1. AVIAN INFLUENZA An Animal Health Perspective Dr. Thomas J. Holt State Veterinarian/Director FDACS, Division of Animal Industry

2. Etiology Etiology Orthomyxoviridae Envelope Glycoprotein projections/surface antigens Hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) 15 hemagglutinin and 9 neuraminidase antigens A Type designation (A - only, B or C only present in humans) Primary reservoir is wild birds, especially water fowl H5, H7 strains of primary concern 2

3. Avian Influenza Incubation Period 3-14 daysIncubation Period 3-14 days Highly contagious (100%)Highly contagious (100%) Low-Path - low mortality, recover in 3 weeksLow-Path - low mortality, recover in 3 weeks High-Path - >95% mortality within 24 hoursHigh-Path - >95% mortality within 24 hours 3

4. Disease in Poultry Low pathogenic strainsLow pathogenic strains – mild to severe respiratory symptoms – egg production may drop by up to 45% and take 2—4 weeks to recover High pathogenic strains High pathogenic strains – severe respiratory distress, diarrhea, nervous signs – watery eyes and sinuses – cyanosis of the combs, wattle and shanks – swelling of the head 4

5. Gross Lesions Swollen head, edema Excess mucous, hemorrhage Paint brush hemorrhage 5

6. Why Control Low-Path H5/H7 AI? Significant carcass condemnations Significant carcass condemnations Significant egg production losses Significant egg production losses Inter-state and international trade embargoes Inter-state and international trade embargoes Mutation to High Path Mutation to High Path Potential Zoonotic Disease Potential Zoonotic Disease 6

7. Infection and Depopulation Spatial Patterns March 12 through June 24, 2002 7

8. Virginia: All Turkey and Chicken Flocks As of April 18, 2002 Turkey or Chicken Flock 8

9. 2002 VA AI Outbreak H 7 N 2 March 7-12Index Case Confirmation Voluntary Company Depopulation On-Site Burial March 2820 Positive Flocks State/Company Control Measures Controlled Slaughter Permitted 9

10. 2002 VA AI Outbreak H 7 N 2 April 12 60 Positives Flocks 30 Flocks Pending Depopulation 24 hr. State Destruction Orders USDA Assistance Requested April 14 Initial Deployment of Task Force April 18 Full Assistance of Task Force 10

11. Virginia: Infected Flocks (89) As of April 18, 2002 11

12. 2002 VA AI Outbreak H 7 N 2 April 25 Barrel or Dead Bird Surveillance 12 Flocks Positive In Initial Round May 8 West Virginia Flock Positive Intensive Surveillance No Additional Cases July 2 Last Positive Case Found to Date Continue Enhanced Surveillance 12

13. 2002 VA AI Outbreak 197 Positive Farms/ 1000 Farms20% 4.7 million birds/ 56 million birds 8.4% 13

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16. Types of farms affected No. of farms affected …………………………...………. 197 Turkeys (78%): Turkey breeders ……………………………………… 28 Commercial turkeys (meat) ……………………125 Chickens (22%): Broilers (chickens) ……………..........................13 Broiler breeders (chickens) ………….………..29 Layers (chickens) ………………………………….…… 2 No positives found in area backyard flocks or wild waterfowl. 16

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19. Incident Command Post 19

20. VIRGINIA AVIAN INFLUENZA TASK FORCE Personnel 20

21. Virginia AI Task Force Mission:To control low path AI 1.Identify and eliminate foci of infection 2. Prevent spread of disease Priorities: 1. Safety of Incident Personnel and Involved Public 2. Adherence of Strict Biosecurity Measures by Incident Personnel 21

22. Three Focus Areas Surveillance Surveillance Eliminate foci of infection Eliminate foci of infection Biosecurity Biosecurity 22

