1. SMART CARDS Contents of today’s lecture: 3. Security issues
1. Introduction
What is a smart card?
Use of SM’s
Objectives
Future views
HST-project
2. Technology
Physical structure
Different types of SM’s
Chip
Standards
3. Security issues
Features
Authentication
Signatures
SET
4. Applications
Multiple Application Smart Card Systems
Electronic Smart Passport/Visa
Different applications of the future

2. Introduction to smart cards - What is a smart card?
A credit card-sized plastic token with an embedded microchip (integrated circuit chip)
Provides
Persistent, protected storage
Memory capacity (4K - 32K is typical)
Computational capability and Processing power (a small CPU)
Self-contained
 Doesn’t need to depend on potentially vulnerable external resources
Today, smart cards are used by millions of cardholders worldwide and are at work in more than 90 countries, primarily in Europe and the Far East, processing point-of-sale transactions, managing records, and protecting computers and secure facilities.

3. SMART…? Usage of smart cards
In different applications which require strong security protection and authentication
Identification card
Medical card
Credit/debit bank card (as an electric wallet)
All require sensitive data to be stored on the card, such as:
biometrics information
personal medical history
cryptographic keys for authentication
Logging on to networks
Wirelessly:
Public transport payments (tickets) etc.

4. Objectives
Accelerate and harmonize the development and the use of sm’s
Interoperability:
- Build a consensus for system interoperability
- Harmonize smart cards based infrastructures across sectors
Multi-application cards:
- Advance smart card technology for seamless use of multi-application cards.
- Contribute to the development of innovative applications and services.
Security of transactions:
- Agree on common protection profiles and specifications.
- Develop certification services and cryptography support.
User Acceptance of Smart cards
Accessibility

5. Interoperability different cards are usually not interchangeable
Memory cards usually have different interface characteristics from microprocessor cards:
different data formats and/or electrical signals across the interface between card and terminal
provide the different mixes of applications that various types of cardholder will want (BUT: rarely accepted at the moment)
A rare example of an attempt at interoperability:
The UK EMV bank debit/credit card scheme demands interchangeability from its various suppliers - and gets it at the level at which the cards are used by the cardholder.

6. Future views
“Smart cards are the keys to the media and information revolution no matter whether it is wired or wireless”
magnetic strip card will be replaced and integrated together into a multi-application card
Use becomes daily
Will be used to carry a lot of sensitive and critical data
issues about whether or not the smart card is secure and safe enough to store that information

7. HST-project (Finnish research in 1999)
A Governmental project in Finland to build national Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Key concept in HST is Electronic ID-card, smart card which contains users cryptographic keys and certificates.
With this card and other PKI components person can be digitally identified in Internet where he or she can use it for example to sign documents.
Card contains its own operating system, special RSA-processor, specific software and certificates. In the card there are two certificates and private keys: one for authentication and encryption, other one for digital signature. Certificates are protected with PIN-codes which are only known to the card owner.
More of this can be read at:

8. Technology
Physical structure
Different types of SM’s
Chip / Standards

9. Physical Structure Made up of three elements
A physical card (plastic)
A printed circuit chip
An integrated circuit chip (microcontroller)
(Chips are embedded on the card)
Printed circuit conforms to ISO standard 7816/3 which provides five connection points for power and data
The printed circuit protects the circuit chip from mechanical stress and static electricity
The capability of a smart card is defined by its integrated circuit chip.
Chip made from silicon which is not flexible and particularly easy to break
In general, the size, the thickness and bend requirements for the smart card are designed to protect the card from being spoiled physically

10. Different types of SM’s
Java cards
SIM cards
eCash cards
Contact / Contactless Smart Cards
Proximity cards
Hybrid/twin cards
Combi cards

11. Contact / Contactless Smart Cards
Cards the size of a conventional credit or debit card with a single embedded integrated circuit chip that contains just memory or memory plus a microprocessor.
Popular Uses: Network security, vending, meal plans, loyalty, electronic cash, government IDs, campus IDs, e-commerce, health cards
CONTACTLESS:
Cards containing an embedded antenna instead of contact pads attached to the chip for reading and writing information contained in the chip's memory.
Popular Uses: Student identification, electronic passport, vending, parking, tolls, IDs

12. Proximity cards Hybrid/twin cards Combi cards
"Prox cards" communicate through an antenna similar to contactless smart cards except that they are read-only.
Uses: Security, identification and access control
Cards containing two or more embedded chip technologies such as a prox chip with its antenna and a contact smart chip with its contact pads are Hybrid/twin cards.
Uses: Accommodates legacy system infrastructure while adding applications that require different e-card technologies
The combi card has one smart chip embedded in the card that can be accessed. This form of smart card is growing in popularity because it provides ease-of-use and high security in a single card product. 
Uses: Mass transit and access control combined with other applications such as network security, vending, meal plans, loyalty, etc.

13. Java card
The Java Card specifications enable Java technology to run on smart cards and other devices with limited memory
Multi-Application Capable
- Java Card technology enables multiple applications to co-exist securely on a single smart card
Dynamic:
- New applications can be installed securely
Secure:
- relies on the inherent security of the Java programming language to provide a secure execution environment.
- platform's proven industry deployments and security evaluations ensure that card issuers benefit from the most capable and secure technology available today.

