1. Logical behaviourism: objections
Michael Lacewing

2. Logical behaviourism
Mental states are dispositions of a person to behave in certain ways (in certain circumstances)
Talk about the mind and mental states is talk about behaviour

3. Mental causation
Ryle: mental states aren’t causes – to think that they are is a category mistake
To cite a disposition is not to cite a cause
Obj: there is mental causation
Even if dispositions aren’t causes in the same sense as events, they are part of the ‘causal story’
E.g. the flying stone won’t break the glass if it is not brittle

4. Davidson’s argument
‘I went to the party because I thought it would be fun’
My thought is causally relevant to my action
Suppose I also believe that you’ll be at the party, and I want to see you. But suppose that my reason for going is not to see you, but because I want to have fun
How is this possible? I have both dispositions
My reason for going is the one that causes my action

5. Is mind without body conceivable?
If mental states are behavioural dispositions, only creatures that can behave have mental states
So mind without body is inconceivable – a category mistake
But mind without body is conceivable
So behaviourism is false
Reply: we are wrong to think that mind without body is conceivable

6. Multiple realizability
Which behaviour is a mental state a disposition to?
Multiple realizability: different people can express the same mental state by different behaviours in the same situation
How can these different dispositions be the same mental state?
Reply: On the whole, people with the same mental state have similar dispositions
Fear: facial expression; saying ‘yes’ to ‘are you scared?’ …

7. Multiple realizability
The same behaviour can express different mental states
E.g. running towards a lion
Depends on what else one believes and desires
Reply: ‘Behaviour’ doesn’t name a single ‘piece’ of behaviour
Can’t tell from this what disposition is being expressed – need to consider broader spectrum of behaviour
This doesn’t remain the same while expressing different mental states

8. Circularity There is no set behaviour correlated with a mental state
Can’t analyze what dispositions to behaviour a mental state without referring to other mental states
A particular belief is compatible with any behaviour at all, depending on what else you believe or want

9. Circularity
So different mental states may be dispositions to the same behaviour, depending on other mental states.
And the same mental state may be dispositions to different behaviour, depending on other mental states
So mental states can’t be analyzed as behavioural dispositions

10. Reply
Ryle: we can’t reduce mental concepts to a set of behavioural dispositions
They are ‘indefinite’
Dispositional statements can’t be completely analyzed either
But mental concepts are still concepts of behavioural dispositions, just at a higher level of generality
So the circularity objection is correct, but not an objection

11. Knowledge of the mind
Dualism thinks of mental states as ‘inner’ and defends an asymmetry of knowledge
Our mental states are inaccessible to other people
But known to us through conscious introspection

12. Knowledge of the mind Behaviourism rejects this
We don’t have to infer that someone has a mind from their behaviour
To say that someone has certain behaviour dispositions just is to say they have a mind
So we can know other people’s mental states
But now, can I only know my own mental states by observing my behaviour??
If they are behavioural dispositions, how could ‘introspection’ reveal them?

13. Knowledge of the mind Ryle: conscious introspection is a myth
We pay attention to ourselves just as we pay attention to others’ behaviour
To know what you think is just to be ready to say what you think
We just have more evidence – thinking is inner speech

14. Mental states without behaviour
Many conscious mental states, e.g. pain, have a particular feeling, ‘what it is like’ – this cannot be understood just as a behavioural disposition
Behaviourism misses the phenomenology of the mind
Putnam’s ‘super-spartans’
Through culture, they have no disposition to express pain at all
Yet they feel pain