1. Ricardo Goulão Santos PhD Candidate in Economics at IDS, University of Sussex Visiting Researcher of the National University Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL) Post-Conflict Demand for Secondary Education in Timor-Leste

2. Motivation & Findings Background Theory and Empirical Review Data and Empirical Strategy Results Outline Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

3. About Fragile and Conflict Afflicted States, in UNESCO Education For All Global Monitoring Report 2011 (35 countries): More than 28 million children of primary school age out of school, or 42% of the world total. Gross enrolment ratios in secondary school are nearly 30% lower in conflict- affected countries (48%) than in others (67%), and are far lower for girls. The study reviews and acknowledges the negative impacts of conflict on structural variables that, in turn, are empirically shown to affect demand for secondary education: returns to education (PhD paper) and quality of schooling. Most notably, there are indications that the experience of violence and conflict may have had a net positive effect on the intrinsic preferences of households for secondary education. Conflict hurts Education – but there may be a peace dividend Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

4. Violence during the conflict Source: Author’s calculations using CAVR (2006) data. Civilian killed in each district (maximum, median, minimum) in each yearDeaths due to hunger and illness in each district in each year Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

5. Only became a topic of interest with human capital and the works of Schultz (1960), Becker (1962) and Ben-Porath (1967). Education is an investment in human capital and is expected to pay with higher income in the future (Becker 1964). Returns to Education are the signal that education pays as an investment (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974). Education is a choice with direct costs but also indirect/opportunity costs (Becker 1964; Ben-Porath 1967; Wilkinson 1966; Heckman 1976; Lazear 1977; Mattila 1982) Education demand reacts to differences in quality of schooling (Glewwe 2002) Other notable contributions: Willis and Rosen (1975); Manski and Wise (1983) Education and child labour: Ranjan (2001); Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) Empirical applications: King (1993) on Puerto Rico; Kingdon and Theopold (2008) on India Demand for Education Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

6. School enrolments decrease or increase less in conflict afflicted countries: FitzGerald et al. (2001) and Stewart et al. (2001a); Stewart, Huang, and Wang (2001) - mixed results in primary education; Kondylis (2010) - no statistically significant impact of conflict on schooling in Bosnia. Literacy reduces, with persistence of illiteracy after conflict: Carlton-Ford and Boop (2010) Some channels: loss of parents (Evans and Miguel 2004, on Kenya; Akresh and de Walque 2008, on Rwanda finds contradictory evidence); consumption smoothing (Ibáñez and Moya 2006, on Colombia); expectation of lower returns to education (Rodriguez and Sanches 2009); displacement (Chamarbagwala and Morán 2011; Raeymaekers 2011; SWAY 2006); recruitment (Blattman and Annan 2007, Annan 2010); disruption of education institutions (Cranna 1994; Kondylis 2010; Blattman 2006 on Uganda; Shemyakina 2006 on Tajiskistan; Akresh and de Walque 2008, on genocide in Rwanda; Swee 2009, on Bosnia; Lai and Thyne 2007; Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 2004); health of the children (Verwimp, Bundervoet and Akresh (2010; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2006); targeting (Justino and Verwimp 2006). Education and Conflict Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

7. Secondary School Attendance as a Household choice Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

8. Empirical strategy Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

9. Data sources Datasets used: World Bank Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards 2006 : 4,477 households, 25,000 observations, 4,102 between the age of 12 and 18 Benetech-CAVR (2006) data on Human Rights Violations: death (violent and by deprivation) and alleged disappearances, fatal violations and graveyard census Historical sources: CAVR (2005), Taylor (1990,1999), Mattoso (2005) Contextual sources: Life stories interviews (21) and qualitative interviews (20) Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

10. Dimensions of Conflict Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults During LifeDuring School Years Violence Killings And Disappearances Yearly average Number of Extreme years Yearly average Number of Extreme years Deaths due to hunger and illness attributed to conflict Yearly average Number of Extreme years Yearly average Number of Extreme years Control Disputed. Territories Number of years Control By the Resistance Number of years