14. CHIP - What does the chip contain and what is it made for?
Made for the portable storage and retrieval of data
Used memory types:
ROM Read only memory (mask ROM)
PROM Programmable read only memory
EPROM Erasable programmable ROM
EEPROM Electrically erasable PROM
RAM Random access memory
Memory-only chips are functionally similar to a small floppy disk.
Chips that contain both memory and a microprocessor are also similar to a small floppy disk, except they contain an "intelligent" controller used to securely add, delete, change, and update information contained in memory.

15. Standards
The standardization of smart card systems is an ongoing process. One of the standards most referred to is the ISO-7816 standard. It is divided as follows:
Part 1: Physical characteristics
Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts
Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols
Part 4: Industry commands for interchange
Part 5: Number system and registration procedure for application identifiers
Part 6: Interindustry data elements
Present projects:
Smart MEIJI is a joint project designed to reinforce co-operation between Europe and Japan in the field of smart cards

16. SECURITY ISSUES
- Features
- Authentication
- Signatures
- SET

17. Security features
An important aspect to smart cards to prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to information contained on the card.
The advantage smart cards have over magnetic stripe cards is that the smart card contains the computer chip which stores the password or PIN.
the password is not sent over a communication line to a computer system for verification, which can easily be tapped.
most important part of a smart card is the software that provide the applications
It has been established that any secure transaction involves 6 generic functions:
Data Protection
Identification of the cardholder
Mutual authentication
Secure writing
Certification or signature
Encryption
The security imposed to protect the transmission between the card and the outside world by the mean of cryptographic technique in order to control the:
writing operation
authentication the card or the terminal
origin of the message
transmission of cryptographic keys

18. Authentication
The most common method used for cardholder verification at present is to give the cardholder a PIN (Personal Identification Number) which he or she has to remember.
PINs can be stolen or abused.
The only truly effective method of Cardholder Verification is the measurement of a physiological characteristic unique to an individual and incapable of fraudulent replication or abuse.
Biometrics:
Iris and Retinal scans,
Face or Hand geometry,
DNA,
most acceptable attribute is the fingerprint.

19. Signatures Electronic signatures in combination with a PKI.
Loaded with private key(s), public key certificates and some ways to point securely to non-repudiation policies
The loading procedure and the data formats need to be specified.
The use of standardized APIs to allow electronic signature enabled applications to interface with any kind of smart card is to be considered
Blind signatures allow privacy features to be built into applications.
Ecash, for instance, uses blind signatures to offer payer anonymity.
Privacy issues are certain to play an increasingly important role in the continuing development of digital signature applications.

20. SET (Secure Electronic Transaction)
When a purchase is made:
- the user's credit card account information is verified as authentic to the vendor and then debited at the user's financial institution.
- All transmissions of information are secure through the use of the SET (Secure Electronic Transaction) Protocol 1.0, developed by Visa and MasterCard, which encrypts all data during transmission.

21. APPLICATIONS Application areas Multiple Application Smart Card Systems
Different applications of today and the future

22. Applications
With advanced technologies special solutions for various applications have been created with smart cards, for example in the fields of:
Mobile telephony
Gaming and Wagering
Healthcare systems
Network security
Personnel access
Logistics management
Multiple basic application areas and industries in our daily lives

23. Multi-application sm’s
Most of the smart card systems in use today serve one purpose and are related to just one process:
smart telephone card
electronic money
medical card
electronic identification card
All of these applications are stored in different smart card systems separately  require users to carry multiple cards for multiple applications
The smart card has the capability to integrate those applications together to form a multiple application card by utilizing its embedded microprocessor and memory storage spaces.
3 different infrastructures of multiple application smart card systems

24. LAST SLIDE…
Any questions ?
Thank you for your time!

25. 2.2 Life cycle of smart card
2. Security
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Life cycle of smart card
2.3 Logical Structure
2.4 Access Control

26. 2.1 Introduction
What makes the smart card better than normal magnetic stripe card?
The advantage smart cards have over magnetic stripe cards is that the smart card contains the computer chip which stores the password or PIN
Therefore, the password is not sent over a communication line to a computer system for verification, which can easily be tapped.

27. 2.2 Life cycle of smart card
Divided into five phases (on most smart cards)
These phases justified by
Limitation of transfer and access of data is incremental throughout different phases
Different areas of smart card protected throughout the life cycle

28. 2.2.1 Fabrication phase Carried out by the chip manufacturers
A Fabrication Key (KF) is added to protect the chip
unique and is derived from a master manufacturer key
Fabrication data will be written to the circuit chip

29. 2.2.2 Pre-personalisation phase
Done by Card manufacturers
Chip will be mounted on the plastic card
The connection between the chip and the printed circuit will be made
Fabrication key (KF) changed to Personalisation key (KP)
Personalisation lock Vper
No further modification of the KF
Physical memory access instructions will be disabled
Access of the card can be done only by using logical memory addressing

