1. RON: Resilient Overlay Networks David Andersen, Hari Balakrishnan, Frans Kaashoek, and Robert Morris MIT Laboratory for Computer Science http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/ron/

2. Fault-tolerant networking Network A B C D Packet switching and route around failures

3. Internet: network of networks ISPs peer to forward packets ISP exchange route info using BGP ISP3 ISP1ISP2 Site 1 Site 5 Site 4 Site 3 Site 2

4. The Internet is ill suited to mission-critical applications Commercial peer architecture –Performance bottlenecks at peering points –Ignores many existing alternate paths –Directly conflicts with robustness Internet’s global scale: –Prevents sophisticated algorithms –Route selection uses fixed, simple metrics –Routing isn’t sensitive to path quality

5. How robust is Internet routing? Paxson 95-97 3.3% of all routes had serious problems Labovitz 97-00 10% of routes available < 95% of the time 65% of routes available < 99.9% of the time 3-min minimum detection+recovery time; often 15 mins 40% of outages took 30+ mins to repair Chandra 01 5% of faults last more than 2.75 hours

6. Our goal To improve communication availability for small groups by at least a factor or 10 Many applications –Collaboration and conferencing –Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) across public Internet –Overlay Internet Service

7. Overlay routes around Internet failures Utah Utah Company MIT Cable Modem Failures: –Outages: Configuration/operational errors, backhoes, etc. –Performance failures: Severe congestion, denial-of-service attacks, etc.

8. Scalability versus recovery Internet scalability pays a price: –Slow recovery RON recovers fast by –Limiting size of overlay –Exploiting redundancy in underlying Internet

9. Redundant links Multiple paths between all sites Utah Company Cable Modem Utah MIT Internet 2

10. Redundant links But many of them are hidden Utah Company Cable Modem Utah MIT

11. Resilient overlay networks Measure all links between nodes Compute path properties Determine best route Forward traffic over that path

12. RON: routing using overlays Types of failures –Outages: Configuration/operational errors, backhoes, etc. –Performance failures: Severe congestion, denial-of-service attacks, etc. Scalable BGP-based IP routing substrate Reliability via path monitoring and re-routing Reliability via path monitoring and re-routing Reliability via path monitoring and re-routing Reliability via path monitoring and re-routing

13. RON design Prober Router Forwarder Conduit Performance Database Application-specific routing tables Policy routing module RON library Nodes in different routing domains (ASes)

14. Routing and path selection Path selection at the entry node –Specialized for routing through one intermediate node Router computes the forwarding tables –Link-state dissemination through RON Path evaluation and selection –Latency minimizer: EWMA of round-trip samples –Loss-rate minimizer: average of the last k samples –Throughput optimizer: TCP throughput equation Select when estimated throughput improves by 2x 5% hysteresis to avoid flapping

15. Policy routing Router computes a forwarding table for each policy Two ways of describing policies: –Exclusive cliques (e.g., educational only) –General policies BPF-like packet matcher, which returns a policy Links that are denied by a policy Entry node classifies packet with a policy tag

16. Responding to failure Probe interval: 12 seconds Probe timeout: 3 seconds Routing update interval: 14 seconds

17. RON overhead Probe overhead: 69 bytes RON routing overhead: 60 + 20 (N-1) 50: allows recovery times between 12 and 25 s 10 nodes20 nodes30 nodes40 nodes50 nodes 1.8 Kbps5.9 Kbps12 Kbps21 Kbps32 Kbps

18. Many research questions Does the RON approach work at all? Each RON is small in size, no more than 50 or 100 nodes –How fast can failure detection & recovery happen? Policy routing –Doesn’t RON violate AUPs and other policies? Routing behavior –Can stable routing be achieved? –Implementing efficient multi-criteria routing Is it safe to deploy a large number of (small) interacting RONs on the Internet?

19. IP forwarder A RON application Transparently forwards IP traffic over RON Allows comparisons of IP traffic over RON versus over direct Internet

20. RON deployment (19 sites).com (ca),.com (ca), dsl (or), cci (ut), aros (ut), utah.edu,.com (tx) cmu (pa), dsl (nc), nyu, cornell, cable (ma), cisco (ma), mit, vu.nl, lulea.se, ucl.uk, kaist.kr, univ-in-venezuela To vu.nl lulea.se ucl.uk To kaist.kr,.ve

21. AS view

22. Experiments Measure loss, latency, and throughput with and without RON RON1: 12 hosts in the US and Europe –64 hours of measurements in March 2001 RON2: 16 hosts –85 hours of measurements in May 2001 30-minute average loss rates –A 30 minute outage is very serious! Note: Experiments done with “No-Internet2-for- commercial-use” policy

23. Take home messages 1.RON reduced outages by a factor 5 to 10, and routed around all major outages 2.RON takes 18s (average) to route around a failure, and can do so in the face of flooding attacks 3.Single route indirection delivers the majority RON benefits

24. RON improves loss-rate 30-min average loss rate with RON 30-min average loss rate on Internet 13,000 samples RON loss rate never more than 30%

25. An order-of-magnitude fewer failures Loss Rate RON Better No Change RON Worse 10%526 [517]58 [51]47 [45] 20%142 [140]4 [3]15 [15] 30%32 [32]00 50%20 [20]00 80%14 [14]00 100%1000 30-minute average loss rates 6,825 “path hours” represented here 12 “path hours” of essentially complete outage 72 “path hours” of TCP outage RON routed around all of these! One indirection hop provides almost all the benefit! 6,825 “path hours” represented here 12 “path hours” of essentially complete outage 72 “path hours” of TCP outage RON routed around all of these! One indirection hop provides almost all the benefit!

26. Why does one hop work? In RON testbed: –P(direct path is good) is 48.8% –P(intermediate path is good) is 51% sourcetarget RON R RON nodes Good (p) Bad (1-p) P(good path) = (1 – (1-p)^2)^(R+1)

27. Resilience Against DoS Attacks

28. Latency using RON

29. What’s next for RON? Data mining of collected samples Applications Routing policies (e.g., rate control)

30. Other progress: Chord Chord: a peer-to-peer lookup system CFS: a peer-to-peer file sharing application www.pdos.lcs.mit.edu/chord

31. Conclusion Improved availability of Internet communication paths using small overlays –Layered above scalable IP substrate –RON provides a set of libraries and programs to facilitate this application-specific routing Experimental data suggest that approach works –Over 10X availability –Outage detection and recovery in about 15 seconds –Able to route around certain denial-of-service attacks Many interesting questions remain… http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/ron/

32. Policy Routing Today, wide-area policy expression is a sledgehammer Policy control is important –From talking to some providers –E.g., rate control policy; Internet2, etc. True, RONs could violate AUPs But, the RON approach enables more flexible policies –More complex routing decisions; rate-based too –Multiple routing tables –Deeper packet inspection, etc.

33. Example

34. Throughput Improvement