1. Doctrine for Counter Insurgency: The British Army’s Experience
Colonel Alexander Alderson
Afghan COIN Centre

2. Counterinsurgency
“Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by the Government to defeat insurgency”

5. The Evolution of COIN Doctrine
Northern
Ireland
SOPs
2009
2001
Counter Insurgency Operations
1972
Counter-Revolutionary Operations
NI, Oman
1966
Counter-Revolutionary Operations Peace
Aden
1950
1957 and Keeping the Peace
Malaya, Kenya, Borneo
Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power
Palestine, Malaya
Control
1934 – Notes on Imperial Policing
1909 – Field Service Regulations
Maj. Gen. Sir Charles Gwynn’s Imperial Policing
Expansion
Callwell’s Small Wars

6. Field Service Regulations (1909)

7. 1923 – Minimum Force?
Amritsar, India – April 13, 1919

8. Amritsar: the Change to Policy
“The principles which have consistently governed the policy of His Majesty’s Government are determined that [Minimum Force] shall remain, the primary factor of policy whenever circumstances unfortunately necessitate the suppression of civil disorder by military force within the British Empire.”

9. Gwynn: Imperial Policing (1934)
Questions of policy remain vested in the civil Government
The amount of military force employed must be the minimum the situation demands
Take firm and timely action
Co-operation: the task of restoring order does not rest on the Army alone

10. Inter-War Assumption: Status quo ante?

11. Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (1952)
“The Job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture CT in Malaya. This book shows in a clear and easily readable form the proven principles by which this can be done. This book is by no means perfect. Criticisms and improvements are invited by GOC Malaya, who will produce a revised edition in six months’ time.”

12. ‘Warn the crowd by all available means that effective fire will be opened unless the crowd disperses at once. This can be done by a call on the bugle, followed by the display of banners showing the necessary warning in the vernacular.’
Land Operations Volume III, Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 1969, Part 2, p. 103

13. Sir Robert Thompson
The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable
Function in accordance with law
The government must have an overall plan
Give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas
In the guerrilla phase, secure base areas first

15. Deter, Disrupt, Dislocate
Shape
Domestic and International Audiences
Host Country Security Forces
Local Population
Key Local Leaders
Host Country Government
Other Agencies
Detainees
Media
Develop
Host Nation Security Forces: train, mentor, monitor and embed
Support better governance
Support economic development
Restore essential services
Secure
Clear-Hold-Build
Find-Fix-Strike
Deter, Disrupt, Dislocate

16. Elements of Effective Security
Security for the Population
Presence
Continuity
Embedded Training Teams
Intelligence
ISTAR
Influence
Education

17. Primacy of Political Purpose
Gain and Maintain Popular Support
Operate in accordance
With the Law
Unity of Effort
Understand the Human Terrain
Integrate Intelligence
Secure the
Population
Prepare for the Long Term
Neutralize the
Insurgent
Learn and Adapt

19. Conclusions