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Copyright © 2007 - The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License. To view this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/ The OWASP Foundation 6 th OWASP AppSec Conference Milan - May 2007 http://www.owasp.org/ Software Security The Bigger Picture Rudolph Araujo Senior Principal, Foundstone Professional Services rudolph@foundstone.com www.codesecurely.org
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Who am I? Developer for over 10 years Foundstone / McAfee Morgan Stanley BindView Microsoft Visual Developer Security - MVP Masters from Carnegie Mellon University Computer Science / Information Security Areas of expertise: C / C++ / C#, Windows / Unix
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Agenda State of Software Security Defining a Security Frame Security Requirements Engineering Security Acceptance Testing Security Knowledge Management Parting Thoughts Q&A 3
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 STATE OF SOFTWARE SECURITY 4
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 The Stages of Software Security
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Innocence No formal security requirements Security flaws are identified through: Penetration Testing Security Incidents
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Application Security Awareness Penetrate & Patch Bug fixing late in the lifecycle is extremely expensive and time consuming Reactive approach Application Security Identifies and corrects instances of security issues in applications Tactical, near-term approach to securing an application
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Application Security Enlightenment Push security earlier in the lifecycle Threat Model the Application Structured approach for identifying, evaluating and mitigating risks to system security Models the system as an attacker would see it …with the advantage of knowing the internal s Code Review the Application
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Software Security Awareness Application Security is expensive and time consuming Vulnerabilities are still found year after year Application Security Enlightenment is false enlightenment Addressing the symptoms and not the disease
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Software Security Awareness Root cause analysis determines the sources of insecure software People –Lack of security knowledge and motivation Process –Reactive approach to security issues Technology –Lack of appropriate tools
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Software Security Enlightenment Create a holistic Software Security program Integrate security into all phases of the SDLC High-ROI activities first Not all software security programs are identical Build a program to meet your needs
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 State of Software Security 12
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 DEFINING A SECURITY FRAME 13
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Defining a Security Frame 14
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Foundstone Software Security Frame Configuration Management Data Protection in Storage & Transit Authentication Authorization User & Session Management Data Validation Error Handling & Exception Management Logging & Auditing 15
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING 16
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Security Requirements Engineering Lack of / bad software requirements leads to bad software Lack of security requirements leads to insecure software No benchmarks for QA to perform testing No traceability! Problem: Requirements are often written by business analysts or product management that may not be technical AES-256-CBC – WTF is that? 17
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Organizational Drivers Regulatory compliance SOX 404 HIPAA PCI GLBA CA SB1386 / State Notification Laws BASEL II FISMA EU Data Protection Directive … Industry regulations and standards FFIEC OWASP Top 10 / Guides SCADA Security OASIS ISO 17799 … 18
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Organizational Drivers Company policies / documents Privacy policy Coding standards Patching policy Data classification policy Infosec policies Acceptable use policies Export control Results from previous security audits … Security features Authentication Authorization Administrative interfaces User management … 19
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Requirements Pre Process 1.Work with legal / internal audit to identify drivers Define an organizational superset 2.Convert each driver to a superset of technical requirements Use your security frame as a guide Eliminate duplicates 1.Build application vs. driver matrix 20
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Requirements Process 1.Based on features / data elements determine which drivers apply Leverage data classification / privacy policy 2.“Copy-paste” requirement(s) from superset defined earlier Consider building a thin “requirements” application Perhaps an Excel template? 21
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 SECURITY ACCEPTANCE TESTING 22
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Security Acceptance Testing QA folks test software! How many test for security? Plus unit tests, build verification tests, test driven development … Penetration testing can often be too late But … 23
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Security Acceptance Testing The Mindset Training and exposure Consider Foundstone Hacme* / WebGoat Testers need to help define the threat model Use threat model to prioritize and scope effort Define attack libraries of test cases Based on vulnerabilities and the security frame Based on phase of testing Choose which ones to apply to this rev 24
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Unit Testing Data validation Fuzzing SQL injection Buffer overflows Cross site scripting Authorization Method level permissions 25
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Build Verification Testing Integrate source code analysis Simple regular expression based scans Commercial tools Build custom rule sets Define exit criteria for build acceptance 26
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 QA Testing IIntegrate with existing bug tracking systems NNo high / medium / low! GGo with Severity / Priority ratings FFollow the existing process TTreat security bugs no different than other bugs WWell maybe a little different ;) 27
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 QA Testing Tag security bugs Maybe used to ensure developer assigned to fix is “security conscious” Classify by security frame Allows root cause and other statistical analyses Classify by nature Bugs Flaws Commendations Informational Mark for regression testing 28
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 SECURITY KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 29
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Why Knowledge Management? Well, learn from other’s mistakes! Within your team / organization / community Guidance on an ongoing basis 30
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Software Security Portal Document repository Threat modeling artifact repository Leverage commonality across similar applications Metrics reporting 31
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Software Security Wiki Security architectures and infrastructure components Reviewed and tested code snippets for commonly used tasks Links to additional information about software security on the Internet Lessons learned from previous security issues identified in applications 32
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Security Knowledge Management Benefits Wide distribution of best practices Prevention of repetition of similar issues Improved productivity Overall better software quality Gotchas! Don’t disclose too soon – even if it is internal only! Anonymize the examples and code if necessary Share not only the issue but how the issue was discovered and fixed Root cause analysis Tweaking the SSDLC Make sure the fix is bug free! 33
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 Special Case: Third Party Components Open Source / COTS OpenSSL zlib Who is tracking updates / patches? The average developer??? Which of our applications are affected? What’s the plan to rollout patches? Back again to matrices! Role: Software Security Architect Subscribe to mailing lists –Patch reliability Notify application owners 34
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 PARTING THOUGHTS 35
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007 It takes a village to raise software security! 36
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6 th OWASP AppSec Conference – Milan – May 2007
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