2.  “Picture a pasture that is open to all. Each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons…the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.” ---Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 1968

3.  A key characteristic of “local” commons is that there are typically several participants (but a relatively small “several”.)  Hardin applied the commons metaphor to “global” commons problems such as large- scale air and water pollution and overpopulation.  Ostrom has concentrated her attention on local commons.

4.  Pastures  Woodlands  Fishing grounds  Hunting Grounds  Watersheds  Ground Water Basins  Oil Fields  Parking spaces

5.  Instinctive economists’ approach: Model common commons problem as an “appropriation game”.  Common resource shared by N players, intensity of use by i is x i.  number of cows pastured, amount of water extracted, etc  Payoff to player i is P i (x i, Σ x j ).

6.  Given actions of others, P i (x i, Σ x j ) is increasing in x i over some range and then decreasing. P i x i  P i (x i, Σ x j ) is a decreasing function of Σ x

7.  Under plausible assumptions, this game will have a unique Nash equilibrium.  In Nash equilibrium each user imposes a “negative externality” on all other users, but does not take this into account when choosing his intensity of use.  This equilibrium will not be Pareto efficient.  The resource will be overused.

8.  Centrally enforced solutions:  “Pigovian solution”: Price the externality.  Find the optimal solution, charge an access fee equal to the total externality caused by an extra use.  Legal limits on quantities extracted by each individual  “Enclosure” Privatize the commons by assigning property rights to exclusive use

9.  Centrally imposed solutions require central knowledge of payoff functions and public observability of activities of each individual.  They require a non-corrupt central authority.  They require intelligent political decision-making by central authority.

10.  Requires enforcement of property rights and monitoring of action of users.  Fencing the range land.  Patrolling the berry patches.  How does one assign property rights to flowing water, swimming fish, or game in the forest?  Transferring property rights to a single owner introduces the holdout problem.  Similar to land assembly problems Problems with Privatization

11.  Ostrom proposed that we learn from case studies of successful and unsuccessful real world common property institutions.  She conducted field studies and studied the field studies of others.  She found that enduring institutions achieved more efficient outcomes than Nash equilibrium for simple game, but were not the predicted first-best efficient outcomes.

12.  Mountain meadow and forests in Swiss Alps and in mountains of Japan.  Irrigation systems in Spain, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Nepal  Fisheries in Turkey, Sri Lanka, and Nova Scotia

13.  Ostrom documents overexploitation and rent dissipation  Fisheries in Turkey, Sri Lanka  Water basins in the U.S  Enclosure often replaces commons. Often the one-shot model applies

14.  Ostrom noted that many commons problems are not one-shot games, but repeated games, played year after year.  The Swiss canton of Törbel has maintained communal management of forests and meadows for more than 500 years.  Irrigation institutions in Spain are also more than 500 years old.

15.  What does game theory predict for repeated games?  Folk theorem: In a repeated game without a fixed end point, if players are well-informed about each others actions, almost any behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium (by strategies that punish deviations.)  Some of these equilibria will be efficient. Some will not be.  Neither Nash equilibrium of one-shot game, nor Pareto optimal outcome is a reliable predictor of outcome.

16.  Ostrom suggests a fruitful path.  Outcomes are not well predicted by simple models that incorporate few facts.  Study a large number of durable and less durable institutions.  Look for regularities. Try to understand what happens and why.  This requires detailed observation, guided by sophisticated theory.

17.  Clear boundaries of resource and of the group who share it.  Congruence of benefit shares and cost shares.  Constitutional rules for changing operating rules.  Monitoring.  Graduated sanctions.  Conflict resolution mechanism. Ostrom’s List: Characteristics of durable commons institutions

18.  Finding and enforcing a nearly efficient allocation is relatively easy in a symmetric game where it is efficient for everyone to be treated equally.  More challenging where there are important differences in the interests and bargaining positions of players. Symmetry and asymmetry

19.  Landholders near headwaters have advantage over those downstream.  Some land is more suitable for water- intensive crops.  Elaborate rules for allocating water under different scarcity conditons.  Philippines-symmetrization by allocating some land near head and some near bottom to each landholder. Irrigation examples

20.  Durable institutions must be internally stable.  They need not be efficient.  Ostrom’s case studies document this.  Group selection may impose some efficiency. Stability and Efficiency

21.  Analogy to medicine.  Observe what has evolved, try to understand how it works.  Where outcome is inefficient, seek alternative designs that are internally consistent and likely to work.  Mechanism designers need to observe and understand existing institutions before tinkering.  Example: Medical intern matching algorithm. Evolution and Design of Mechanisms

22.  Successful commons operations are enforced by norms.  Norms are monitored by entire population.  Humans seem to have an evolved ability to generate and follow norms.  Like potential for language, can take many forms  Experimental evidence. Norms and Human Evolution

23.  Where does altruism enter?  Helps when information is incomplete  Limits variety of solutions in repeated games.  Kin selection theory and the family as a commons. Family networks and altruism Family networks and altruism

24.  Agriculture displaces hunter gathering. Fixed, appropriable resources.  Cheaper fencing makes enclosure of pastures possible.  Manufacturing allows clear ownership rights.  But the information economy is a commons. Is technology making commons obsolete?

25. The information economy as a commons An idea is no easier to appropriate than wild game or running water.

26.  Information economy has been described as an “anti-commons”.  Instead of a game in which substitute goods are depleted, complement goods are added by individual contributors.  Nash equilibrium has undersupply.  Privatizing ideas with patents does not help. Anti-commons

27.  Success Stories  The internet  Open access publishing  Open source software  Patent pools  Google  Wikipedia  Tales of Woe  Patent morasses  Monopolies Institutions in the information economy

28.  Nobel ceremonies, a week of celebration of science.  Work of Ostrom dramatizes the potential of social science as a multidisciplinary, multi-method commons.  Theory, case studies, experiments  Political Science, Economics, Game theory, History, Anthropology, Ecology  Antidote for inbreeding--Hybridization Hybrid Vigor in Social Science