1. Plenary Session European – American Workshop on Global Security Affairs Workshop Outbrief LTC Christopher L. Tomlinson U.S. Army Europe May 31, 2015

2. Working Session 1 Panel Question: What have been the military lessons learned from the Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine? Main Points: – Russian’s has evolved “New Generation Warfare (NGW)” in enabling proxy forces with Russian arms, munitions, C2, Arty, EW, and UAV – Exploitation of Diplomacy, utilizing Minsk II cease fire as an “operational pause” to resupply and train Russian Led Separatist Forces (RLSF) forces to become more independent while maintaining deniability – Gen Zamana – UKR forces demonstrated innovation and resiliency, maintain core combat seasoned force to integrate and train new forces – Col. Bereza- Evolution of former corrupt Soviet military into a seasoned UKR fighting force. Need for equipment: AT systems, Fire Control for Arty systems. Need Long term technological solution, simple transfer will not work Key Takeaway’s: – Inform policy & decision makers the level of direct Russian involvement in Ukraine, and what is the counter-strategy? (asymmetric/conventional/nuclear) – Failure of OSCE in monitoring the Minsk II implementation, what is the alternative? – Acknowledge that Russia considers themselves at war NOW, and is implementing this NGW across the DIME. – Any NATO/Western unified response must remain representative of our values and demonstrate a combined resolve.

3. Working Session 2 Panel Question: What is the perceived threat from Russian New Generation warfare? Main Points: – Russian goals of Baltic instability to establish loyal gov. and divide NATO. Response of Increased presence, early warning, capability should be the appropriate response to increased Baltic military activity – Counter NATO with: build up/Ideology push back of western ideology/ pivot to China – Use of maritime power in NATO decision making, Russian Naval activities in Baltic’s as nexus to China in South China Sea, Combined RU/China naval exercises – Nuclear coercion at the front of any discussion of UKR. Exercising nuclear capability at all levels within the doctrine of escalate to deescalate Key Takeaway’s: – NATO needs to pursue Full spectrum deterrence; we have to be able to respond in scale and momentum – Change de-escalation to appropriate response, close the capability gap. Bringing back the nuclear armed cruise missiles. Return of B-52 flights. Develop Intermediate range missiles

4. Working Session 3 Panel Question: How are Russian ZAPAD exercises reflective and instructional for the U.S. and Europe? Main Points: – ZAPAD 1999 – 1 st Operational/Strategic Exercise, Russians profoundly affected by the military operations of the Gulf Wars… – OSEN 2009 – One exercise in 3 strategic directions, demonstrated the operational and strategic command of forces. “New Look Structure” – ZAPAD – 2009 scenario based on a Polish minority in Belarus against a Multi- BDE NATO force, Lithuanians attack Kaliningrad: US in support to allies Key Takeaway’s: – Deterrence in the Eye of the beholder, Russians maintain a different calculus. Exercises indicative of OPS/Strategy – Incorporated the use of nuclear weapons for operational and tactical level problems. Also, rhetoric would indicate the use of nuclear coercion across the instruments of national power, i.e. economic – Freedom of movement on interior lines is invaluable – We have little to no warning for unambiguous exercises – Zapad movements could be a cover for hostility – Ambiguous vs. unambiguous warnings

5. Working Session 4 Panel Question: Non-Military “Lessons Learned” from Russia’s NGW? Main Points: – EU highlighted the use of energy levers as a NGW lever for their objectives. – Natural Gas dependency, Pipeline infrastructure demonstrates the energy dependence of Europe to Russia for their energy needs – LNG export, storage, and distribution can provide energy alternatives to Russian dependence. Russian NGW methods to create direct energy supply routes, massive capacity, and the allocation of EU storage facilities to influence price levels – Russian recent reactions to western sanctions will create additional economic problems. Countersanctions have created additional capital flight – Consequences of the Russian economy collapsing, will generate extraordinary nationalism, and potentially cause irrational decisions inside Russia Key Takeaway’s: – What measures will Russia take as we attempt to reduce dependence on Russian energy? – Will it remain covert or will they attempt more overt kinetic measure to secure and maintain these markets – The Russian dependence and the use of energy levers create and promote EU corruption which complicates independence efforts

6. Working Session 5 Panel Question: What does the Russian practice of NGW say about Russian motives and their potential as a “European Security Partner?” Highlights: – If we understand their motives, then we must ask ourselves “What next?” Are there opportunities for a strategic partnership or are they a security threat? – (Dr. Nerlich) Next 2 years there will be opportunities for engagement to secure a security partnership. Global economic conditions coupled with sanctions will create an environment to provide the Russians the incentive to seek this partnership – (Dr. Peterson) Elites and Policymakers need to understand the existential challenge from Russia to European collective security. UKR is the manifestation, and NGW is the method of that challenge – (Mr. Barrass) Putin has created an unpredictable future for the next 5 years. Ultimately a strategic mis-calculation whereas we can get smarter. Putin is a underdog strategist, he will find weakness (EU/NATO) and exploits it as an opportunity

7. The Big Rocks Inform policy makers that Russia considers themselves at war NOW, and that Russia is implementing NGW in depth across the DIME Inform policy & decision makers the level of direct Russian involvement and use of NGW in Ukraine, and what is the most effective counter-strategy? (asymmetric/conventional/nuclear) NATO needs to pursue full spectrum deterrence; we have to be able to respond in scale and momentum Inform that Russian ZAPAD and “Snap Exercises” could be a cover for hostility and their frequency could create a false sense of the assessed threat Dependence on Russian energy and the manipulation of those energy levers create opportunity and could promote EU corruption Based upon current Russian operations and activities, the window for any potential security partnership is rapidly closing