Case 1 – Jemaah Islamiyah Network Evolution Global Jihadist Database Project Scott Atran - P.I. Marc Sageman - P.I. Justin Magouirk - Principal Case Architect.

Case 1 – Jemaah Islamiyah Network Evolution Global Jihadist Database Project Scott Atran - P.I. Marc Sageman - P.I. Justin Magouirk - Principal Case Architect Ken Ward – Consultant Dominick’ Wright and Darcy Noricks - Contributors

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Overview
JI was formed in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar (548) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (10) after Sungkar split with the leadership of Darul Islam Sungkar and Ba’asyir had been leaders in Darul Islam, a jihadist movement in Indonesia, since the 1970s Sungkar set JI up as a hierarchical organization with regional heads (mantiqi) reporting to the leader (amir) Sungkar (548) was the central figure and the source of vision, inspiration, and direction for JI Sungkar (548) died in 1999 leaving a leadership void Sungkar’s long-time confidant, Ba’asyir (10), was expected to successfully lead the organization Ba’asyir (10) took over as amir, but proved to be an extremely weak leader

JI Overview (cont.) Unlike the centralized Sungkar (548) era, the organization split into two fractious groups under Ba’asyir (10) Moderate majority wing led by: 574, the head of Mantiqi II (Indonesia) 234 and 92, heads of Mantiqi III (Philippines) 592, head of Mantiqi IV (Australia) Radical minority wing led by: Hambali (520), the head of Mantiqi I Zulkarnaen (244), the head of military affairs for JI Ba’asyir (10), who was unwilling to provide the vision for the organization, initially sided with Hambali (520) Hambali (520) radicalized the organization through his pursuit of violent activities and his connections with al Qaeda

JI Overview (cont.) Hambali’s militant minority was responsible for all of JI’s terrorist attacks from With Hambali in hiding in Thailand in 2003 (and later under arrest in August 2003), Noordin Top (261) took over the informal role of attack leader for the radical fringe of the organization To illustrate the evolution of the network over time, we will focus on changes in the JI leadership At pivotal points in time, we will “drill down” into the networks of the militant minority, which implemented all of the attacks

Social Network Graph Background
Node size is based on individual reputations. Reputations are based on an algorithm that evaluates: Organizational role (Mantiqi leadership, key Afghanistan and Philippines trainer, bomb expert, pesantren teacher at key JI school, etc) Attack activity (participation and role on JI bombing operations) Larger nodes are more central to the JI attack network Node color is based on the most important tie group to which the individual belongs. Tie groups are explained in the legend for each graph Many individuals belong to multiple tie groups (i.e. a jihadist trained in Afghanistan, attended the JI school Lukmanul Hakiem, attended the JI school Ngruki, etc) In such cases, the individual is assigned the most important tie group for the entire period ( )

Social Network Graph Background
Arrests are signified by a box around the node in question Depictions of arrests occur in the period following the event Deaths are signified by a plus sign (+) Depictions of deaths occur in the period following the event Tie thickness and color reflect the strength of the tie between two individuals Thin red lines represent acquaintances and in-laws Medium blue lines represent friends, non-nuclear relatives, and individuals that have met on operations Thick black lines represent nuclear family members

1985-1989: Leadership Network Evolution
Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) are leaders in Darul Islam Zulkarnaen (244) and 180 attend Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir’s (10) flagship madrassah, Pesantren al-Mukmin (Ngruki) in the 1970s and 1980s respectively The Ngruki school is one of the founding pillars of JI 180 becomes Sungkar’s (548) driver 592 meets Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) in Indonesia Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), 574, and Hambali (520) form an exile community in Malaysia after the two leaders flee Indonesian authorities in 1985 368 meets Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), and Mukhlas (26) in Malaysia Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), and 574 recruit a first generation of Afghanistan training volunteers The majority of initial connections are formed here - 26, 92, 154, 198, 234, 244, 245, 250, 262, 520 Afghanistan training is one of the founding pillars of JI

= Lukmanul Group = Afghan Ties = Ngruki Ties + = Dead = Arrest = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other

