1. Accountability and Human Rights: The Political Impact of National Human Rights Institutions in New Democracies Dr Thomas Pegram University College London 29 April 2014

2. Global Diffusion of NHRIs

5. A Typology of Human Rights Ombudsmen

6. Country Year created Nomenclature Guatemala1985National Human Rights Prosecutor Mexico1990National Commission of Human Rights Honduras1990 National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights Colombia1991National Human Rights Ombudsman El Salvador1991National Human Rights Prosecutor Costa Rica1992National Human Rights Ombudsman Paraguay1992National Human Rights Ombudsman Argentina1993National Human Rights Ombudsman Peru1993National Human Rights Ombudsman Bolivia1994National Human Rights Ombudsman Nicaragua1995 National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights Ecuador1996National Human Rights Ombudsman Panama1996National Human Rights Ombudsman Venezuela1999National Human Rights Ombudsman Chile2009National Human Rights Institute

7. Accountability functionAccountability actors

8. Hypotheses on the effectiveness of accountability agencies General hypotheses: Accountability actors are more likely to be effective when: Legal statusEstablished in legislation or the constitution Independence Formal guarantees of de jure independence to safeguards de facto autonomy in performance of functions Capabilities (incl. funding) Equipped with protective and promotive capabilities to achieve their goals through direct or indirect governance modes FocalityThey are focal within the relevant issue-area Entrepreneurship Leadership and organizational structure encourages policy entrepreneurship

10. Formal design: independence and capabilities of HROs in Latin America CAPABILITIES INDEPENDENCE

11. Four Modes of Governance (Abbott & Snidal 2014) Orchestrator → Intermediary → Target

12. Four Modes of Human Rights Governance (O) Human Rights → Intermediary → (T) Government Ombudsman

13. Principal-Agent Theory (and its limitations) Limitations: International actors (additional principals) Principal “moral hazard” (Miller 2005) Collective principals (goal divergence) Selection effects as ex post control Feedback effects & “virtuous” agency slack

14. Hypotheses on the effectiveness of accountability agencies HRO-specific hypotheses HROs are more likely to be effective when: Goal divergence There is divergence of goals among government actors State oversight Government principals have weak institutional control mechanisms Engagement with International bodies Cooperation is developed, formalized and maintained with international organisations Intermediary availability Intermediaries with correlated goals and complementary capabilities are available Local salience of issue-area norms Global norms resonate in local context and are responsive to specificities Supportive background norms Legal traditions; presence of credible, routinized and stable rule of law frameworks

15. A Typology of Human Rights Ombudsmen Human rights defender Institutional bridge Façade Regime proxy