23. Laboratory Diagnosis Viral isolation Viral isolation AGID AGID ELISA ELISA Battery of specific antigens to identify its serologic identity (HA and NA type). Battery of specific antigens to identify its serologic identity (HA and NA type). Sera from infected chickens usually yield positive antibody tests as early as 3 or 4 days after first signs of disease. Sera from infected chickens usually yield positive antibody tests as early as 3 or 4 days after first signs of disease. Real time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rT-RT-PCR) Real time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rT-RT-PCR) 23

24. Virus Level Days Post-Infection (Flock) 07142128 Directigen AGID RT-PCR Virus Isolation Avian Influenza Tests 24

25. AI Surveillance Pre-Outbreak During Outbreak Post-Outbreak Breeders or Layers NPIP required Ab testing Ab At Slaughter Weekly Ag Bi-weekly Ab Pre-SlaughterAg/Ab Ab every 4-6 weeks Pre-Slaughter Ag/Ab Breeder Replacements NPIP required Ab testing Weekly Ag Pre-movementAg/Ab Monthly Ab Pre-movement Ag/Ab Turkey Growout Ab At Slaughter Weekly Ag Pre-SlaughterAg/Ab Pre-Slaughter Ag/Ab BroilersNone Weekly Ag Pre-Slaughter Ag Ab/Ag At Slaughter 25

26. Barrel Surveillance 26

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28. Elimination of Foci of Infection Rapid humane euthanasia of infected flocks Rapid humane euthanasia of infected flocks Rapid removal of carcasses Rapid removal of carcasses Disposal – a major challenge Disposal – a major challenge Closing of Houses followed by testing Closing of Houses followed by testing Cleaning and Disinfection of houses Cleaning and Disinfection of houses Implementation of Biosecurity Measures Implementation of Biosecurity Measures 28

29. Carcass Disposal Methods – On Farm Burial – Incineration – Landfill – Composting 29

30. Biosecurity 30

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32. Incident Command System Incident Command Staff Incident Command Staff Planning Planning Administration and Finance Administration and Finance Logistics Logistics Operations Operations 32

33. Incident Commanders 33

34. Forest Service 34

35. Army 35

36. Department of Health and Human Services 36

37. Incident Command System Daily Meeting 0700Surveillance Personnel (All) 0800Daily Briefing (All w/o Surveillance) 1300Chiefs Meeting (Commanders and Chiefs) 1800Planning Meeting (Planning) 1830Plans Approval Meeting (Commanders and Chiefs) 37

38. Planning Meeting 38

39. Morning Briefing 39

40. Supply 40

41. TrainingTraining 41

42. Surveillance 42

43. Epidemiological Assessments Proved Critical in Success Surveillance Design for Commercial Flocks Surveillance Design for Commercial Flocks Surveillance of Backyard Flocks Surveillance of Backyard Flocks Surveillance of Wildbirds Surveillance of Wildbirds Case Control Study Case Control Study GIS Mapping and Spatial Analysis GIS Mapping and Spatial Analysis 43

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46. AI Case Control Study Preliminary Results Epidemiology Section Analysis team: Jennifer McQuiston Lindsey Garber 46

47. Risk Factors Assessed: Premises Characteristics - Security - Nearby lake/pond Farm Management - litter source - dead bird disposal Biosecurity - Visitor log - Showers - Disinfectant Footbaths Presence of Other Birds and Animals (wild, domestic) Recent Visitors Recent Travel 47

48. Case Control Study Assessment of Risk Factors Variable Odds Ratio P Value Use of Renderer 7.3<0.001 Older Birds >10 weeks>4<0.001 Use of Non Family Caretakers 2.10.04 Family Member Working Offsite 2.00.03 Wild Mammals on Site 1.90.04 48

