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Department of Defense Investigation Into Sources and Effects of Counterfeit Electronic Components Art Ogg, Global Director of Quality World Micro, Inc.

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Presentation on theme: "Department of Defense Investigation Into Sources and Effects of Counterfeit Electronic Components Art Ogg, Global Director of Quality World Micro, Inc."— Presentation transcript:

1 Department of Defense Investigation Into Sources and Effects of Counterfeit Electronic Components
Art Ogg, Global Director of Quality World Micro, Inc. &

2 Presentation Outline:
Package Inspections Resistance to Solvents False Top Coatings Fake Logos Chipped Components Damaged/Re-plated Leads Dissimilar Country of Origin Tantalum Capacitors ESD/Handling Techniques X-ray Observations Summary & Recommendations 2

3 PRESENTATION OUTLINE:
How to idnetify parts Travel from source to customer How often change hands, how paid for Parts disposition Shenzen trip details Resistance to Solvents 3

4 DEFINITION OF A COUNTERFEIT COMPONENT
PRE- AS5553: “ Items that are produced or distributed in violation of intellectual property rights, copyrights or trademarks”. AS 5553 Definition (July-2009): Parts that do not contain the proper internal construction Used parts, refurbished parts or reclaimed but sold as new Parts with different package style or surface plating Parts which have not successfully completed the OCM testing Parts sold as being up screened which have not been up screened Parts with modified labeling or markings intended to misrepresent 4

5 Which One is the Counterfeit?
What Were Your Observations? 5

6 6

7 7

8 OPEN COUNTERFEIT ACTIVITIES
OBSERVED COUNTERFEITING PRACTICES IN CHINA, DECEMBER, 2010 8

9 FACILITY IN SHENZHEN CHINA FOR INTERNET SALE OF PARTS
INTERNET VENDORS OF C/F PARTS MULTI-STORY BUILDING OF VENDORS 9

10 PACKAGE INSPECTIONS Confirm the external package labels with a bar code reader Examine the shipping bag for cuts, tears, vacuum seal, labels Are parts in a proper bag; ESD type, MBB type, non-ESD type For MSD; is there a HIC, desiccant and is the bag sealed 10

11 INSPECTING A FACTORY SEALED BOX
11

12 THE BAG IS MISSING THE HIC & DESICCANT
AND THERE IS NO ESD OR MBB LOGOS 12

13 THE BAR CODES DO NOT MATCH THE LABEL
13

14 THE CRACK SHOWS THE FALSE TOP COATING
14

15 INK DEFECTS DEMONSTRATES FAKE MARKINGS
15

16 Check for Multiple D/C’s
16

17 RESISTANCE TO SOLVENTS
Marker Permanency Test (used to test for uncured ink) Acetone Wash Test (used to test for false top coats) 17

18 THE “MARKER PERMANENCY TEST”
(NOTE: THIS TEST IS NOT FOR LASER MARKED PARTS) A MIXTURE OF 3 PARTS MINERAL SPIRITS AND 1 PART ALCOHOL IS USED FOR TESTING FOR A RE-MARKED COMPONENT. MIL-STD-883 (METHOD ) REQUIRES MARKINGS TO WITHSTAND A SWAB WASH WITHOUT FADING. MIL-STD-202 (METHOD 215) PROVIDES FOR A SIMILAR TEST. 18

19 THIS INK WAS NOT APPLIED BY THE OCM
19

20 FALSE TOP COATS 20

21 ACETONE REMOVES THE FALSE TOP COATING
21

22 THE RESULTS OF USING ACETONE ON A FALSE
TOP COATING. A GOOD COMPONENT WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY ACETONE.. 22

23 REJECT A PART THAT HAS A SHINY OR GRAINY TOP
23

24 False Top Coating Removed
24

25 CORRECT MOLD INCORRECT MOLD
25

26 Check Mold Cavity for Coatings
26

27 Pin-1 Dimple is Coated 27

28 REMARKED COMPONENT TO MAKE IT APPEAR TO BE A MILITARY
GRADE COMPONENT INSTEAD OF THE ORIGINAL COMMERCIAL. THE SUFFIX OF THE P/N WHEN VIEWED FROM ONE ANGLE IS SHOWN AS “EEAI” THIS SAME PART WHEN VIEWED FROM A DIFFERENT ANGLE SHOWS THE P/N USED TO BE “EGAI” “EEAI” IS A FAST VERSION “EGAI” IS A SLOWER VERSION 28

