1. Cuban Missile Crisis Graham Allison
Operation Anadyr
Hypotheses
American Blockade
Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba

2. 13 days of Crisis between Soviet Union and United States
Cold War nuclear tension
16-28 October 1962

3. Soviet Union installed nuclear warheads in Cuba which is discovered by American U-2 planes
During the crisis President Kennedy initiated to establish ExComm

4. Why did Soviet Union attempt to place offensive missiles in Cuba?
Operation Anadyr: Strategic missile base in Cuba
Soviet governments first gave arms Cuba in 1959
Next phase of military assistance in 1962

5. The medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles transported to Cuba and followed by nuclear warheads on 4 October 1962 (first time Soviets install missiles out of its territory)
Soviet decision to operationalize missiles –secret operation
Deployed tactical nuclear weapons

7. Missiles were discovered by U-2 planes on 14 October
Soviets did not started worrying about the American discovery of Missiles until 22 October (until the news bulletins upcoming Kennedy's address to the nation)

8. Why missiles in Cuba: four hypothesis
Why did Soviets deploy missiles in Cuba?
Kennedy’s advisor consider following issues on 16 October, four hypothesis
Hypothesis 1:Cuban defence
To deter any U.S intervention to weaken or overthrow Castro regime
Cuba was at risk of attack by U.S so as ally Soviet Union would come to the aid of its weak friend (fail to invade Cuba in 1961, possibility to believe that U.S might attempt to invade again)
Increase Cuba’s defensive capacity

9. But why not Soviet troops (tactical nuclear weapons/easier to deploy/less costly/be ready before discovered) but nuclear deterrence
Cuban defense hypothesis actually made Cuba’s position more dangerous in intense crisis.

10. Hypothesis 2: Cold War politics
Competition/rivalry between superpowers
Soviet opportunity to extend its global powers

11. U.S administration assumes that Soviet military buildup in Cuba demonstrates changing balance of power/Soviet offensive power in U.S own hemisphere
What is on stake?
If U.S accepts/allows buildup it could lose its allies in the region
Changing Soviet policy and its affects on global balance of power

12. Kennedy believes there is three reasons of Soviet action:
1st: Soviet demonstrate it is capable to support communist revolutions (impressing China)
2nd:redifine context of Berlin
3rd: Soviet deal with US and its political implications

13. Hypothesis 3: Missile Power
U.S strategic nuclear arsenal superiority (intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBM)
Strategic balance of power motivated the Soviet Union
Problem of hypothesis: why Khrushchev urgently insists on strategic balance instead of developing ICBM/ why Khrushchev take risk to balance nuclear arsenal

14. Hypothesis 4: Berlin-win, trade, or trap
If its not the missile power than reason is “Berlin” (Khrushchev wants to solve Berlin problem) if U.S did not do anything than Soviet Union would force U.S to get out of Berlin
Missiles in Cuba aim to deter U.S to start war!!
If U.S wants to bargain the terms it would be trade off Cuba and Berlin (Khrushchev believes this is still win)

15. If the U.S attack/blockade Cuba it gives Khrushchev opportunity to use this as an excuse to attack/blockade Berlin!!
So whatever the U.S do in regard to Cuba it would increase the possibility that Soviets do the same thing in Berlin!!
Worse case scenario European allies could blame US to lose Berlin which would be split and Moscow could be the winner

16. Most reasonable explanations are missile power and Berlin hypothesis
However still all hypothesis has inconsistency
Soviet Union did install the air defense cover on time to prevent shields the missiles from being discovered and why did Soviet Union permit U-2 plane to fly over Cuba and spot the missiles?

17. October 18-Absence of camouflage of missiles, and installation near U2 planes flying over/camouflage of missiles during the shipment to Cuba
U.S government concluded that Soviet government must expected the U.S to discover missiles after missiles shipped to Cuba!!

