1. UNICEF Social Protection Work an overview Show and Tell on Social Protection Bonn, 2011 “Social Protection for Families and Children” Tuesday, May 20, 2014 David Stewart Child Poverty and Social Protection Unit, UNICEF

2. General Overview 1.UNICEF’s work and the UNICEF approach 2.The impacts of social protection 3.The reasons behind reluctance

3. A quick reminder of the need for social prot.

5. A quick reminder of why

6. 6 UNICEF’s work and approach to Social Protection

7. UNICEF Social Protection Framework 1.Progressive realization 2.National ownership 3.Moving towards systems

8. “Social protection is the set of public and private policies and programmes aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating economic and social vulnerabilities to poverty and deprivation.” UNICEF’s definition

9. -UNICEF supports social protection in 104 countries (71 cash transfer programs in 52 countries) reaching about 12 million households UNICEF’s work on Social Protection

12. 12 The impacts (of cash transfers!)

13. Cost or the need to work for not attending school

14. Evidence of SP impact on Nutrition Food expenditure Nutrition outcomes CountryProgrammeImpact Bangladesh Chars Livelihood Programme/Cash -for-work Over 99% of beneficiaries of the Chars Livelihoods Programme reported spending money earned from the programme on food. BrazilBolsa Família/CCT Rural households on the Bolsa Familia scheme were found to spend as much as 88% of the cash received on food. Colombia Familias en Acción/CCT Average increase of 0.58 kg for newborns in urban areas attributed to better nutrition during pregnancy. South Africa Old Age Pension/CSG Female pension eligibility results in an increase of 0.6 standard deviations in young girls’ weight-for-height z-scores. ZambiaCGP/ UCT Increased the weight for height of 0.196 z-scores among children ages 3 to 5 years and increased infant and young child feeding by 22 percentage points.

15. Evidence of SP impact on Health Utilisation Health outcomes CountryProgrammeImpact AfghanistanUser fee removal 400% increase in health centre utilisation. Bangladesh Vouchers for maternal health Institutional delivieries from 2% to 18%, antenatal care from 42% to 89% BrazilBolsa Familia Probability that all vaccines delivered increased by 12-15 percentage points. ColombiaCCT Diarrhoea decreased from 32.6% to 22%. Probability of immunization compliance increased. MalawiUCTReported incidence of illness dropped by 23% points

16. Evidence of SP impact on Education Enrolment and attendance Outcomes CountryProgrammeImpact CambodiaCCT Enrolment and attendance of girls up by 30-43% percentage points. ChinaCCT High school drop out rate reduced by 60% Brazil and others ManySignificant increase in enrolment and/or attendance KenyaOVC-CT8% point increase in enrolment PeruCCTPositive impact on secondary school transition ?

17. Evidence of SP impact on Child protection Child Labour Violence CountryProgrammeImpact Brazil CT and after school Children worked 50% less EthiopiaCash for work Reduction in child wage employment PakistanCCTGirls labour force participation down, age at marriage up PanamaCCTReduction in child labour among 12-15 years olds by 15.8% MalawiCT/UCT Decline in sexual activity among adolescent girls, drop in marriage (40%) and pregnancy rates (30%) ??

18. Length of time that food stores are projected to last by household (“intervention” households receive a cash transfer under the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot; “control” households do not) SP in times of crisis: example from Malawi

19. Cost or the need to work for not attending school

20. Impact of abolishing school fees on enrolment

21. Social protection is not a silver bullet…

23. 23 The reasons behind reluctance

24. What the bottlenecks and what can we do? 1- What are the three main blockages to bring the social protection agenda forward at national level? 2- What are the key changes at the global/regional level that could help unlock some of these national blockages?

25. Design and implementation issues

26.  Conditionality HH decision makers lack information or knowledge. Address norms that can harm children Political support

27. Design and implementation issues Conditionality HH ability to make most rational choice Implementation Marginalize the most vulnerable  X Conditionality HH decision makers lack information or knowledge. Address norms that can harm children Political support

28. Design and implementation issues Conditionality HH ability to make most rational choice Implementation Marginalize the most vulnerable  X Conditionality HH decision makers lack information or knowledge. Address norms that can harm children Political support ? Conditional vs. Unconditional

29. Reasons behind reluctance Dependency – a hand up, not a hand out Ghana LEAP/UCTincreased likelihood of holding savings of 11 % points South Africa Old age pension53% of transfers to men and 82% of transfers to women were saved, compared to 50% of non-pension income Mexico Progressa/ CCT2% of the transfers are invested in productive assets such as land Kenya CT-OVCReceipt of the CT-OVC led to a 15 and 6 % point increase respectively in the share of smaller and female-headed households owning small animals.

30. Reasons behind reluctance Dependency – a hand up, not a hand out Ghana LEAP/UCTincreased likelihood of holding savings of 11 % points South Africa Old age pension53% of transfers to men and 82% of transfers to women were saved, compared to 50% of non-pension income Mexico Progressa/ CCT2% of the transfers are invested in productive assets such as land Kenya CT-OVCReceipt of the CT-OVC led to a 15 and 6 % point increase respectively in the share of smaller and female-headed households owning small animals.