JI is formed in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar (548) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (10) after Sungkar split with the leadership of Darul Islam First documented ties between Hambali (520) and al Qaeda core (650) 234, 92, and 250 set up a JI training camp in the Philippines at Zulkarnaen’s (244) request Mukhlas (26) founds Lukmanul Hakiem, the most important JI madrassah in exile in Malaysia, at the request of Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) Lukmanul Hakiem is one of the founding pillars of JI 592 accompanies Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) on a recruitment trip to Australia

Pesantren Lukmanul Hakiem in Malaysia becomes the center of radical activity for JI Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), Mukhlas (26), 245, 358, Noordin Top (261), and Hambali (520) live or commute there on a regular basis Zulkarnaen (244) and 198 visit often JI leadership ties are strengthened Sungkar (548) – Amir Ba’asyir (10) – Deputy Amir Hambali (520) – Mantiqi I 574 – Mantiqi II 92 – Mantiqi III 592 – Mantiqi IV Mukhlas (26) – Head of Lukmanul Hakiem, Central Command Zulkarnaen (244) – Central Command 154, 234, Zulkarnaen (244), 245, 250 – Lead trainers for the organization 368 – Treasurer for Mantiqi I (de facto treasurer for JI)

Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), and Zulkarnaen (244) formalize strong ties with the al Qaeda core (650) Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir’s (10) ties are based on a letter from Sungkar / Ba’asyir to Darul Islam commanders stating that they are the representatives of Bin Laden in Southeast Asia (August 3, 1998) Zulkarnaen’s (244) ties are based on his tenure as lead trainer in Afghanistan Hambali (520) strengthens ties with al Qaeda core (650) Hambali (520) brokers a trip to Afghanistan for 368 368 outlines one of the Singapore terrorist plots for the al Qaeda core (650) 368 and Hambali (520) strengthen their ties through their Mantiqi I leadership roles 368 acts as a liaison for Hambali for the Singapore cell Noordin Top (261) and 358 enter the network Sungkar (548) remains the dominant JI figure with unquestioned authority until his death in 1999

2000: Leadership Network Evolution
The death of Sungkar (548) and the weak leadership of Ba’asyir (10) results in multiple centers of power within JI Hambali (520) rises to prominence based on his ties and funding with al Qaeda (650) Mukhlas (26) becomes prominent as the de facto leader of Lukmanul Hakiem and as one of the few legitimate Islamic scholars within JI Faiz Bafana (368) rises to prominence as Hambali’s (520) key aid and treasurer of JI First documented ties between Mukhlas (26) and al Qaeda core (650)

The moderate majority faction of JI leadership (92, 234, 574, 592) is sidelined by Ba’asyir’s (10) decision to side with the militants led by Hambali (520) Hambali cultivates the Afghan training and Lukmanul Hakiem radical networks Hambali (520) directs three attacks within six months in the latter part of 2000 Philippines Ambassador Residence Bombing in August 2000 Christmas Eve Bombings in December 2000 Rizal Day Bombings in December 2000

2000: Philippines Ambassador Residence Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
The Philippines Ambassador Residence (PAR) bombing is envisioned by Hambali as revenge for the Philippines government’s decision to overrun the JI / MILF training camps, Camp Abu Bakar and Camp Hudaibiyah The PAR bombing network is cultivated by Hambali (520) from former Afghan trainees and Lukmanul Hakiem members Funding stems from Hambali’s (520) connection with al Qaeda (650) The PAR bombing is approved by Ba’asyir (10) and planned by Hambali and his Mantiqi I aids – Mukhlas (26), 368, and 584 In what would become a standard operating procedure, Hambali (520) “borrows” Al-Ghozi (521), a Mantiqi III member to help lead the bombing

Hambali chooses two separate groups to implement the bombing The first group, consisting of 226 and future Bali bombers 27, 29, 167, 209, 522, constructs and delivers the bomb and the car that would be used for the bombing 29 buys the explosives from 587, a non-jihadist who was later arrested after the Bali I bombing The second group, consisting of 4, al-Ghozi (521), and 55, detonates the bomb The bombing occurs on August 1, 2000, injuring the ambassador and killing his security guard and an innocent bystander