18. Group Think
ExComm Committee (Executive Committee of the Nations Security Council)-advise President Kennedy-diversity of ideas according to their job and backgrounds
declassification of tapes and documents help to understand crisis
Soviet decision making process still opaque-

19. President Kennedy under pressure,
If Kennedy fail to respond the crisis there could be undesirable outcomes: undermine confidence of the members of his administration, weak leadership view by public and Congress, difficulty of re-election in the weakness.

20. Why American Blockade?
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) wanted an invasion
Dean Dusk, Secretary of State wanted diplomatic –suggest o convince Castro to push Soviets out of Cuba.
R. Mcnamara, Secretary of Defense, believed that missiles were political problem

21. Raised the idea of blockading future weapons shipments to Cuba- but not solving the issue of missiles already shipped to Cuba but warned Soviet not to use them.
Options:
Narrow air strike against the missile sites only
Air strike
Invasion follow up the air strike

22. Robert Kennedy against any surprise attack which would be immoral (like Pearl Harbour)
Blockade or immediate air strike???
So Kennedy changed his idea from surprise attack to blockade
Blockade-negotiate approach: following the blockade U.S would negotiate for the removal of missiles from Turkey and Italy and closing U.S base at Guantanamo in Cuba but this option was disagreed

23. New solution: blockade and air strike ultimatum demanding removal of the missiles
Other option offered by Dean Dusk: blockade but instead of ultimatum or trade of US assets is to freeze the situation, leaving to the UN observation, installation of missiles would be monitored by UN
Kennedy refused blockade-negotiation approach: it raised an idea that US had been frightened

24. And he choose blockade-ultimatum (any air strike would be limited to missiles)
Advantages of blockade: middle course between inaction and attack, aggressive enough to communicate of intention but not as a strike, it gave responsibility/burden to Khrushchev of choice for the next step
Blockade began on the morning of 24 October, 500 miles off the coast of Cuba and Soviet ships turned around before challenging quarantine

25. Why Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba?
US blockade was initial step in series of moves that threatened air strikes or invasion!!
Khrushchev sent two letters secretly to Kennedy
In the first letter he claimed to remove missiles from Cuba in return for ending US quarantine and not to invade Cuba

26. In the second letter adding new demand and seek into bargain with US removal of missiles in Turkey in return for taking Soviet missiles out of Cuba
So the second letter was problematic, US could simply reject bargaining, if US tradeoff NATO missiles in Turkey there would be consequences for the NATO alliance and US commitments in elsewhere.

27. US response to letters (Robert Kennedy met to Abassadorn Dobryin): no Soviet missiles in Cuba and no US invasion, no deal over Turkish missiles but they would be get out once the Cuban crisis was resolved.
R. Kennedy insisted on secrecy
Deal that withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons in exchange for the non-invasion!!!!!

28. Blockade did not change Khrushchev’s mind but threat of further action in the form of alternatives did it succeed for withdrawal of missiles
Blockade with threat

29. Three conceptual frameworks for analyzing foreign policy
MODEL I:Rational Actor Model: why did Soviet Union decide to install missiles in Cuba? attention on goals and objectives of government-but also calculations about the situation
The actions of states are analyzed by assuming that nations consider all options and act rationally to maximize their utility
Analyst considers on objectives and alternatives

30. states are key players and decision makers try to maximize expected utilities by looking at all different options and calculating cost and benefits so decision makers look for highest benefits with lowest cost
Analyze why Khrushchev deployed missiles in Cuba or Why US responded with blockade and ultimatum./leaders choices as unitary decision maker

31. MODEL II-Organizational Behavioral Model: decision making according to regular patterns of behaviors
This model focuses on the standard or routine operating procedures and solves problems in immediate urgency.
Decision makers prefer to apply this routine procedure as automatic response to some problems
Model II extend first model and analyze organizations coordinated by leaders (Model I)

32. Soviet missiles in Cuba: Model II analyst focus on the existing organizations and their standard operating producers for acquiring information, defining feasible options, and implementing programme
Government is not the individual/presidents (rational decision maker aim to maximize utilities) but allied organizations

33. Government/leaders define alternatives and consequences as their component organization process information.
Large organizations functioning according to standard pattern of behaviors.