31. Reasons behind reluctance Dependency – a hand up, not a hand out Long term effects of improved human capital Address market failure (lack of access to credit, insurance) Reduce burden on social networks Infusion of cash can lead to multiplier effects in local village economy Ghana LEAP/UCTincreased likelihood of holding savings of 11 % points South Africa Old age pension53% of transfers to men and 82% of transfers to women were saved, compared to 50% of non-pension income Mexico Progressa/ CCT2% of the transfers are invested in productive assets such as land Kenya CT-OVCReceipt of the CT-OVC led to a 15 and 6 % point increase respectively in the share of smaller and female-headed households owning small animals.

32. Households invest in livelihood activities— though impact varies by country ZambiaMalawiKenyaLesothoGhana Agricultural inputs+++- - -+++++ Agricultural tools+++ NS Agricultural production+++NS++(1)NS Home production of food NS+++ NS Livestock ownershipAll types Small++(2)NS Non farm enterprise (NFE) +++NS 1)Maize and garden plot vegetables 2)Pigs Stronger impact Mixed impact Less impact

33. Reasons behind reluctance It’s too expensive!

34. Subsidy vs SP spending Source: Fiszbein, Kanbur and Yemtsov (2013): “Social Protection, Poverty and the Post-2015 Agenda,” The World Bank 34

35. In summary… 1.Children are overrepresented among the poor 2.For UNICEF: progressive realization, national ownership and a move towards systems. 3.The evidence clearly shows SP makes a difference for children. 4.We need to listen and understand the reluctance to expand programmes, and how to address these concerns. Ghana LEAP/UCTincreased likelihood of holding savings of 11 % points South Africa Old age pension53% of transfers to men and 82% of transfers to women were saved, compared to 50% of non-pension income Mexico Progressa/ CCT2% of the transfers are invested in productive assets such as land Kenya CT-OVCReceipt of the CT-OVC led to a 15 and 6 % point increase respectively in the share of smaller and female-headed households owning small animals.

36. UNICEF Social Protection Work an overview Show and Tell on Social Protection Bonn, 2011 Thank you! Contacts: dstewart@unicef.org

37. UNICEF Social Protection Strategic Framework: http://www.unicef.org/socialprotection/framework/ http://www.unicef.org/socialprotection/framework/ Transfer project : http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer Protection to Production project : http://www.fao.org/economic/ptop/home/en/ http://www.fao.org/economic/ptop/home/en/ For more information…

38. What the bottlenecks and what can we do? 1- What are the three main blockages to bring the social protection agenda forward at national level? 2- What are the key changes at the global/regional level that could help unlock some of these national blockages?

39. The time to invest in children is now

40. Household monetary poverty Inequitable access to quality services Child and household characteristics that may increase the likelihood of discrimination or disadvantage  Design and implementation matter Addressing the drivers of child poverty

41. Programme scale (BOE)

42. Subsidy vs SP spending Source: Fiszbein, Kanbur and Yemtsov (2013): “Social Protection, Poverty and the Post-2015 Agenda,” The World Bank 42

43. Evidence of SP impact on nutrition: the “critical window” Heterogenous Treatment Effects by Age of Treatment South Africa’s Child Support Grant (CSG) is closely linked to improvements in nutrition. The CSG is an unconditional cash transfer (paid out to mothers) which began in 1998 and now reaches 11 million children. However, the age at which children begin receiving the CSG determines how large the impact of the program on height-for-age (HA) will be. The impact is positive when treatment started at the youngest age but decreases as age of initial treatment rises. There is a critical window of opportunity for SP to have an impact on long-term nutritional outcomes.

44. 44 Design & Implementation issues

45. Design and implementation considerations ~ There is no one-size-fits-all in SP design and implementation. ~ Size of the transfer : should reflect the cost of a nutritious diet and adjust to price increases. (Rule of thumb of 20 % of mean consumption) Frequency of the transfer: Delivery needs to be predictable, timely and convenient to allow planning and consumption smoothing. Frequent transfers increase the probability that money is spend on food and health. Age at enrollment of the beneficiary: the sooner the higher the impact on nutrition outcomes and child development (critical window 0-2 y.) Recipient of the transfer: Benefits paid to women significally increase the proportion of household expenditures that go to food Type of transfer: depending on the context and the preferences of beneficiaries, also on the availability of the necessary food items in that particular region/country. UNICEF’S position on key design issues: Conditionalities should not be assumed to be most effective in all contexts (little evidence that it is more effective, added cost, risks of reducing access, increased strain on beneficiaries, etc.) Targeting: human rights, political, resource and capacity considerations SP design should be inclusive of socially vulnerable groups and child-sensitive: - consider intra-household distribution issues - critical window of opportunity in child’s development

46. Social cash transfers targeted to poorest of the poor can have productive impacts Long term effects of improved human capital – Nutritional and health status; educational attainment – Labor productivity and employability Transfers can relax some of constraints brought on by market failure (lack of access to credit, insurance) – Helping households manage risk – Providing households with liquidity Transfers can reduce burden on social networks and informal insurance mechanisms Infusion of cash can lead to multiplier effects in local village economy

