

29. 4・Positive humanitarian outcome
Long Term No
Failed to stop new round of ethnic cleansing(p.274)
Tension still continues today

30. 5・Humanitarian Motives
Yes
They argued that their action was first aimed at “averting an impeding humanitarian catastrophe”

31. 6・Humanitarian Justification
“Risk-free” limited intervention.
Russia questioned US motive
“Bill Clinton wants to win… He hopes Milosevic will capitulate, give up the whole of Yugoslavia, make it America’s protectorate”- Boris Yeltsin
NATO’s face keeping