= Lukmanul Group = Misc. Other = al Qaeda Core = Afghan Ties + = Dead = Arrest Leadership Group Reconnaissance / Detonator Group Material Sourcing / Bomb-making Group = Lukmanul Group = Afghan Ties = Misc. Other = al Qaeda Core

2000: Christmas Eve Bombings Network (Militant Minority)
The Christmas Eve bombings involve perhaps JI’s most ambitious operational planning. Envisioned by Hambali (520) and approved by Ba’asyir (10), the bombings were planned by Hambali and his hand-picked team of jihadists Imam Samudra (1), Mukhlas (26), 55, 368, 538, and 584 Hambali (520), Imam Samudra (1), 55, 336, and 538 are in charge of the actual bombing teams Some bombing teams hit more than one city The teams strike 38 churches in 11 cities in Indonesia in an effort to foment conflict between Christians and Muslims Batam, Bekasi, Bandung, Ciamis, Jakarta, Mataram, Medan, Mojokerto, Pekanbaru, Pematang, and Siantar 19 people are killed and 120 injured The bombs are crude, often killing the jihadists who try to detonate them, including Hambali’s friend 538 Jihadists are spatially positioned in the graphs based on their bombing teams

2000: Christmas Eve Bombings Network (Militant Minority)
Pekanbaru Group Medan Group Batam Group Leadership Group Ciamis Group Sukabumi Group Bandung Group Jakarta Group Mojokerto Group Mataram Group + = Dead = Misc Other = Lukmanul = GAM = al Qaeda Core = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = Darul Islam = Arrest

2000: Rizal Day Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
The Rizal Day bombing is a joint venture between JI and the MILF The origins of the bombing lay with Hambali’s (520) direction to al-Ghozi (521) to buy explosives from the MILF. Al-Ghozi approaches his former Philippines training member, 513 about purchasing explosives 513 is willing to help but wants JI to help him implement an attack in the Philippines as revenge for the Philippines army’s decision to overrun the MILF militant training camps Hambali (520) approves the bombing and provides funding through 368 Al-Ghozi (521) and 513 successfully implement five simultaneous explosions in Manila on December 30, 2000, the Rizal Day holiday

2000: Rizal Day Bombing Network Militant Minority
= Lukmanul Group = Afghanistan Training

234 takes over the Mantiqi III leadership from 92 245, 250, 262 rise to prominence within the JI leadership structure Hambali (520) flees Indonesia after the Christmas Eve bombings Hambali (520) directs church bombings through Imam Samudra (1) and the Singapore terror plots through 368 and al-Ghozi (521) Ba’asyir (10) approves all of the 2001 plots and bombings The 2001 Singapore terror plots are foiled by Singapore authorities

2001: HKBP / Santa Ana Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
The HKBP / Santa Ana church bombings are a continuation of Hambali’s strategy of bombing churches to foment conflict between Christians and Muslims Imam Samudra (1) directs a six-person cell that includes Christmas Eve and PAR bomber, 55 Funding occurs through 368, the treasurer of Mantiqi I The cell simultaneously hits the Santa Ana Catholic church and the HKBP Protestant church on July 22nd

2001: HKBP / Santa Ana Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
= Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Pesantren = al Qaeda Core = Afghan Ties = Misc. Other

2001: Atrium Mall Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
The Atrium Mall bombing is a continuation of Hambali’s strategy of fomenting conflict between Christians and Muslims The target is a group of charismatic Christian worshippers on the upper floor of the Atrium Mall Imam Samudra (1) directs a five-person cell. The cell is the same as the HKBP / Santa Ana bombings, minus one jihadist, 547 Funding occurs through 368, the treasurer of Mantiqi I The bomb prematurely explodes, injuring 196 196 is immediately captured and his leg amputated 55, who took part in the Christmas Eve bombings, PAR bombing, and the HKBP / Santa Ana Church bombings, is arrested

2001: Atrium Mall Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
= Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Pesantren = al Qaeda Core = Afghan Ties = Misc. Other

