1. Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties? By Oona A. Hathaway

2. Main factors that affect willingness to commit to treaties  Domestic enforcement of the treaty Are domestic institutions enforcing compliance?  Collateral consequences of the treaty: “ the expected reactions of individuals, states and organizations to the state’s decision to commit” (592). Does committing affect the country’s relationship/image with other countries?

3. Predictions  Less democratic states will be no less likely to commit to a human rights treaty if they have poor human rights records  Reasons: --Lack of domestic institutions that will enforce compliance -Low cost -Improve image internationally

4. Predictions  More democratic states will be less likely to commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records  Reasons: -Higher possibility of domestic institutions enforcing the treaties’ agreements -Higher cost--Required change in behavior

5. In other words:  Whether a state commits to a treaty or not depends mainly on whether they expect to comply with it or not once they join.  Commitment will also depend on the costs and benefits of committing to a treaty.

6. Treaties analyzed in this article  The 1987 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT)  The 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)  The 1981 Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

7. Goal of these treaties  “…the central shared goal of these treaties is to define and protect the rights of individuals against abuse by their  “…the central shared goal of these treaties is to define and protect the rights of individuals against abuse by their own governing institutions”(592). What does this mean?  States do not have reciprocal interests in checking on each other, and  Formal international legal enforcement of the treaties is “minimal to nonexistent”

8. The research  Dataset includes more than 160 countries in a period of several decades. Dependent Variables:   Likelihood of ratifying a human rights treaty Independent Variables:   Democracy   Rights Violations   Torture   Political Terror (Amnesty): From Amnesty International reports   Political Terror (State): From the State Department reports   Civil Freedom

9. Independent Variables cont.   Fair Trial   Difference in Literacy Rates   New Regime   Number of Human Rights NGOs   Regional Ratification Rate (percentage of countries within a given region and in a given year that have ratified the treaty)

10. Conclusion  Domestic legal enforcement and indirect collateral consequences are the main factors that will determine whether a state commits to a human rights treaty. WHY???

11. WHY??   For a dictatorship with weak domestic institutions and human rights violations the cost of committing is low. There is no domestic pressure to comply, so they are more willing to commit, and it makes the state look good.   For a democracy in transition with lingering human rights violations, the cost is higher domestically and collaterally, so they are less willing to commit.

12. The Partial Effect of Torture on the Likelihood of Ratifying the CAT across Levels of Democracy. This confirms the two predictions mentioned earlier

13.   For an established democracy without any human rights violations there is more incentive to commit because there is no cost to doing so. (See Figure 12)   See examples of two collateral effects in graphs 14 and 15. In both cases the, the variables New Regime and Higher Ratification Rates increase the chances of state ratifying a treaty.

14. The end