29 FAKE LOGO MARKS 29

30 EXAMPLES OF COUNTERFEIT PHILIPS LOGOS
30

31 CHIPPED CORNERS FROM REMOVAL
31

32 Check for Cracks on the Bottom
32

33 CHIPS ON CORNER MEANS IT IS A “PULLED PART”
WHICH INDICATES THE PARTS ARE USED. 33

34 DAMAGED AND RE-PLATED COMPONENT LEADS
34

35 SOLDER DEFECTS (PILLOWING) IS A SIGN THEY
HAVE BEEN RETINNED AND ARE MOST LIKELY USED 35

36 TWO EXAMPLES OF LEAD DAMAGE CAUSED FROM
BEING IN A CIRCUIT FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. THIS IS NOT FROM TESTING THE COMPONENT. 36

37 EXAMPLE OF A RETINNED LEAD WITH SOLDER
DEFECT. THIS IS A REJECT. 37

38 Damaged BGA Spheres 38

39 Check the Leads for Coatings
39

40 Look for Tin Whiskers 40

41 CUTTING MARKS ON THE ENDS SHOWING THE SAME STAMPING
CORRECT VIEW OF THE SIDES OF LEADS SHOWING CUTTING MARKS ON THE ENDS SIDE VIEW OF A U.S. COIN SHOWING THE SAME STAMPING MARKS ON THE SIDE. 41

42 DISSIMILAR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN STAMPS
42

43 TWO PARTS FROM THE SAME TUBE; DIFFERENT
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, DIFFERENT LEAD HOLES. THIS LOT NEEDS TO BE REJECTED. SQUARE HOLES ROUND HOLES DIFFERENT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 43

44 TANTALUM CAPACITOR COUNTERFEIT TESTING
44

45 TESTING FOR COUNTERFEIT TANTALUM CAPACITORS
GOOD PART REFLECTS LIGHT BAD PART IS DULL 45

46 TANTALUM COUNTERFEIT LIGHT TEST
PASSES THE LIGHT TEST FAILS THE LIGHT TEST 46

47 ESD & HANDLING CONSIDERATIONS
47

48 THE USE OF MICROSCOPE SYSTEMS TO DETECT
COUNTERFEIT AND REWORK COMPONENTS CONDUCT THE IDEA-STD-1010 INSPECTION 48

49 X-RAY PHOTO OBSERVATIONS
49

50 THE USE OF X-RAY SYSTEMS TO DETECT COUNTERFEIT AND REWORK COMPONENTS
A lot purchased directly from Maxim had 2 date codes. This x-ray shows 2 different die types. The OCM was asked to verify these 2 had the same specifications. Maxim responded they were the same, which enabled the lot to be released for shipment to the customer. 50

51 TWO DIFFERENT DIES FOUND IN ONE REEL OF PARTS
THE USE OF X-RAY SYSTEMS TO DETECT COUNTERFEIT AND REWORK COMPONENTS TWO DIFFERENT DIES FOUND IN ONE REEL OF PARTS A lot with the same D/C, L/C, P/N, etc. was examined visually. The parts were suspected as being blacktopped and remarked after visual inspection. A sample was inspected using x-ray. This photo shows two distinctly different internal die’s. The lot was therefore rejected as a result of this x-ray photo. 51

52 THE USE OF X-RAY SYSTEMS TO DETECT COUNTERFEIT AND REWORK COMPONENTS
TWO DIFFERENT DIES FOUND IN ONE REEL OF PARTS CORRECT DIE INCORRECT DIE This lot of components did not come with traceability records, it was given a detailed examination with high powered microscopy. No anomalies were noticed. A (15) piece sample was examined using x-ray and it was discovered that ~ one in five pieces had a different die as shown in the photo on the right. The entire lot was rejected. 52

53 THE USE OF X-RAY SYSTEMS TO DETECT COUNTERFEIT AND REWORK COMPONENTS
1 2 3 1- Unknown part has the markings upside down. 2- Unusual S-shaped bond with a ball at the end. 3- Top down looks alright. 4- Known good part does not have “S” bond or the ball at the end of the wire. 5- Known good part looks OK in the top down view. 4 5 53