47. Impact on productive assets and local economy: Kenya: – CT-OVC programme had a significant impact on the accumulation of some productive assets, especially among some subgroups within the evaluation sample. – Receipt of the CT-OVC led to a 15 and six percentage point increase respectively in the share of smaller and female-headed households owning small animals. – Moreover, the CT-OVC transfer was associated with a seven percentage point increase in household participation in a non-farm enterprise for female headed households, and a similar decrease was recorded for maleheaded households. Lesotho : – By stimulating demand for locally supplied goods and services, cash transfers have productive impacts. These effects are found primarily in households ineligible for the transfers. This finding is not surprising given that the eligibility criteria for the CGP favour asset and labour- poor households. – Recipient households receive the direct benefit of the transfer plus a small spillover effect of LSL 0.15 per LSL 1.0 loti transferred. Their total income increases by LSL 3.79 million (LSL 3.42 million in real terms). The ineligible households benefit from spillovers amounting to an increase in income of LSL 3.59 million (LSL 1.08 million in real terms) with each transfer. – The productive impacts vary by sector. The cash transfers stimulate the production of crops and livestock by LSL 0.19 and LSL 0.28 per loti transferred. The largest positive effect is on retail,

48. Impact on productive assets and local economy: (2) Ghana LEAP: – Increase in non consumption expenditure: increasing savings, reducing indebtedness, asset disinvestment and re-engaging with social networks increasing savings, drawing down indebtedness, increasing gifts, and investment in some productive activities – LEAP has a positive impact on some aspects of productive activity, particularly among smaller households, supplied both more own male farm labour, as well as hired in more male farm labour—an impact evident in the qualitative work as well. – The qualitative work also found that the transfer in some cases provided working capital for income earning activities, ranging from petty trading to increase on-farm productivity. – The use of negative livelihood coping strategies, such as working as kaaya-yei porters in the south, was also reported to have been reduced.

49. Impact on productive assets and local economy: (3) Zambia significant impact on the accumulation of livestock and agricultural implements. Large effects were found on both the share of households (21 percentage points) owning animals and on the number of animals owned, especially for larger sized households positive impact on agricultural activity. Receipt of the CGP led to an 18 percent increase in the area of worked land as well as an increase in the use of agricultural inputs, including seeds, fertilizers and hired labour. led to increased production – approximately a 37 percent increase in the value of overall production. The increase in production appeared to be primarily sold rather than consumed on farm; the CGP led to a 12 percentage point increase (from a 23 percent base) in the share of households selling their harvest. Finally, in term of labour supply, receipt of the CGP transfer led family members to reduce participation in, and intensity of, agricultural wage labour. The impact was particularly strong for women – a 17 percentage point reduction in participation and 12 fewer days a year. Both males and females increased time spent in family agricultural and nonagricultural businesses

50. Shift from casual wage labor to on farm and family productive activities adultsZambiaKenyaMalawiLesothoGhana Agricultural/casual wage labor - - - --NS Family farm+++ NS+++ Non farm business (NFE)+++ NS Non agricultural wage labor+++NS children Wage laborNS - - -NS Family farmNS- - - (1)+++NS 1) Particularly older boys Shift from casual wage labour to family business—consistently reported in qualitative fieldwork No clear picture on child labor (but positive impacts on schooling)

51. Improved ability to manage risk ZambiaKenyaMalawiGhanaLesotho Negative risk coping- - - Pay off debt+++ NS Borrowing- - -NS- - -NS Purchase on creditNS Savings+++ Give informal transfersNS+++ Receive informal transfers- - -NS+++ Strengthened social networks In all countries, re-engagement with social networks of reciprocity— informal safety net Allow households to participate, to “mingle” again Reduction in negative risk coping strategies Increase in savings, paying off debt and credit worthiness

52. Cash transfers lead to income multipliers across the region Production constraints can limit local supply response, which may lead to higher prices and a lower multiplier Every 1 Birr transferred can generate 2.52 Birr of income If constraints are binding, may be as low as 1.84

53. Nearly all the spillover goes to non-beneficiary households

54. Stimulating local economies. SP can have significant multiplicative effects on others in the local economy. In Malawi, a cash transfer program generated up to US$2.45 in local communities for every dollar provided to beneficiaries. In Lesotho and Mexico, similar programs are estimated to have, respectively, a multiplier effect of US$2.23 and up to US$2.60 per dollar distributed. Promoting better job opportunities in the future. Oportunidades reaching 6.5 m. HH sparked demand for higher-level education and improved job prospects. Recent evaluations show that former beneficiaries are more likely to enter middle-class occupations than non-beneficiaries. This result is particularly significant for indigenous women who had participated in Oportunidades. On average, their share in better-paying jobs was about 25 percentage points higher than their peers who did not benefit from the program. Recent Evidence: SP stimulates local growth, education, health and job creation

55. Household monetary poverty Inequitable access to quality services Child and household characteristics that may increase the likelihood of discrimination or disadvantage Addressing the drivers of child poverty