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Published byStephen Nash Modified over 9 years ago
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Explanations & Questions
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“Payments crises” (liquidity crises) Debtors (first level) stop payments Lenders (first level) income drop, reduce payments on short term loans Short-term (money market) lenders income drop, reduce payments … Consumption/Investment effects Wealth (balance sheet) effects: firms, households reduce consumption/investment as wealth decreases Debt/Income ratios: solvent firms, household reduce consumption/investment to bring debt to income ratios down
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Infinite Horizon Economy Budget Constraint: PV Income + PV Debt = Debt Service + PV Consumption “NPG” Condition: Over the long run income funds consumption (not debt) Entire economy faces a budget constraint just as households or government Sustainable Long Run Relationship: Income – Consumption – Debt Service >= 0 Income Growth > Interest Rate on Debt
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$11 Billion City Center Project Las Vegas – MGM Mirage Bank Loan/Bond Funded
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Whether Debt-instrument (bond, loan) funded or Equity (stock) funded, ultimate value is net revenue stream from project (Modigliani-Miller Theorem) High Debt or Equity values imply high expected future net revenue Consider 2 Scenarios for City Center (at $10B nominal value) Case 1: $9B in Shareholder Equity with $1B in bank debt; Case 2: $1B in Shareholder Equity with $9B in bank debt: Actual PV of future net revenue of project = $5T With project bankruptcy: Case 1: Bank claims bankruptcy value = $1B Original shareholders lose $9B New shares issued worth $4B Loss in balance sheets = $5B Case 2: Bank claims bankruptcy value = $1B Shareholders lose $1B Bank loses $8B in value up front; issues new stock and regains $4B Loss in balance sheets = $5B In both cases, assets on balance sheets over-valued by $5T; purchases made with this “leverage”
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Long Run Problems: Mortgage markets overvalued Fed & other gov’t guarantees (moral hazard) pushing mortgage markets Fed supplied too much money to markets in early 2000sseparating “systemic” v. non-systemic problems Poor pricing models separating “systemic” v. non- systemic problems pushing too much money into mortgage markets Short Run Sparks Uncertainty about Fed reaction Lack of Fed reaction (2007-08) Marked-to-market accounting for mortgages
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See mortgage debt as leading indicator, not as only cause Fire analogy: room with fire in it first does not tell you about the fuel and match Mortgage debt securitized-tradeable; Quickly reflecting change in valuations Commercial bank loans non-tradeable; Held at bank estimated values for longer
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Securitization, e.g. CDOs Pooling mortgage (other debt) risk (CDOs, SPVs) Credit Insurance Transferring Risk (CDS) Cochrane: can shuffle risk around, but not change total amount Evaluation: CDOs, CDS actually relatively small versus size of overall debt growth
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How big of an effect is possible from MTM pricing of banks? See SEC Dec. 2008 Study www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf 31% of bank assets MTM 22% of these impact income statement Part of this amount in Treasuries Differences in MTM and “amortized cost” If 20% difference, then 4.4% impact on income Currently, using “amortized cost” method Citi assets increase by apx. $3B (out of $1.2T) BoA assets increase by apx. $9B (out of $1.4T)
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Cochrane: Specify systemic risk for Fed, limiting TBTF Stiglitz, … Limit financial innovation More stringent oversight Poole, Bullard, BG, … Raise equity standards Limit financial firm size Charge insurance fee based on size Explicit size limitations
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No difference of debt v. equity (ownership shares) financing of projects if Asset prices move with statistical independence; Asset prices are information based without systematic errors; Taxes treatment of both sources is the same Bankruptcy treatment of both is the same No asymmetry of knowledge among borrowers, lenders, shareholders Implies capital structure matters to the degree that these conditions matter
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