49. Epidemiological Considerations The source of this outbreak was never established. The source of this outbreak was never established. The same strain of H7N2 has been seen in other small outbreaks in eastern states and live bird markets in the Northeast over a number of years. The same strain of H7N2 has been seen in other small outbreaks in eastern states and live bird markets in the Northeast over a number of years. A case-control study found flocks 7 times more likely to be infected if transporting dead birds to a rendering facility. A case-control study found flocks 7 times more likely to be infected if transporting dead birds to a rendering facility. No evidence was found of airborne spread or spread associated with depopulation or disposal. No evidence was found of airborne spread or spread associated with depopulation or disposal. Disease was spread primarily by movement of people and equipment in a densely populated poultry rearing area. Disease was spread primarily by movement of people and equipment in a densely populated poultry rearing area. 49

50. Lessons Learned The H 7 N 2 strain that has circulated among Live Bird Markets of the Northeast and their supply and distribution channels continues to represent a serious threat to commercial poultry. The H 7 N 2 strain that has circulated among Live Bird Markets of the Northeast and their supply and distribution channels continues to represent a serious threat to commercial poultry. Control measures need to be taken to lessen the spread of this virus and further protect commercial flocks. Control measures need to be taken to lessen the spread of this virus and further protect commercial flocks. Rendering practices need to be reexamined with respect to the risk of disease spread. Rendering practices need to be reexamined with respect to the risk of disease spread. During an outbreak biosecurity measures at the farm and plant level must be strengthened to prevent disease spread by people and equipment. During an outbreak biosecurity measures at the farm and plant level must be strengthened to prevent disease spread by people and equipment. 50

51. Reasons for Success Lessons Learned from the Past Lessons Learned from the Past Industry Involvement and Commitment Industry Involvement and Commitment Cooperation Between Virginia, West Virginia, USDA and all of the Cooperators Cooperation Between Virginia, West Virginia, USDA and all of the Cooperators Improved Technologies (Rapid Diagnosis and Computer Support) Improved Technologies (Rapid Diagnosis and Computer Support) Rapid and Coordinated Response Rapid and Coordinated Response 51

52. AI Vaccination: Poultry Non H5/H7 AI vaccines routinely used in some areas Non H5/H7 AI vaccines routinely used in some areas H5/H7 vaccines traditionally not used because of trade restrictions H5/H7 vaccines traditionally not used because of trade restrictions Usage of H5/H7 vaccines requires USDA and State Approval Usage of H5/H7 vaccines requires USDA and State Approval 52

53. 2003 Connecticut H7N2 Outbreak Controlled and Eradicated utilizing H7N3 vaccine, intense biosecurity, and controlled slaughter 2003 Connecticut H7N2 Outbreak Controlled and Eradicated utilizing H7N3 vaccine, intense biosecurity, and controlled slaughter AI Vaccination: Poultry 53

54. Animal Health responders must be included in targeted human vaccination in zoonotic outbreak involving poultry. Animal Health responders must be included in targeted human vaccination in zoonotic outbreak involving poultry. Poultry workers in outbreak area of any zoonotic AI should also be included as priority for vaccination. Poultry workers in outbreak area of any zoonotic AI should also be included as priority for vaccination. AI Vaccination: Human 54

55. Commercial Poultry in Florida 55

56. Added Animal Health Concerns with Zoonotic AI Farm workers may introduce disease to poultry Farm workers may introduce disease to poultry Birds may serve as reservoir with on-going human and bird exposure Birds may serve as reservoir with on-going human and bird exposure Personal safety of Animal Task Force Workers and Poultry Caretakers Personal safety of Animal Task Force Workers and Poultry Caretakers 56

57. Added Animal Health Concerns with Zoonotic AI Humane care and euthanasia of birds Humane care and euthanasia of birds Carcass Disposal, Biosecurity, and Environmental Safeguards Carcass Disposal, Biosecurity, and Environmental Safeguards Rapid Detection and Prevention of Spread Rapid Detection and Prevention of Spread 57

58. AVIAN INFLUENZA An Animal Health Perspective Presented by: Dr. Thomas J. Holt State Veterinarian/Director Division of Animal Industry Phone: 850-410-0900 Email: holtt@doacs.state.fl.usholtt@doacs.state.fl.us Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Charles Bronson, Commissioner