After the United States attack on Afghanistan, connections between the al Qaeda core (650) and Zulkarnaen (244) and Mukhlas (26) are severed Hambali (520) continues to work through Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 368, the treasurer for Mantiqi I, is arrested in late 2001 after the Singapore terror plots are foiled 358 takes over responsibility for JI finances Hambali (520) calls a meeting of his Mantiqi I followers and redirects their focus to soft targets Top (261) is charged with creating a proposal for al Qaeda funding 358 is charged with handling the transfer of funds Mukhlas (26) is charged with directing the bombing

Because much of the Mantiqi I leadership structure is dispersed and in hiding after the 2000 bombings, the Mantiqi I leader, Mukhlas (26), turns to the Mantiqi II administrative structure for help Mukhlas (26) works through the militant Zulkarnaen (244), rather than the Mantiqi II moderate leadership led by 574 574 quits his Mantiqi II leadership post in protest of Ba’asyir’s (10) weak leadership 262 takes over the Mantiqi II leadership 198 ascends to the post of caretaker amir when Ba’asyir (10) is arrested after the Bali I bombing

2002 Bali Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
The Bali I bombing is the culmination of a series of events Death of JI’s founder, Abdullah Sungkar Weak leadership of Ba’asyir (10) Establishment of Lukmanul Hakiem as the center of JI radicalism in Malaysia Rise of the militant minority within the ranks of JI Hambali (520) orders the bombing from Thailand, dispatching his small group of radical followers to carry out his orders The director of the operation, Mukhlas (26) bypasses the moderate Mantiqi II leadership and plans the bombing through the Central Command Military Affairs chief, Zulkarnaen (244)

Mukhlas (26) chooses Imam Samudra (1), one of the most violent and radical members of JI, to carry out the bombing Samudra recruits the most radical JI members, the majority of which have already taken part in previous bombings – 27, 29, 127, 167, 202, 209, 249, 265, 522 Samudra is also cultivating a small group of Darul Islam members as potential suicide bombers, including the eventual suicide bomber, 524

In mid-August, Zulkarnaen (244), Mukhlas (26), and Imam Samudra (1) convene a meeting at 81’s house that is attended by the majority of the bombing participants The plans for the Bali bombing are announced and roles are delegated 27, 167, 202, 265, 522 mix and build the bomb with the guidance of Azhari Husin (249) 127 handles all logistical issues Samudra (1) is only able to convince one of his DI protégées, 524, to become a suicide bomber 522 is forced to recruit one of his own protégées, 588, to be the second suicide bomber

On October 12th, 524 and 588 detonate the bombs at Paddy’s Bar and Sari Club, killing 202 people and injuring another 209 The Bali bombing is implemented by a militant minority of JI, with no input from the majority of the organization, including high-level leadership In the October Markaziyah (Central Command) meeting shortly after the Bali bombing, there is no discussion of the bombing 234, head of Mantiqi III, asked Zulkarnaen (244) at this meeting who had carried out the bombing. He is told that it is “none of his business”

2002 Bali Bombing Network Serang Group = Serang Group = Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties = Misc. Other = al Qaeda Core = Afghan Ties + = Dead = Arrest

The first round of Bali I bombing arrests weaken the leadership structure Ba’asyir (10), Mukhlas (26), and 358 are arrested in late 2002 245 and 250 are promoted to the JI Central Command In his final act, Hambali (520) arranges for al Qaeda funding of the Marriott bombing Because Hambali (520) is on-the-run (and eventually captured), Noordin Top (261) gains stature within the organization as a developing strategist There is no longer coordination from JI leadership for attacks 262 plans an attack on the Bank Central Asia Plot in Jakarta (foiled by police) at the same time that Top (261) plans the Marriott bombing Zulkarnaen (244) and 92 create a JI special forces group The two do not get along (Zulkarnaen is from the militant group and 92 is from the moderate group of JI) 180 takes over the leadership of Mantiqi I 198 continues his role as caretaker Amir

2003 Marriott Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
Hambali is still in hiding in Thailand during the initial preparations for the bombing, but remains in communication with JI’s chief bomb-maker, Azhari (249) Hambali promises to send money for the operation, eventually using his brother (66) to funnel money from al Qaeda (650) Noordin Top (261) serves as the chief strategist and Azhari (249) serves as the field commander for the bombing This would be the first of three partnerships between Azhari (249) and Top (261) The bombing starts in earnest when 200 contacts Noordin Top (261) about leftover explosives from the Christmas Eve bombing Top has 129 and 200 coordinate a group of JI members to move the bombing materials including 54, 127, 151, 166, 173, 530

