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Nick Vink Department of Agricultural Economics University of Stellenbosch
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Policy changes Productivity indexes SA/NZ (Vink and Sandrey) Technology change (Sandrey and Vink, OECD) Where does RSA fit in? (Anderson et al) Conclusion
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Reduction in commodity-specific subsidies Interest rate subsidies cut (but ‘drought aid’) Abolition of dairy price control Bread price subsidy Abolition of control over price of maize meal, bread flour, bread Maize price formula changed Etc.
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Reduction in farmer support programmes Tax treatment changed (ring fencing tightened, capital depreciation aligned) Budgetary allocations supporting white farmers declined by some 50 per cent between 1987 and 1993 The basis for farmer support programmes was taken away
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Trade liberalization under the AoA Tariffication and agreed reductions Unilateral reductions GEIS
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Intervention in input markets Land Abolition Act 1991 White Paper, Acts, Implementation Labour Dedicated legislation, 1993 Incorporated in mainstream after 1994 Minimum wage, etc. 2001 Water Loss of riparian rights
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Deregulation of agricultural marketing The ‘big bang’ of 1997
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Productivity of: Labour Capital Land TFP
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Western Cape RSA 19939.218.5 200215.411.7 200715.210.8
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SA/NZ comparison Technology adoption Southern hemisphere comparison
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Share southern hemisphere climate NZ has more reliable rainfall and better soils NZ, with its smaller domestic population, is more export-oriented Both are Cairns Group members: world leaders in unsubsidised agriculture
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Both underwent dramatic reforms; NZ in the mid 1980s and SA a decade later The evidence shows that NZ has adjusted to ‘free’ markets better than SA to date The ‘to date’ qualification is important, as the NZ experience shows that time lags can be longer than expected
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Marketing reform was triggered by external macroeconomic factors in both NZ: economic stagnation, change in government in 1984, subsequent drive to liberalise Agriculture a central part of these reforms SA: also macroeconomic precedents, as attempts to stabilise the economy in the late 1970s resulted in a rapid increase in interest rates
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Thus, both countries embarked on the reforms at about the same time However, the process from that time onwards was markedly different To understand these differences, and their consequences, it is necessary to compare the reforms in terms of their timing, sequencing, breadth, and depth
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NZ: most reforms implemented within 3 years of the 1984 elections PSE declined to below 5% after 1988, and has since declined to below 1% SA: reforms for 15 years followed by the ‘big bang’ that lasted for 12 months NZ market reforms preceded SA by a decade SA’s PSE remained at above 10% until 1995 after which it declined to below 5%
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Deregulation in NZ had two distinguishing features : NZ: marketing reforms preceded international trade liberalisation under the AoA SA: sequencing more complex as explained above. Trade liberalisation preceded the ‘big bang’ However, no evidence that policy makers in NZ or SA followed any deliberate sequence of reforms
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SA and NZ: Virtually all of agriculture was subject to intervention before deregulation In both there is evidence that previously uncontrolled industries have been the most successful NZ: deer and wine SA: Poultry and vegetables NZ also implemented labour market reforms, which resulted in more flexible labour markets
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The biggest difference between SA and NZ was in the depth of the reforms SA: all statutory powers were removed, with two exceptions: Sugar industry The powers of the NAMC that allow statutory levies NZ: the end result was more nuanced: Quota allocations into EU and USA remain in dairy and meat, while kiwifruit operates a single desk with monopoly export powers
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This did not result in a higher PSE, because import controls are not necessary to maintain an export monopoly, hence the price gap between domestic and world prices, the key to the measurement of PSE, is unaffected This has both costs and benefits to different stakeholders
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Agricultural exports’ share in production increased from 1/5 to 1/3 Agricultural exports increased by 9.2% p.a. between 1997 and 2007: wine, citrus and table grapes grew by 17.8%, 16% and 12.9% Some evidence of innovation, but the jury is still out on the results of the reforms Different patterns of technological growth can be observed by and within regions over time
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Innovation continues apace, but how much of it can be ascribed to the reforms? Field crops Prices declined to world market levels Farmers shifted to low-till, etc. production Reduced inputs such as fertilisers, insecticides, herbicides, tractors, other machinery, and fuel Thus process rather than product innovation Industry average yields more than doubled
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Fruit sector Increase in output and exports, driven by: (1) the addition of new export-oriented production regions (Orange river: pre-reform) (2) introduction of new production technology (3) introduction of better control over the cold chain Export growth OK, but limited
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Wine Marketing reforms resulted in: (1) Many new entries in the industry (2 cellars/month for >10 years!) (2) Inward FDI, accompanied by overseas marketing and the burgeoning tourism sector (3) Large scale replanting of vineyards
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World = 1.0
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NRA calculations show that South African agriculture is relatively unprotected – similar to Australia, Chile and New Zealand (Argentina still taxes agriculture) But output and export growth has been slowest in South Africa Why: poor resources or investor confidence? Or do we just have to wait longer to reap the benefits (or pay the price!)
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