11. Results (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) Standard ModelHunger during school Years w/ ext. kills during school Conflict ModelMarginal Effects b/se Probit (Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school year) Constant-27.442***-25.209***-30.602***-28.390*** (3.223)(3.153)(3.377)(3.388) Age3.133***2.947***3.451***3.261***0.470*** (0.410)(0.401)(0.420)(0.418)(0.061) Age 2 -0.097***-0.091***-0.106***-0.100***-0.014*** (0.013) (0.014) (0.002) Migrant0.361*0.303-0.028-0.038-0.006 (0.192)(0.201)(0.218)(0.221)(0.032) Married-4.271***-4.404***-4.650***-4.559***-0.657*** (0.577)(0.604)(0.710)(0.745)(0.102) Years of Education0.517***0.508***0.485***0.484***0.070*** (0.039)(0.037) (0.036)(0.003) E(Returns to Education)44.930***19.853***113.249***85.771***12.360*** (6.244)(7.111)(12.455)(14.101)(1.960) Has Occupation-1.517***-1.503***-1.494***-1.496***-0.216*** (0.272)(0.270)(0.283) (0.039) Insufficient Quality-19.534*-21.013*-20.973*-22.562*-3.251* (11.513)(11.663)(11.966)(11.911)(1.724) Insufficient Security-27.566*-29.514**-23.019-25.201*-3.632* (14.076)(14.212)(14.655)(14.552)(2.107) Hunger during school -0.098*** -0.074***-0.011*** (0.022) (0.023)(0.003) Years with extreme kills during school 1.781***1.601***0.231*** (0.300)(0.307)(0.043) District fixed effectsYes Ethnolinguistic fixed effectsYes N4099 F testF(50,2270)F(51,2269) F(52,2268)- F statistic....- Prob > F....- Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

12. Other variables, whose coefficients’ estimates were not statistically significant: Female; Urban; Household size; Father attended school; Mother attended school; First child; Adopted; Niece or nephew; Per capita hh expenditure; Hours of care activity; Insufficient Access; Results: Synthesis of Marginal Effects Variable  value Avg. Mg. Effect AgeUnit+1 year+22% to +30% Years of educationUnit+1 year+ 7% Being marriedUnit1 = yes- 66% Has an occupationUnit1 = yes- 22% Expected returns to educationSt. Dev.1,25%+15% Insufficient quality (prevalence)St. Dev.+2,3%-7.5% Insufficient security (prevalence)St. Dev.+1,3%-4.7%. Conflict Hunger during schoolSt.Dev.+3,6 people died/year-4% Years with extreme kills during school Unit+1 year+23% St. Dev.+ 0.4 years+13.9% Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResults

13. Finishing writing up: – Corrections – Introduction and Conclusion Submit before January 19 th 2015 Next Steps Motivation & FindingsBackgroundLiterature ReviewData & StrategyResultsNext Steps

14. This research is a work in progress. All your feedback is needed and valuable. Thank You! r.santos@ids.ac.uk

15. Dili Aileu Liquiça Bobonaro Covalima Ainaro Ermera Manufahi Manatuto Viqueque BaucauLautem Oecussi Synthesis of the conflict Political control variables: number of years of education in a district under dispute number of years of education in a district controlled by the Resistance

16. Number of secondary schools in Timor-Leste 1973-2012 Sources: Estatisticas do Ultramar 1973; Timor-Timur Dalam Angka 1989, 1993; Saldanha (1994); GIS Timor 2000, 2002 and MoE EMIS (2012)

17. School attendance

18. Household characteristics MotivationBackgroundReviewDataStrategyResultsNext steps

19. Economic drivers and quality of education MotivationBackgroundReviewDataStrategyResultsNext steps RuralUrban All MaleFemaleMaleFemale VariableN=1044N=1009N=1057N=992N=4102 (Completed) Years of Education 33554 33333 E(Returns to Education) 0.57%0.67%0.55%0.60%0.59% 1.36%1.21%1.31%1.07%1.25% Per capita Monthly Household Expenditure 20.120.928.729.924.9 (10.1)(10.8)(41.0)(42.5)(30.7) Hours of Care Activity 9.713.87.810.910.5 (7.5)(9.8)(8.6)(10.2)(9.3) Has Ocupation 34%30%11%9%21% (47.6%)(45.9%)(31.9%)(28.2%)(40.9%) RuralUrban All MaleFemaleMaleFemale VariableN=1044N=1009N=1057N=992N=4102 Insuficient Quality 2.9%2.8%1.6% 2.2% (2.8%)(2.7%)(1.5%) (2.3%) Insuficient Access 7.6% 5.0%5.1%6.3% (4.0%)(3.9%)(2.7%)(2.9%)(3.6%) Insuficient Security 1.1%1.0%0.6% 0.8% (1.6%) (0.7%)(0.8%)(1.3%)

