1. Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
Meeting IAEA - June 2014
Anne Cordelle - Grégory FONTAINE 1

2. Storages of gamma device
Industrial radiography in France
550 gamma radiography devices X ray generators
Recorded exposures : in 2011
-> 1/2 on site -> 1/3 on site with Ir 192
Recorded shielded enclosures :
-> 93 for gamma device -> 242 for X ray generators
1266 radiographers
336 radiation protection officers
Storages of gamma device
200 agencies
Main fields : nuclear plants, refinery, chemistry factory, foundry…
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

3. Recent incidents
Events notified to ASN according to specific requirements
Incidents occured in BNI
Other incidents
Only few incidents with dose exceeding regulatory levels (3 incidents)
Main causes are : controlled areas, source control loss
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

4. Theses operations must be specifically controlled
Recent incidents
Since 2010 ASN has observed the operations to retrieve the source when the source is stuck or misconnected could be improved
important consequences on industrial safety of the facilities where site radiography is performed
important consequences on the radiation protection of the workers who carried out these operations
Theses operations must be specifically controlled
→ In 2013, ASN organized a working group to define or to review Different types of source control loss . Procedures and means to regain the control of the source
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

5. Context UES National register for radioactive sources
Expertise in radiation protection for radioactive sources
Technical support
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 5

6. Context Working Group Incidents in France
Markup crossing
Incidents in France
Loss of control of sources
Working Group on industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 6

7. Context Working Group Incidents in France
Markup crossing
Incidents in France
Loss of control of sources
Working Group on industrial radiography
1. Source stuck in the device
2. Source disconnected from the drive cable
3. Source out of the device
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 7

8. Context
Working Group
Markup crossing
Technical solutions for recovering a source in case of a loss of control
Incidents in France
Loss of control of sources
Working Group on industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 8

9. Context Working Group Definition of interventions in advance
for each situation
Scenarii
Source out of control
Working Group on industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
9/26 9

10. Methodology
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 10

11. Methodology Databases Incidents in France Circumstances, causes
Loss of control
Circumstances,
causes
Real situations
Internet
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 11

12. Methodology Scenarii Databases Incidents in France Circumstances/
Loss of control
Circumstances/
causes
Real situations
Internet
Scenarii
Study of equipment
Potential situations
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 12

13. Equipment Particularity in France One type of device widely used.
600 devices in France, 90% are Gam80/120.
The Scenarii are mainly defined for Gam80/120
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 13

14. Equipment Description Exposure container Source holder 14
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 14

15. Equipment Description The canal is linear. For the connections :
Drive cable
Guide tube
A remote control permit to move the source (electric or with a crank)
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 15

16. Equipment Description 16
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 16

17. Methodology Location of the source 17
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 17

18. Methodology Location in the guide tube 18
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 18

19. Methodology Location in the guide tube
Source-holder connected to the drive cable
Source-holder disconnected from the drive cable
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 19

20. Scenarii
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 20

21. Scenarii 21 Object in the container Object in the guide tube
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 21

22. Scenarii 22 Damage of the guide tube Damage of the guide tube
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 22

23. Scenarii 23 Crank failure Crank failure Rupture of shutter control
Rupture of the source holder
Crank failure
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 23

24. Scenarii 24 Connection of the collimator
Connection drive cable/source holder
Connection of the collimator
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 24

25. Other points to consider
Environment
Where is the equipment ?
Access conditions ?
Radioactive source
Half-life
Activity
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography 25

26. Main actions defined by the working group
Emergency response
Main actions defined by the working group
(1) Ensure controlled area barriers are in the correct place
(2) Inform customer
(3) Inform RPO, qualified expert, source supplier, ASN
(4) Definition of an intervention to retrieve source
(5) Intervention
(6) Report with doses
In compliance with stages described in the IAEA guide
(6)
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
(5)
(5)
Initial stage
Planning stage
Recovery stage
Post emergency
stage
Report
stage
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

27. Definition of a summary sheet
Emergency response
Definition of a summary sheet
Description of the incident : - source, device, failure, - dose rates,
- site configuration
Stakeholders to inform
Intervention definition
Intervention implementation - operators,
- assessed doses
- received doses
- successful attempt or not
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

28. Intervention to decrease dose rates
Emergency response
Different types of interventions
Intervention complexity
Level 2
Intervention
Intervention to decrease dose rates
Level 1
Intervention
Distance with source
Who
Training
Equipment
When
Level 1 intervention
Radiographers
Common training (CAMARI)
Common tools
Quickly
Level 2 intervention
Qualified expert
Specific training
Specific tools
Need few hours up to few days
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

29. 10 procedures have been written to describe interventions 75 % covered
Emergency response
10 procedures have been written
to describe interventions
75 % covered
Incident scenarios
Procedures framework :
When the procedure has to be implemented
Material means, operator training
A flow sheet with all steps
A safety assessment
Dose assessment
Maximum dose rates
Critical intervention : -> Intervention to locate source and
to cover it with shielding
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

30. With Iridium or Selenium sources
Emergency response
With Iridium or Selenium sources
-> Maximum dose rate about 50 mSv/h
(a distance about 3 m with an Iridium source about 120 Ci)
-> An individual dose about 3 mSv
With important Cobalt sources
-> Dose rates are too important
(about 600 mSv / 3m far the source)
-> Robots would be used
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

31. Tools used to retrieve source
Emergency response
Tools used to retrieve source
-> When the guide tube is damaged and the source
has become stuck
Source holder
Tool
Guide tube
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

32. Tools used to retrieve source
Emergency response
Tools used to retrieve source
-> When the source is disconnected from the control cable
Source holder
Specific tool connected with the control cable
-> to push
-> to pull (magnetic tool)
Source changer
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

33. Finish writing all the procedures
Working group prospects
Finish writing all the procedures
Communication of a report
Authorizations to implement procedures
Annual meetings
-> feed back
-> procedures improvements
Implementation
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

34. French regulations currently covers . Gamma radiography device design
Regulatory projects
French regulations currently covers
. Gamma radiography device design
. Conditions of use of gamma radiography device
. Shielded enclosure design
. Radiographer certification
. Radiation protection organization, dosimeters, health monitoring, controlled area…
Projects to strengthen implementation of justification/optimization principle :
. Ban site radiography when the object to be controlled may be moved
-> Incident consequences are less important in shielded enclosures
. Ban using Ir (or Co) when the thickness is less than 30 mm (steel eq.) to promote Se
-> Incident consequences are less important with Se
-> Operations to regain control of the situation are easier with Se
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography

35. Projects to improve the emergency response :
Regulatory projects
Projects to improve the emergency response :
. Availability of suitable means and procedures to regain control of the situation
-> needs convention with supplier, qualified expert
June 2014 – Management of emergencies in industrial radiography