1. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect Dr Jonathan Leader Maynard, New College jonathan.leadermaynard@politics.ox.ac.uk 1

2. Key Pieces of International Humanitarian Law  Geneva Conventions:  Wounded and sick in the armed forces [1864].  Wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of naval forces [1906].  Prisoners of War [1929]  Protection of civilians [1949]  Additional Protocol I (on protection of victims of international conflict) and II (non-international conflict) [1977].  Hague Conventions (1899/1907)  Nuremberg Charter (1945)  UN Charter (1945)  Genocide Convention (1948)  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)  The Rome Statute (1998) 2

3. Legal Obstacles to HI  Article 2(7) of the UN Charter: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.  Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: ‘All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’.  Unless in self-defence (Article 51), military action requires authorization by the Security Council under its Chapter VII powers to maintain international peace and security. 3

4. A Rough History of Humanitarian Intervention (1800-1945)  In 19 th Century, the Great Powers sometimes invoked a duty to intervene to protect Christians in the (Muslim) Ottoman Empire, a duty articulated in some early modern era treaties. Such interventions occur in 1824, 1861 and 1877.  In 1848, for the first time, British and French naval captains consider intervening to halt the bombardment of Messina.  In particular, 19 th Century concerns about fate of civilians tied to concerns with destruction of European private property, e.g. US destruction of Greytown, Nicaragua (1854), bombardment of Valparaiso by the Spanish (1866). But bombardment of ‘savages’ is accepted – indeed, punishing savages for their ‘atrocities’ a feature of imperial rule.  Limited humanitarian motives involved in US intervention in Cuba (1898) and used to justify (though probably did not motivate) US occupation of Haiti (1915). 4

5. A Rough History of Humanitarian Intervention (1945-1990)  Grounds for Humanitarian Intervention increased after 1945 with development of International Humanitarian Law.  But Cold War politics obstruct HI, and push humanitarian concerns to the background of international politics.  UN does intervene in the Congo on humanitarian grounds in 1964, fairly unsuccessfully.  But usually, humanitarian motives are either denied, not present, or not central:  US intervention in Dominican Republic 1965  Indian intervention in Pakistan 1971  Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia 1978  Tanzanian intervention in Uganda 1979. 5

6. A Rough History of Humanitarian Intervention (1990-Present)  End of Cold War, American unipolarity, and the “liberal moment” allows expansion in non-coercive peacekeeping operations, and appearance of many operations nominally or potentially motivated by Humanitarian Intervention: Northern Iraq 1991, Somalia 1992, Liberia 1992, Haiti 1994, Bosnia 1995, East Timor, 1999, Kosovo 1999, Sierra Leone 2000.  UNSG Kofi Annan notes a developing international norm to forcibly protect civilians in speech to GA September 1999.  In the middle of the Kosovo War, Tony Blair lays out a “Doctrine of the International Community” in a speech to the Economic Club in Chicago, April 1999.  But also key failures or cases of inaction: Rwanda 1994, Darfur 2003. Somalia 1992 sees US withdrawal.  And opposition from Russia, China, and the Non-Aligned Movement. 6

7. What is the Responsibility to Protect?  From 2001, R2P comes to replace HI.  First proposed in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Affirmed state and international responsibilities “to prevent, react and rebuilt” with respect to “a population suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure.”  Accepted in Art. 138 & 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document 2005, which is approved by the UN General Assembly in September 2005. But UN Security Council has to approve intervention. And restricted to four “mass atrocity crimes”:  Genocide (defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention)  War crimes (violations of the four Geneva Conventions)  Crimes against humanity (as defined in the Rome Statute 2002)  Ethnic cleansing (no legal definition, but forced deportation a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute)  R2P reaffirmed April 2006 in UNSC Resolution 1674. 7

8. What is the Responsibility to Protect?  In January 2009, the UN Secretariat produces Implementing the responsibility to protect, its first comprehensive report on R2P. It introduces the ‘three pillars of R2P, namely:  Pillar 1: Responsibility of the state to protect its citizens  Pillar 2: Responsibility of international community to assist states in building protection capacity.  Pillar 3: Responsibility of international community to respond in a timely and decisive fashion when a state is “manifestly failing” to protect its people.  This is debated in the General Assembly, and GA resolution A/RES/63/308 affirms notion of R2P in 2009.  But UNSC is silent on R2P 2006-10, and it has been separated from Protection of Civilians agenda.  Still different perspectives on emphasis – interventionist (Evans, Pattison) vs. preventative (Bellamy). 8

