1. Public Administration Reform: Comparative Perspectives Tony Verheijen Senior Public Sector Specialist World Bank

2. Key issues in PAR Rationale: internally or externally driven, ideologically driven or based on economic necessity Rationale: internally or externally driven, ideologically driven or based on economic necessity Sequencing Sequencing Tools: managerial tools, legislation Tools: managerial tools, legislation Management: what works under what conditions? Management: what works under what conditions? Models, what value under what conditions Models, what value under what conditions

3. Rationale: relevance Rationale for reform may determine approach to reform support: Internally driven processes mainly need an emphasis on technical (substantive) support Internally driven processes mainly need an emphasis on technical (substantive) support Externally driven processes need conviction and sound argumentation as well as a close understanding of context Externally driven processes need conviction and sound argumentation as well as a close understanding of context

4. Rationale: internal drivers Internally driven PAR processes are still relatively rare: PAR can be costly and brings few immediate benefits to those who initiate PAR can be costly and brings few immediate benefits to those who initiate Vested interests tend to be strong, both political and administrative Vested interests tend to be strong, both political and administrative Processes tend to be technical, don’t speak to the imagination of politicians and voters Processes tend to be technical, don’t speak to the imagination of politicians and voters

5. Rationale: internal drivers Likelihood of internally driven processes: 1. Ideologically motivated (NPM reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, UK, NZ, but also Latvia 1996, Estonia, etc.) 2. Economic necessity: hardship and extreme fiscal constraints require downsizing and prioritization (Lithuania, 1999, Slovakia, 2000) 3. Administration considered a brake on other reform processes (Ukraine) 4. State building considerations (Kazakhstan)

6. Internal drivers, ctd. Chances of success: Ideologically driven: depends on the staying power of the initiators and their ability to continue ‘conviction politics’ (few and rare success cases) Ideologically driven: depends on the staying power of the initiators and their ability to continue ‘conviction politics’ (few and rare success cases) Need driven: ‘patching up’ or the start of a long term process? (Czech Republic vs. Lithuania) Need driven: ‘patching up’ or the start of a long term process? (Czech Republic vs. Lithuania)

7. External drivers Integration processes Integration processes IFI driven reform IFI driven reform

8. Integration processes Reform processes often a combination of external conditions and internal need for reform (awareness of adaptation pressure) Reform processes often a combination of external conditions and internal need for reform (awareness of adaptation pressure) Success depends on the credibility of conditions and the degree of complexity of the agenda Success depends on the credibility of conditions and the degree of complexity of the agenda Few examples of adaptation processes arising from economic integration per se (NAFTA and Mexico) Few examples of adaptation processes arising from economic integration per se (NAFTA and Mexico)

9. IFI driven reforms IFI conditionalities: Do they constitute a shared agenda (always the initial objective) Do they constitute a shared agenda (always the initial objective) How reasonable are they perceived to be (quality of design, link to existing national policy issues) How reasonable are they perceived to be (quality of design, link to existing national policy issues) Are IFIs used as a ‘cover’ for already planned reforms or really externally imposed Are IFIs used as a ‘cover’ for already planned reforms or really externally imposed

10. Problems with IFI conditions IMF PAR conditions often too generic (IMF does not have internal capacity on PSR), causes either resistance or compliance without change IMF PAR conditions often too generic (IMF does not have internal capacity on PSR), causes either resistance or compliance without change WB conditions often too ‘soft’, PAR still too rarely a central element of adjustment operations, with few exceptions (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) WB conditions often too ‘soft’, PAR still too rarely a central element of adjustment operations, with few exceptions (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) However, a well designed package can bring good results (e.g. Bulgaria)

11. Sequencing What comes first, people, structures?? Too often reforms are started without putting the appropriate conditions in place: a cause of failure of many processes

12. Sequencing ctd. Investing in strategies is crucial: Clarifies the rationale for reform Clarifies the rationale for reform Builds consensus on the reform agenda Builds consensus on the reform agenda Allows reflection on sequence of steps Allows reflection on sequence of steps Prepares constituencies for the implications of the process Prepares constituencies for the implications of the process Still: good strategies are very rare, few go beyond formality

13. After strategies: what next? Policy management system Policy management system Administrative structures and accountability Administrative structures and accountability Civil Service reform Civil Service reform However, sequence often is the reverse: the temptation to start with people…..