54 THE USE OF X-RAY SYSTEMS TO DETECT COUNTERFEIT AND REWORK COMPONENTS
MISSING DIE IN COUNTERFEIT COMPONENT ON THE RIGHT The components at left are normal. The two on the right aroused suspicions due to topographical irregularities. They were x-rayed and compared with known good parts on the left. They were rejected. 54

55 SUMMARY PROCEDURES Inspect packaging for damage and verify labels
Always be mindful of handling and ESD concerns Compare the components to the OCM data sheet Inspect leads; retinning, bent, co planarity, solder balls, observe the tips check for false top coating, remarking, surface scratches Compare top surface to bottom surface Check pin-1 and mold cavity for foreign material Check for corrosion anywhere on the part Check for cracks or chips Conduct resistance to solvents testing when applicable Use the IDEA-STD-1010 Inspection Standard 55

56 WHAT IS NEEDED A CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT ADMINISTERED REPOSITORY
WHERE CONFIRMED COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS CAN BE SENT ALLOWS DISTRIBUTORS TO STOP PAYMENT TO THE SUPPLIER REQUIRES THE SUPPLIER AGREE TO DISPOSITION WITH THE U.S. THIS PLAN WOULD REMOVE CONFIRMED C/F FROM SUPPLY CHAIN THE OCM’S WOULD NEED TO COOPERATE TO CONFIRM DIAGNOSIS 56

57 WHAT IS NEEDED AN OFFICAL U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED DEFINITION FOR
A COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONIC COMPONENT: ICE HAS ONE BASED UPON INTELECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS 5553 HAS ONE BASED UPON COMPONENT MODIFICATIONS AS 6081 BEING WORKED ON, WILL HAVE YET ANOTHER The distribution market place is not certain which definition applies at any one point in time. 57

58 WHAT IS NEEDED A GOVERNMENT SPONSORED DATA BASE TRACKING
CONFIRMED COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS GIDEP IS ON THE RIGHT TRACK BUT ONLY TRACKS THOSE THAT WERE SOLD TO GOVERNMENT & AEROSPACE SITES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TRACKS EVERY COUNTERFEIT BILL BY S/N, LOCATION FOUND, DENOMINATION, ETC. THIS PROGRAM NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED TO COMBAT THE ENTIRE POPULATION OF COUNTERFEITS NOT JUST MILITARY 58

59 INDUSTRY WIDE COOPERATION IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE:
WHAT IS NEEDED INDUSTRY WIDE COOPERATION IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE: ORIGINAL COMPONENT MANUFACTURERS (OCM’S) WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH ANY ENTITIY WHO DID NOT PURCHASE PARTS FROM THEM OR THEIR FRANCHISED DISTRIBUTORS DISTRIBUTORS MUST SEND SUSPECTED C/F PARTS TO A 3RD PARTY WITH OCM COOPERATION, THE SPREAD OF C/F PARTS COULD BE GREATLY REDUCED 59

60 ELIMINATE CONFUSION OVER WHO DECLARES A PART
WHAT IS NEEDED ELIMINATE CONFUSION OVER WHO DECLARES A PART AS BEING A COUNTERFEIT SOME SAY ONLY THE OCM CAN MAKE THE CALL OTHERS SAY A 3RD PARTY ANALYSIS HOUSE CAN STILL OTHERS RELY ON ANY IDEA-CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL INSPECTOR 60

61 WHAT IS NEEDED THERE NEEDS TO BE A GOVERNMENT ENDORSED
PROGRAM FOR CERTIFYING INDEPENDENT DISTRIBUTORS: THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ADOPT THE IDEA INSPECTION STANDARD FIRST THEN ENDORSE AN IDEA PROGRAM FOR FOR CERTIFYING INDEPENDENT DISTRIBTORS. ONE SUCH PROGRAM IS BEING WRITTEN. ONCE THE PROGRAM IS IN PLACE, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PURCHASE ONLY FROM THOSE WHO ARE CERTIFIED. 61

62 World Micro Thanks The Department of Defense
for This Opportunity to Present Counterfeit Detection Techniques and Observations Dan Ellsworth, President Art Ogg, Quality Director &


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