9. The Case for HI  Cosmopolitan/liberal moral arguments (Teson, Shue, ICISS):  The grounds of sovereignty  Human Rights and backup duties  The ‘Counter-restrictionist’ legal argument (e.g. Reisman, Damrosch):  Humanitarian Intervention authorised by either international treaty law (e.g. Preamble and Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, Genocide Convention) or customary international law.  Benignly self-interested arguments (Blair):  Global interconnectedness  Terrorism  Refugee crises 9

10. Criticism of HI/R2P  Moral Hazard (Kuperman)  Encouraging rebellion  Accelerating atrocity  Disingenuousness of R2P (Chandler)  Problem of Abuse (Chandler). Especially in light of ‘War on Terror’.  Vehicle for Western/Liberal governmentality and interests (Chandler, Dillon & Reid)  Communal rights to self-determination (Mill, Walzer)  Pluralism/Cultural Relativism (Parekh)  Ineffectiveness  In halting atrocities  In reconstructing states  International order 10

11. Methods of HI/R2P  Mediation/Diplomatic Measures  Military Intervention  Economic Sanctions  Comprehensive sanctions  Targeted/Smart Sanctions  International Justice Tools  ICC  International or Synthetic Tribunals (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone)  Commissions of Inquiry  Ideological Interventions  Coercive  Persuasive http://www.acmc.gov.au/publications/the-prevention-toolbox-acmc- supports-oxford-project-on-how-to-prevent-mass-atrocities/ 11

12. Potential Examples of HI  Russian, British and French Anti-Ottoman Intervention in Greek War of Independence (1824)  French expedition in Ottoman Syria (1860–1861)  Russian Anti-Ottoman Intervention in Bulgaria (1877)  Spanish–American War (1898)  United States occupation of Haiti (1915)  United Nations Operation in the Congo (1964)  US intervention in Dominican Republic (1965)  Indian intervention in East Pakistan (1971)  Vietnamese Intervention in Cambodia (1978)  Uganda-Tanzania War (1979)  Operation Provide Comfort (Iraq, 1991)  Unified Task Force (Somalia, 1992)  ECOWAS intervention in Liberia (1992)  Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994)  Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia, Aug 1995)  UNAMIR (Rwanda, 1994)  UNTAET (East Timor, 1999)  NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (1999)  British intervention in Sierra Leone (2000)  African Union Mission in Darfur (2004)  Coalition (mainly NATO) military intervention in Libya (2011)  Primarily French (plus ECOWAS) forces into Mali (2013)  Military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2014) 12

13. − Bellamy, A.J. Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Polity, 2009) − Bellamy, A.J. & Wheeler, N. ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’, in J. Baylis, S. Smith and P. Owens (eds). The Globalization of World Politics (2010) − Blair, T. ‘Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club’, (1999) http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www. number10.gov.uk/Page1297 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www. number10.gov.uk/Page1297 − Chandler, D. ‘The responsibility to protect? Imposing the “Liberal Peace”', International Peacekeeping vol. 11, no. 1 (2004) − Damrosch, L.F. ‘Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law’ in L.W. Reed & C. Kaysen, Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (1993) − Dillon, M. & Reid, J. The Liberal Way of War (2009) − Evans, G. ‘Ethnopolitical Conflict: When is it Right to Intervene?’ Ethnopolitics, vol. 10, no. 1 (2011), − Evans, G. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (2008) − International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001) − Kuperman, A.J. ‘Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention,’ Ethnopolitics 4/2 (2005): 149-73. − Pattison, J. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (2010) − Ramsbotham, O. ‘Islam, Christianity and Forcible Humanitarian Intervention,’ Ethics and International Affairs 12 (1998) − Shue, H. ‘Limiting Sovereignty’ in: J. Welsh, Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (2004) − Teson, F. ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,’ in J.L. Holzgrefe & R. O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (2003) − Walzer, M. Just and Unjust Wars (2000) − Welsh, J. (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford, 2004) − Welsh, J. ‘Implementing the ‘‘Responsibility to Protect’’: Where Expectations Meet Reality’, Ethics & International Affairs 24/4 (2010)