1. Professor Jack M. Beermann Boston University School of Law
Public Pension Reform
Professor Jack M. Beermann
Boston University School of Law

2. Professor Jack M. Beermann
Introduction
The Public Pension Crisis: Magnitude and Causes
A. How did the problem happen? Underfunding, increased promises and unreasonable investment projections. Political factors.
B. How big is the problem? $1 trillion-$4 trillion plus. 1. Proper discount rate controversy. 2. The special case of health care. 3. Crowding out of services in the no tax increase environment.

3. State Law Constraints on Pension Reform: Funding
Professor Jack M. Beermann
State Law Constraints on Pension Reform: Funding
State Law Constraints on Underfunding Pension Liabilities. Most states don’t require full funding; a few do.
Should states be constitutionally required to fund their pension obligations in full?
Compare to federal Social Security and other federal systems. Projected unfunded Social Security liability over next 75 years: $10.6 trillion to $25.4 trillion.

4. State Law Constraints on Pension Reform: Balanced Budget Requirements
Professor Jack M. Beermann
State Law Constraints on Pension Reform: Balanced Budget Requirements
State Balanced Budget Requirements and Pension Plan Funding:
Underfunded pensions are not considered “deficits” under state balanced budget requirements.
Stricter balanced budget requirements correlate with higher unfunded pension liabilities.
Seems like political leaders cannot resist deficit spending.

5. State Law Constraints on Pension Reform: Pension Clauses
Professor Jack M. Beermann
State Law Constraints on Pension Reform: Pension Clauses
EXAMPLE: The Illinois Constitution’s Pension Protection Clause. Similar to New York and other states:
Article XIII; SECTION 5. PENSION AND RETIREMENT RIGHTS
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.
The California Rule versus Reasonable Reform (California might not really follow the California rule. Illinois is the next important decision.)
Pension protection clauses combine with state constitutional contract clauses.

6. State Law Constraints on Pension Reform
Professor Jack M. Beermann
State Law Constraints on Pension Reform
In some states, from the moment you become a public employee, you are absolutely entitled to whatever pension and other retirement benefits were promised at the date of employment. (Other states protect only vested benefits.)
Under California Rule, any change to promised benefits is illegal unless there is some compensatory benefit to the employee.
In states that apply strict rules like these, reform is very difficult.

7. Federal Constitutional Law Constraints on Pension Reform
Professor Jack M. Beermann
Federal Constitutional Law Constraints on Pension Reform
The main federal constraint on pension reform is the Contract Clause, which prohibits state laws that impair the obligation of contracts.
Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), and basic legal principles under the Contract Clause: Two issues:
(1) Whether the change in state law results in a "substantial impairment of a contractual relationship” and if so
(2) whether this impairment is justified as "'reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."

8. Federal Constitutional Law Constraints on Pension Reform
Professor Jack M. Beermann
Federal Constitutional Law Constraints on Pension Reform
Sovereign Immunity and State Default
Could a state default and interpose a sovereign immunity defense?
This is actually a more difficult legal question than you might think.

9. Bankruptcy and Pension Reform
Professor Jack M. Beermann
Bankruptcy and Pension Reform
Bankruptcy and Reduction of Pension Obligations
General Principles
States may not use bankruptcy
State decides if municipalities may use bankruptcy
Municipality must be insolvent (strict definition)
Examples: Detroit and Central Falls

10. Alternative Pension Designs
Professor Jack M. Beermann
Alternative Pension Designs
Defined contribution plans.
Hybrid plans.
Place some investment risk on employees.
Advantages to contribution or hybrid plan.

11. Conclusion: Reform and Change
Professor Jack M. Beermann
Conclusion: Reform and Change
Bailouts and Reasonable Reform
What would a bailout look like?
If no reform: pressure to privatization, shrinking government, loss of services.