14. Reform tools Managerial tools vs. legislation Still often seen as ‘either, or’ Still often seen as ‘either, or’ In fact two sides of the same process: diagnostic tools can help shape legislation In fact two sides of the same process: diagnostic tools can help shape legislation Too often law drafting is started too early: the need to resist the temptation of legal quick fixes (especially in states with a ‘continental’ tradition) Too often law drafting is started too early: the need to resist the temptation of legal quick fixes (especially in states with a ‘continental’ tradition) The record of using managerial tools is not good: successful examples are few and far between (design flaws, complexity, ambitions, problems with implementation tools) The record of using managerial tools is not good: successful examples are few and far between (design flaws, complexity, ambitions, problems with implementation tools)

15. Reform tools ctd. Change management and training: The most underestimated and underused tools The most underestimated and underused tools Change management too often pitched at the wrong level Change management too often pitched at the wrong level PAR training capacity often overly conservative: running after the facts, donor driven institutions, politicization of appointments PAR training capacity often overly conservative: running after the facts, donor driven institutions, politicization of appointments

16. PAR Management What works best depends on national traditions and administrative culture: ‘Strong ministry-weak center systems’: ministry- based reform management may be a solution, but risk of PAR being crowded out is significant ‘Strong ministry-weak center systems’: ministry- based reform management may be a solution, but risk of PAR being crowded out is significant In ‘strong center’ systems: PAR should be placed at the CoG In ‘strong center’ systems: PAR should be placed at the CoG Special PAR ministries: record is not good, tend to be marginalized unless linked with a central unit (design-implementation distinctions, Serbia, Romania?) Special PAR ministries: record is not good, tend to be marginalized unless linked with a central unit (design-implementation distinctions, Serbia, Romania?)

17. Models: attractive but deceptive NPM: a model that led its own life 1990s: NPM used as a ‘cure for all ills’ and applied in a variety of contexts (from Mongolia to Latvia and the Pacific Islands)

18. NPM: why was it so attractive? Politically driven: was seen as legitimizing political interference in top management (drawback: enhanced politicization) Politically driven: was seen as legitimizing political interference in top management (drawback: enhanced politicization) Service delivery driven: seen as focusing on citizen’s needs (but: often little result beyond rhetoric) Service delivery driven: seen as focusing on citizen’s needs (but: often little result beyond rhetoric) Contracting between administrative bodies (seen as a way for ministries to create new forms of dependency) Contracting between administrative bodies (seen as a way for ministries to create new forms of dependency)

19. NPM: what have we learned? Why have NPM reforms failed to deliver in so many cases: Enhanced fragmentation in already weak coordination systems Enhanced fragmentation in already weak coordination systems Perceived and real abuse of contract-based top management systems Perceived and real abuse of contract-based top management systems Introduces advanced concepts of accountability that do not fit realities of less developed states Introduces advanced concepts of accountability that do not fit realities of less developed states Undervalues the need to build policy making capacity Undervalues the need to build policy making capacity

20. Alternative models? ‘Mixed’ reforms: the middle way applied in Northern Europe, Netherlands, Ireland: Combining NPM-based efficiency and effectiveness drive with attempt to strengthen coherence and coordination as well as retaining ‘public sector values’ Complexity of such reforms makes them difficult to apply in low capacity environments

21. Alternative models: incremental and gradual Continental European approaches: Piecemeal reforms in small steps may eventually bring (good) results However: not really applicable to systems in needs of significant reform

22. Models: conclusion Is there any sense in following models?? Picking measures rather than wholesale application of models is likely to work better Picking measures rather than wholesale application of models is likely to work better Being weary of exporters of ideology pays: culture and tradition remain key determinants of success, models are not Being weary of exporters of ideology pays: culture and tradition remain key determinants of success, models are not