1. Can DNS Blacklists Keep Up With Bots? Anirudh Ramachandran, David Dagon, and Nick Feamster College of Computing, Georgia Tech

2. Background DNS-based Blacklists –The most prevalent network-level spam filtering mechanism today –Various criteria: open relays/proxies, virus senders, bad/unused address spaces etc. –Hundreds of DNSBLs of all sizes Two distinct issues –Detection First opportunity to classify an IP/message –Response How long it takes after detection for blacklisting to occur

3. Effectiveness of A DNSBL – Pertinent Questions What is the responsiveness of the DNSBL? An important metric, esp. with the proliferation of spam hosts with dynamic IPs (botnets) What is the completeness of the DNSBL? How many distinct domains are targeted before blacklisting happens? Does frequency of spam from a host change after it is blacklisted?

4. A Model of Responsiveness Response Time –Difficult to calculate without “ground truth” –Can still estimate lower bound Infection S-Day Possible Detection Opportunity RBL Listing Time Response Time Fig: Conceptual life-cycle of a spamming host

5. Our Approach Data: –1.5 days worth of packet captures of DNSBL queries from a mirror of Spamhaus –46 days of pcaps from a hijacked C&C for a Bobax botnet; overlaps with DNSBL queries Method: –Monitor DNSBL queries for lookups for known Bobax hosts Look for first query (S-Day or Detection opportunity approximation) Look for the first time a query respose had a ‘listed’ status (RBL Listing approximation)

6. Preliminary Results Observed 81,950 DNSBL queries for 4,295 (out of over 2 million) Bobax IPs Completeness: Only 255 (6%) Bobax IPs were blacklisted through the end of the Bobax trace (46 days) Responsiveness: –88 IPs became listed during the 1.5 day DNSBL trace –34 of these were listed after a single detection opportunity

7. Over 60% are queried by just one IP/AS –Increases response time (i.e., decreases chances of getting reported) Domains Performing Lookups Distinct IP addresses/domains CDF

8. Conclusion DNSBL responsiveness is relatively unstudied –Proposal for a Model of Responsiveness –Points to ponder: Blacklist responsiveness and its effects Preliminary results: –Responsiveness might be low –60% bots target just one domain Future work: –Changes in spamming frequency pre/post blacklisting –Reanalyze with complete DNSBL lookups; other spamming bot data

9. Questions?