34. MODEL III-governmental (bureaucratic) politics model: decision is result of the bargaining within the government
Events in foreign affairs are characterized neither as unitary actor nor as organization outputs
Bargaining among national government players/ who did/what to/ whom that-decisions re result of these bargaining
What bargaining among which players yielded the critical decisions and actions?
Predictions are generated by identifying the game according to their bargaining skills and relative power.

35. Politics is based on bargaining between hierarchical government agencies.
Government behavior can be understood according to third conceptual model/as a result of bargaining games
Not unitary actor but many actors and players, so decision is not result of single person but bargaining games within the government

36. Model I: why Khrushchev deployed missiles to Cuba or why US responded with blockade and ultimatum.
Model II: the subjects are never individuals or governments instead explanations are organizations
Organizational purposes and practices common to the members of organization
Model III: focuses on the politics inside a government, A nation's actions are best understood as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders.

37. Foreign relations result of bargaining games among players in the national governments
Puzzle posed by Soviet missiles in Cuba?
Bargaining among players on critical decisions players interest and actions/ their perception and stands on the issue
Competing preferences (secretary of defense-secretary of state)

38. Government action can be understood according to result of bargaining between players in government agencies. No unitary actor but many actors
Not by a single rational choice but by the pushing and pulling that is politics.

39. None of these three models simply describe events/each emphasized different factors in explaining puzzled of crisis.
Models complements each others

40. Why did the Soviet Union decide to place offensive missiles in Cuba?
Why did the United States respond to the missile deployment with a Blockade ?
Why did the Soviet Union withdraw the missiles?

41. Model I-Understand government behavior as the choice of a unitary decision maker
1-Nikita Khrushchev’s aim to make nuclear balance and believe that US would not respond aggressively after the Bay o Pig fiasco
2-Kenndy choose blockade option to give next move to Khrushchev and something between action/inaction, not necessary lead nuclear war
it forced the Soviets to make the next move.

42. 3-Soviet leader cannot afford nuclear destruction, nuclear crises are manageable when vital interest are at stake-leaders/withdrawal was the only option for Soviet Union

43. High saliency (perception of threat)
Short time horizon (high anxiety)
Imperfect information
The Rational Model does not apply

44. MODEL II organizational routines that produce the information, options and actions.
1-First time missiles installed outside of Soviet Union, lack of set of procedures in both side
Soviets assigned the tasks to established departments, which in turn followed their own set procedures. However, their procedures were not adapted to Cuban conditions, and as a result, mistakes were made that allowed the U.S. to quite easily learn of the program's existence.

45. 2-Blockade or air strike, risk of surgical air strikes by US Air Force so existing plans (routine behaviors) could create collateral damage during surgical air strike and possibility of escalation of war so US decided on blockade option
U.S. Air Force couldn't guarantee it would disable all the nuclear missiles

46. 3-Lack of organized procedures to any U
3-Lack of organized procedures to any U.S decision so only option was withdrawal
The Soviets simply did not have a plan to follow if the U.S. took decisive action against their missiles. Khrushchev's communications indicated a high degree of desperation. Without any back-up plan, the Soviets had to withdraw.

47. Model III-competing perceptions and preferences of each player
1-Governmental problems in Soviet Union, lack of trust to Khrushchev  (military and economy) so installation of missies in Cuba increase popularity of him and his policies
military leaders were unhappy with Khrushchev's decision to cut the size of the army. Placing missiles in Cuba was a cheap and quick way for him to secure his political base.

48. 2-Failure of Bay of Pig fiasco (result of misinformation of CIA) and expectation of strong and decisive response from Kennedy administration but lack of trust to CIA and Robert Kennedy's (Attorney General) insist on Blockade/result of bargaining between government agencies

49. 3-US government decision not to bargain missiles in Cuba with missiles in Turkey but guarantee of not to invade Cuba and withdrawal of Jupiter missiles six months later leaded to Soviet withdrawal.