30. 2.2.3 Personalisation phase
Conducted by the card issuers
Data files contents and application data are written to the card
Information of card holder stored to the chip (PIN, Unlocking PIN)
Utilisation lock Vutil
No further modification of the KP

31. 2.2.4 Utilisation phase Phase for the card owners use of the card
Access of information on the card will be limited by the security policies set by the application

32. 2.2.5 End-of-Life phase Two ways: 1. invalidation lock
All operations will be disabled (except read)
2. Control system irreversibly blocks access
All operations will be disabled

33. According to logical file access conditions
2.2.6 Summary of life-cycle
Areas/Phases
Fabrication
Pre-personalisation
Personalisation
Utilisation
End-of-Life
Access mode
Physical addressing
Logical addressing
System
Not accessible
Fabrication (keys)
Write KF
Write KP
Fabrication (data)
Read, write, erase
Read
Directory
According to logical file access conditions
Data
Optional code
Table 1: Phases and access rights of smart card's life cycle (Source: Philips DX smart card reference manual, 1995)

34. 2.3 Logical Structure
After a smart card is issued to the consumer, protection of the card will be controlled by the application operating system mainly
Access of data has to be done through the logical file structure on the card

35. 2.3 Logical Structure (2)
A smart card can be viewed as a disk drive, including
master file (MF) (similar to root in e.g. MS-DOS)
dedicated files (DFs) (similar to normal folder)
elementary files (EFs) (similar to normal files)

36. Figure 2: Logical file structure of smart card
2.3 Logical Structure (3)
                                                           
Figure 2: Logical file structure of smart card

37. 2.3 Logical Structure (4) In short,
the file structure of the smart card OS is similar to other common OS such as UNIX
However, it provides a greater security control
accessing conditions and file status field for each file header
file lock

38. 2.4 Access Control
Each file attached with a header which indicates the access conditions
The fundamental principle of the access control is based on the correct presentation of PIN numbers
Primarily, the access conditions can be divided into five following non-hierarchical levels ->

39. 2.4 Access Control (2) Always (ALW)
no restrictions
Card holder verification 1 & 2 (CHV1 & 2)
Access granted if valid CHV presented
Administrative (ADM)
Allocation and administrative authority
Never (NEV)
Access always forbidden

40. 2.4 Access Control (3) PIN presentations: PIN and unblocking PIN
Stored in separate elementary files (EF)
Access conditions prevent changes
Changes can be made by issuing old and new PIN
If both PINs fail, irreversible blockage will occur

41. 3. Attacks 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Logical attacks 3.3 Physical attacks
3.4 Mathematical attacks
3.5 Conclusions

42. 3.1 Introduction Target of attacks:
The secret of the cryptographic algorithm
The keys stored
The access control
Information strored on card

43. 3.2 Logical attacks Starting point:
EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable read only memory) write operations can be affected by unusual voltages and temperatures ->
information can be trapped by raising or dropping the supplied voltage to the microcontroller

44. 3.2 Logical attacks (2) Example 1. Attack of PIC16C84 microcontroller
Erasing the memory by raising the voltage VCC (Supply voltage) to VPP (Programming voltage) - 0.5V

45. 3.2 Logical attacks (3) Example 2. Attack on DS5000 security processor
A short voltage drop can release the security lock without erasing the secret data sometimes

46. 3.2 Logical attacks (4) Example 3. Usage of analogue random generator
Creates cryptographic keys that will produce an output of almost all 1’s when the supply voltage is lowered slightly.

47. 3.2 Logical attacks (5) Prevention of logical attacks
some security processors implemented sensors which will cause an alarm when there is any environmental changes

48. 3.3 Physical attacks Invasive physical attacks
Reverse engineering of the circuit chips
erasing the security lock bit by focusing UV light on the EPROM
probing the operation of the circuit by using microprobing needles
using laser cutter microscopes to explore the chip

49. 3.3 Physical attacks (2) Example 1. Invasive physical attacks
Circuit chip removed from the plastic card
The resin dissolved
The acid and resin washed away
>>>>> The chip can be examined and attacked directly (only for US $30)

50. 3.3 Physical attacks (3)
Example 2. Attacking by reverse engineering circuit chips (High quality laboratory needed)
etching away a layer of a chip at a time
thin film of a metal attached to chip creating a diode -> filmed with electron beam
PCs image processing system software used to analyze the pictures
The layout and function of the chip can then be identified

51. 3.3 Physical attacks (4) also…
Technique developed by IBM can be used to observe the operation of the chip. As a result its secret can be fully revealed

52. 3.3 Physical attacks (5) Prevention of physical attacks
Acid added to chip when the chip is tampered, acid destroys all vital information on the chip

53. 3.4 Mathematical attacks Done by mathematical geniuses
Fully theoretical
Usage of complicated mathematical calculations and formulas

54. 3.5 Conclusions
Today's, most of the attacks available are classified as attacks where the cost associated to break the system are far more than the cost of the system itself, or it has to spend several or hundred years of computing power to break into a single transaction…

55. 3.5 Conclusions (2) ..but still questions remain:
Can the PIN code be downloaded by the card reader and then stored somewhere?
When signature is used it is still possible that you don’t know what you’re signing?!