1. DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS IN EUROPEAN CUP COMPETITIONS Dr Peter Dawson University of Bath, UK IASE 10 th Annual Conference, Gijon, Spain. 9-10 May 2008.

2. INTRODUCTION A number of studies have investigated the behaviour of agents in sporting contests. Managerial and coaching decision-making (Clement and McCormick, 1989) Strategic behaviour of penalty-takers and goalkeepers (Palacios-Huerta, 2003) Another important relationship is between players and match officials (referees). In football, as indeed in most sports, referees are assigned the task of implementing the laws of the game and ensuring that players abide by its regulations. Evidence based on match analysis from the European Championship of 2000 suggests that a top official would make an average 137 observable interventions during any one game.

3. INTRODUCTION The performance of players and the actions taken by referees can have an important bearing on the outcome of individual contests and the course of a season. Player transgressions that result in red cards have been found to influence match outcomes (Ritter et al. 1994). A yellow card, which is often issued for a lesser offence, can influence subsequent decision-making made by that player for the reminder of the match. Consequently, and if we assume players rationality, players will commit major transgressions such as professional fouls either if the probability of detection is low and / the player believes the foul will benefit the team.

4. OUTLINE Previous Literature Data Modelling Disciplinary Sanctions Empirical Results

5. PREVIOUS LITERATURE Recent academic literature, which has focused on domestic leagues in a number of major European football leagues, has found evidence to suggest match officials are inconsistent in their decision-making both in terms of the distribution of disciplinary sanctions and time added-on at the end of contests. Some examples: Disciplinary Sanctions Buraimo et al. (2007) – English Premier League and German 1 st Bundesliga. Dawson et al. (2007) – English Premier League. Downward and Jones (2007) – English FA Cup matches. Time Added-On Dohmen (2005), Sutter and Kocher (2004) – German 1 st Bundesliga. Garciano et al. (2005) – Spanish league Scoppa (2007) – Italian league Main finding: referee decision-making is biased.

6. CONTRIBUTION OF PRESENT STUDY This study looks at disciplinary sanctions in the context of European cup competitions at club level (UEFA Cup and Champions League). - Comparison of elimination tournaments - Ability to identify possible nationality effects (evidence from subjectively judged sports indicates this is important determinant of decision-making) Very much a work in progress (comments / suggestions welcome!)

7. DATA Match based data provided by UEFA Full dataset includes over 13,000 observations over the period 1971-2007 Sub-set of observations used in this study: 2002-03 to 2006-07 n = 1720 - Champions League - UEFA Cup

8. DATA Cross-Tabulation of % Yellow Cards Issued to Home and Away Teams (by Competition) Note: Main figures Champions League data, figures in parentheses UEFA Cup data

9. DATA Cross-Tabulation of Red Cards Issued to Home and Away Teams (by Competition)

10. MODELLING DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS A number of different modelling approaches have been used in the literature: Univariate OLS and Poisson (Witt, 2005) Bivariate Poisson and Negative Binomial Models (Dawson et al., 2007) Bivariate Probit Models (Buraimo et al., 2007) It is also possible to model count data by discrete choice methods that recognise the sequential nature of the data (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). One such candidate is the ordered probit model:

11. MODELLING DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS The dependent variable is constructed as the total number of disciplinary “points” incurred by the home team and away team in each match. One point awarded for each yellow card and two points for a red card. The dependent variables in the home and away equations are then re- coded as follows:

12. MODELLING DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS

13. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

15.  The average number of disciplinary points awarded to both home and away teams in the Champions League is lower compared to the UEFA Cup.  A strong home team (relative to the away team) incurs less disciplinary points.  Home teams from the “big five” leagues incur less disciplinary points.  Contests which involve both teams from “big five” leagues generate more disciplinary points.  The presence of a running track has the effect of increasing the number of disciplinary points issued to the home team.  The number of disciplinary points awarded to the away team is higher the fuller the stadium.  Elite referees issue more disciplinary points to the home team.

16. EMPIRICAL RESULTS Referee Nationality Effects Difficult to establish the precise interplay between referee nationality, team nationality and reputation…

17. CONCLUDING REMARKS Consistent with previous studies we find that referees do issue more cards to the away team. This is partly a reflection of the home advantage and the difference in quality of the two teams competing. However stadium specific characteristics are also important. Furthermore there are significant differences across the two competitions analysed in this study. Given the apparent variation in referee behaviour across nationalities further work should explore why such variation occurs. For example to what extent does reputation of teams / nations matter? Are referees with more experience less biased? Are there important differences between the decision-making of referees in domestic competitions compared to European competitions?