1. International Conference «Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security Environment» VIEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MISSILE DEFENSE ISSUES Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General N.E.MAKAROV Moscow, 2012

2. Russian Core BMD Guidelines Equal and indivisible security as crucial feature of regional and global security Solid linkage between strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems Mutual nuclear deterrence is key to global security and stability 1

3. FUNDAMENTALS OF ABM TREATY OF 1972 The Treaty had the USSR and the USA committed:  to limit their Missile Defense systems;  not to deploy nation-wide Missile Defense system;  not to deploy Missile Defense to protect selected areas;  not to create sea-based, air-based, space-based and ground-mobile MD systems;  not to engage radars’ capabilities to fight strategic ballistic missiles. 2

4. US SDI PROGRAM The purpose of SDI program was to create a Missile Defense System protecting the USA and its allies from a Soviet nuclear missile strike. 3 GRAUND-BASED RADAR GRAUND- BASED INTERCEPTOR BATTLE MANAGTR GRAUND- BASED LASER BOOST-BASED SURVERLANCE & TRACKING SYSTEM HIGH ENDO- ATMOSPHERIC DEFENSE INTERCEPTOR SPACE-BASED SURVERLANCE & TRACKING SYSTEM BOOST-PHASE SURVERLANCE & TRAKING SYSTEM SPACE-BASED LASER FRONTING MIRROR NEUTRAL PARTICLE BEAM SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTOR RELAY MIRROR

5. ABMD AGREEMENTS OF 1990-s Joint US-Russian statement on global protection system (Washington, 17 th of June 1992) Joint US-Russian statement on global protection system (Washington, 17 th of June 1992) Joint statement of Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America regarding Agreement on Ballistic Missile Defense (Helsinki, 21 st of March 1997) Joint statement of Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America regarding Agreement on Ballistic Missile Defense (Helsinki, 21 st of March 1997) First agreed statement regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26 th of May 1972 (New-York, 26 th of September 1997) First agreed statement regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26 th of May 1972 (New-York, 26 th of September 1997) General understanding to the first agreed statement of 26 September 1997 regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26 th of May 1972 Second agreed statement regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26 th of May 1972. (New-York, 26 th of September 1997) Second agreed statement regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26 th of May 1972. (New-York, 26 th of September 1997) General understanding to the second agreed statement dated 26 th of September 1997 regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26 th of May 1972. Agreement on confidence- building measures regarding systems for fighting Ballistic Missiles, which are not strategic ballistic missiles (New-York, 25 th of September 1997) Agreement on confidence- building measures regarding systems for fighting Ballistic Missiles, which are not strategic ballistic missiles (New-York, 25 th of September 1997) Provision on Standing Consultative Commission (New-York, 26 th of September 1997) Provision on Standing Consultative Commission (New-York, 26 th of September 1997) Memorandum of understanding regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26 th of May 1972. (New-York, 26 th of September 1997 Memorandum of understanding regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26 th of May 1972. (New-York, 26 th of September 1997 4

6. PLANS OF THE USA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THIRD POSITIONING AREA 5 Kozelsk Tatistchevo TPA defense zone Radar ‘s range in Czech Republic Possible trajectories of Russian ICBMs

7. DECLARED PHASES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF US BMD SYSTEM IN EUROPE (NATO BMD) Phase I(2011) - deployment of MD ships with «Standard- 3» 1А interceptors in Aegean, Adriatic and Mediterranean seas. PhaseII (2011-2015) -deployment of MD base with «Standard-3» interceptors 1B in Romania. Phase III (2015-2018) -deployment of MD base with «Standard-3» 2А interceptors in Poland. Outfitting deployed MD shooters with «Standard-3» 2А interceptors. Phase IV (2018-2020) - outfitting deployed MD shooters in Europe with «Standard-3» 2B interceptors. Protection of South European States from shorter range missiles Protection of South and South-East European States from shorter range missiles Protection of European states from intermediate range missiles Protection of European states from ICBMs 6

8. 7 RUSSIAN “SECTORAL” APPROACH NATO area of responsibility (NATO BMD assets only) RUSSIAN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (RUSSIAN BMD assets only) NATO-RUSSIA JOINT SYSTEM OF COMBAT CONTROL (information exchange and target distribution) BM trajectories do not cross NATO BMD area of responsibility Territoies of European states (NATO members) covered by Russian BMD, where deployment of NATO BMD challenges Russian Strategic Nuclear Force capabilities

9. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE 8 European MD system element The Russian Federation proposal («sectoral approach») NATO approach («cooperative system») Concurrence of views Defense area Joint sector wise areaTwo independent areas No Responsibility Responsible for interception of any BM attacking Europe in its «sector» NATO responsible for NATO territory, Russia – for Russian territory No Information Full data sharing on shooter performances, missile threats, target distribution, results assessment Limited data sharing on missile threats, joint exercises No Missile kills All BMs within the area of responsibility Only the BM attacking the area of responsibility (including adjacent area) No Decision to engage National level Yes «Buffer» zone Not required (possible outside of Russian BM trajectories) Possible ( with NATO and Russian areas overlapping to embrace Russian territory) No

10. RUSSIAN PROPOSALS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTIBLE DECISIONS 9 CRITERIA LIST:  technical performances of BMD components (interceptor’s speed, number of interceptors, radar range, control system capabilities etc.),  deployment sites,  capabilities for interception of various types of BMs at boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight. joint familiarization with European BMD deployment plans and its implications for the relevant strategic deterrence capabilities development of verification measures to assure security of strategic capabilities legally binding agreements defining mutual obligations of the pertinent parties to deploy a European BMD system providing equal security to all participants

11.  to increase defense of fixed launching sites,  to ensure maximal concealment of Strategic Nuclear Force mobile launchers,  to increase readiness of deployed BM platforms,  to increase capabilities of ICBMs in penetrating modern Ballistic Missile Defense,  to decrease the attacking missile launch fixing time,  to increase the numbers of information sources in order to assure target identification by Russian AD and BMD assets,  to employ effective systems in fighting mobile BMD assets,  to ensure destruction or disruption of opposing BMD infrastructure assets (interceptors launchers, command & control posts, outer-space detection means). RETALIATORY MEASURES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDRATION All said measures will be implemented only as retaliatory steps provided a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force from the US and NATO deployed BMD assets appears to be on the rise. Russian response will be adequate, economically well-balanced and effective. 10