1. Agenda Control in Denmark 1971-2003 Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Asbjorn Skjaeveland

2. In all national assemblies of which we are aware, there are certain offices to which extraordinary agenda powers attach. We define an agenda cartel as a set of agents possessing two key properties. –First, they collectively hold a controlling share of the agenda- setting offices relevant to a given assembly. Whether decentralized or centralized, formal or informal, this procedure amounts to investing k groups within the cartel, C­1,...,Ck, with vetoes over the placement of proposals upon the plenary agenda –Second, the cartel establishes a procedure for agreeing on which proposals will be allowed access to the plenary session. Whether decentralized or centralized, formal or informal, this procedure amounts to investing k groups within the cartel, C­1,...,Ck, with vetoes over the placement of proposals upon the plenary agenda.

3. Two subspecies of agenda cartel We call this a parliamentary agenda cartel.First, in parliamentary systems, it is often said that each pivotal party in a multi-party majority coalition wields an agenda veto. We call this a parliamentary agenda cartel. Second, Cox and McCubbins (2002, 2005) suggest that any majority of the majority party can veto the placement of items on the floor agenda in the U.S. House of Representatives.

4. Agenda Power When a parliamentary agenda cartel exists, it is as if the legislative agenda were set as follows. –(1) Whoever wishes may introduce bills. –(2) In order for a bill to advance to the plenary session under the current government, however, it must be acceptable to each veto player, or gatekeeper, C1,...,Ck. –(3) Bills that are not vetoed ex ante are decide in plenary session under open rules with germaneness restrictions. The outcome of which, in a one-dimensional policy game, is that the enacted bill will be located at the location of the median voters ideal point (Black, Downs). In this model, the veto players should never lose (i.e., have an unwanted policy change forced upon them).In this model, the veto players should never lose (i.e., have an unwanted policy change forced upon them).

5. The cartel thesis The cartel thesis is that, if a majority government forms, then it will also constitute an agenda cartel.

6. Rolls and Roll Rates Operationally, if a majority of a party votes against a bill that nonetheless passes, we say that the party has been rolled. Under conditions of complete and perfect information and with costless action, if a party wields a veto, it should never be rolled. –Prior to the final passage stage, there are also sometimes clear agenda-setting votesthat is, votes to determine whether the legislature will or will not consider in plenary session a particular bill. We also speak of parties being rolled on these initial agenda-setting motions, when they vote against them but the motion nonetheless passes. Under conditions of complete and perfect information and with costless action, if a party wields a veto, it should never be rolled. Roll rates are just the proportion of total votes on which a party was rolled. In what follows we examine only final passage votes or FPVs.

7. Floor Agenda (Median Voter) Model What if there is no agenda cartel and no party wields a veto? The median party is never rolled, while roll rates increase monotonically both to the left and to the right.If we assume that all parties can be placed along a traditional left-right scale, so that successful bills necessarily propose to move policy toward the median legislators ideal point, then we have a very simple expectation: The median party is never rolled, while roll rates increase monotonically both to the left and to the right. –The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The median party cannot be rolled because it is not possible to form a majority that wants to move policy away from the median in a unidimensional model.

8. Cartel Agenda Model: Hypotheses H1) Under complete and perfect information, and with costless gatekeeping, the roll rate of governmental parties will be zero. H2) The roll rate of opposition parties should be higher than the roll rate of governmental parties, all else constant. H3) The roll rates of opposition parties should increase the farther is their median ideal point from the floor median. That is, the greater is, the greater an opposition partys roll rate will be, all else constant. Government Party roll rates, by contrast, should not be affected by distance from the assembly median.

9. Denmark Average roll rates 1971-2003 In government parties:.0123 –Range: 0 to.068 Opposition parties:.208 –Range: 0 to.80

10. Effect of Distance (in absolute value) on roll rates Cartel Agenda Model Floor Agenda Model Majority Party0+ Minority Party++

11. Relationship between Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates, in government parties 1971-2003 (Is it positive or zero?)

12. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates, government parties Coefficient (z score) Distance (in absolute value) 1.69(0.75) Constant-1.89 (-6.06) *** Log Likelihood-805.25491 Psuedo R2.14 N91 Estimated using Extended Beta Binomial *** - significant at.001 level

13. Relationship between Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates, opposition parties 1971-2003 (Is it positive or zero?)

14. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates, opposition parties Coefficient (z score) Distance (in absolute value) 1.68 (10.73)*** Constant-2.08 (-21.20) *** Log Likelihood- 16633.614 Psuedo R2.11 N223 Estimated using Extended Beta Binomial *** - significant at.001 level

15. O-LG-L G-MO-MO-R Cartel Agenda Model Predictions Floor Agenda Model Predictions Legend: (1) O-L, Left Opposition Party; (2) O-M, Moderate Opposition Party; (3) O-R, Right Opposition Party; (4) G-L, Left Government Party; (5) G-M, Median Government Party Comparing Predictions of the Relationship Between Roll Rates and Distance for the Floor Agenda Model and Cartel Agenda Model

16. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rate 1971-1972 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

17. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rate 1972-1973 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

18. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rate 1973-1974 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

19. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rate 1974-1975 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

20. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1975-1976 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

21. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1976-1977, session 1 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

22. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1976-1977, session 2 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

23. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1977-1978 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

24. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1978-1979 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

25. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1980-1981 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

26. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1981-1982 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

27. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1982-1983 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

28. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1983-1984, session 1 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

29. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1983-1984, session 2 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

30. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1984-1985 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

31. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1985-1986 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

32. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1986-1987 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

33. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1987-1988, session 1 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

34. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1987-1988, session 2 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

35. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1988-1989 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

36. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1989-1990 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

37. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1990-1991, session 2 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

38. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1993 -1994 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

39. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1994-1995 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

40. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1995-1996 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

41. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1997-1998, session 1 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

42. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1997-1998, session 2 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

43. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1998-1999 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

44. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 1999 - 2000 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

45. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 2001-2002, second session Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition

46. Distance (in absolute value) and roll rates 2002-2003 Labels indicate govt. status: 1=in government; 0 = in opposition