20. Conflict and Violence (adolescent’s experience) MotivationBackgroundReviewDataStrategyResultsNext steps RuralUrban All MaleFemaleMaleFemale VariableN=796N=742N=897N=854N=3289 Kills during life 7.67.57.17.4 (5.2)(5.0)(4.6)(4.5)(4.8) Kills during school 8.07.08.27.8 (12.8)(11.4)(12.2)(10.0)(11.7) Hunger during life 5.25.14.74.85.0 (2.8) (2.2) (2.5) Hunger during school 4.64.24.64.34.4 (4.2)(4.1)(3.3)(2.8)(3.6) Years with extreme kills during life 0.4 0.3 0.4 (0.5) Years with extreme kills during school 0.2 (0.4) Number of years under extreme numbers of deaths by hunger/illness in the birth district 0.00 (0.00) Number of school years under extreme numbers of deaths by hunger/illness in the birth district 0.0 (0.0) Number of years in disputed districts 2.1 1.81.61.9 (3.3)(3.2)(3.1)(3.0)(3.1) Number of school years in disputed districts 0.30.2 (0.7) (0.6)(0.7) Number of years in districts controlled by the Resistance 1.4 1.51.21.4 (2.9) (3.0)(2.8)(2.9) Number of school years in districts controlled by the Resistance 0.20.10.20.10.2 (0.6)

21. Conflict and Violence (HH head’s experience) MotivationBackgroundReviewDataStrategyResultsNext steps

22. Heckman Probit Model (selection) Selection Model b/se Probability of child, between ages 12 and 18, to have completed primary school before the 2004/05 school year Constant -19.112*** (2.733) Age 2.172*** (0.336) Age 2 -0.059*** (0.011) E(Per capita hh income) 0.020*** (0.005) Has occupation -0.399*** 1 (0.126) Insufficient quality -20.834* (10.644) Kills during school -0.075*** (0.008) Years with extreme kills during school 2.270*** (0.256) School years controlled by Resistance 0.224*** (0.074) District fixed effects Yes Ethnolinguistic fixed effects Yes Athrho-0.756 (0.916) N4091 F testF(37.2279) F statistic. Prob > F. Table 14: Secondary Education Demand – Binomial Probit with Selection (Heckman Probit) – Selection model * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

23. Heckman Probit Model (main) (1)(2) ProbitHeckman Probit b/se Probit (Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school year) Constant-36.399***-20.479 (7.278)(19.497) Age5.279***3.262 (0.902)(2.457) Age 2 -0.152***-0.094 (0.027)(0.070) Urban-0.587*** (0.209) Household size0.084*** (0.031) First Child0.490*** (0.185) Is married-4.759***-5.164*** (0.798)(1.378) Years of Education-0.746***-0.663*** (0.134)(0.200) E(Returns to Education) 344.933***294.465*** (62.684)(88.117) E(Per capita hh income) 0.018*** (0.006) Hours of care activity-0.017* (0.010) Has Occupation-1.790***-1.370** (0.295)(0.537) Insufficient Quality -62.009***-14.641 (21.600)(17.190) Insufficient Security -74.897***-65.405** (28.804)(27.611) Hunger during school-0.383***-0.373** (0.119)(0.176) Years with extreme kills during school5.158***4.030*** (0.864)(1.550) District Controls Yes Ethnolinguistic Controls Yes N13834091 F testF(41,982)F(37,2279) F statistic18.73. Prob > F0.0000. Table 15: Secondary Education Demand – Probit and Binomial Probit with Selection (Heckman Probit) – Main model * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

24. Robustness tests