In May 2003, 200 robs a bank in Medan to help fund the bombing The Marriott bombing differs slightly from previous bombings in that there is a wave of arrests before the bombing actually takes place 127, 129, 166, 200 are all arrested from late April to August 2003 245 and 250, both members of the JI Central Command, meet with the core bombers before and after the bombing The bombing occurs on August 5, killing 12 people and injuring 150 324, the suicide bomber, dies during the operation

Bomb Material Movers = Lukmanul Group = Afghan Ties = Misc Other = Ngruki Ties + = Dead = Arrest = al Qaeda Core

Hambali (520) is arrested in August 2003, terminating all known links with the al Qaeda core 234 is arrested in 2003 and jailed for 10 months Upon release in 2004 he repudiates JI and loses all contacts 92 is arrested in 2003 in the wake of the police crack down on the JI special forces unit 198, the caretaker emir, is arrested in 2003 for his role in hiding Bali bombers after the operation Noordin Top (261) takes over the informal role of attack leader for the radical wing of JI With the help of Azhari Husin, Top (261) directs the bombing of the Australian Embassy

2004 Australian Embassy Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
The Australian Embassy is the first JI bombing led entirely by Top (261), without funding from Hambali (520) Azhari (249) again serves as the second-in-command This is the second of three bombings that Top (261) and Azhari (249) lead The Australian Embassy bombing involves an extensive network of jihadists that are not part of JI This results from Top’s (261) direct appeals to Ring Banten and Kompak, two jihadist organizations in Indonesia

The Australian Embassy network results from several key introductions across multiple different groups 243, an instructor at the radical, madrassah-style university an-Nur, introduces his students 117, 183, 203 to Noordin Top (261) 203 then introduces Top to 99 Top recruits 99 to the network 99 immediately sets up a training camp to train the bombers that would take part in the operation Top has his assistant 117 meet with 204, the assistant of Kompak leader 9, to obtain explosives for the operation 9 agrees and Top (261) has a source of explosive materials 250, the Central Command member who had met with Azhari (249) and Top (261) before and after the Marriott bombing, and the Mantiqi I leader, 180, provide explosives

The Australian Embassy operation suffers a series of arrests before the bombing is ever implemented 117, 175, 180, 183, 203, 206, 243 are arrested between June and August 2004 The Australian Embassy bombing occurs on September 9, killing 11 and wounding approximately 140 people 577, the suicide bomber, dies in the operation

= Lukmanul Group = Kompak Group = Afghan Ties = Ngruki Ties + = Dead = Arrest = Misc Other = an-Nur Group = Ring Banten Group An-Nur Group Accommodations Group Ring Banten Group Kompak Group Core Bombing Group

154 is arrested in June 2004 180 is arrested in June 2004 in the wave of Australian Embassy bombing arrests 358 is released from Malaysian detention No resumption of ties as he is monitored by Malaysian authorities and barred from contact with former jihadists 198 is released from jail and reconnects with former contacts 198 does not ascend to his former position of caretaker emir Top (261) continues his role as the attack leader for the militant minority of JI Top (261) and Azhari successfully direct their third bombing together – the Bali II bombings Azhari Husin is killed in a police raids following the bombing in late 2005

Ba’asyir (10) is released from prison and resumes his prior contacts 368 is released from Malaysian detention No resumption of ties as he is monitored by Malaysian authorities and barred from contact with former jihadists There are rumors that 245 has taken over as Amir, although this has not been substantiated 245 and 250 are clearly the link between the JI Central Command and Noordin Top’s (261) attack networks

Case 1 – Jemaah Islamiyah Network Evolution Global Jihadist Database Project Scott Atran - P.I. Marc Sageman - P.I. Justin Magouirk - Principal Case Architect.

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Case 1 – Jemaah Islamiyah Network Evolution Global Jihadist Database Project Scott Atran - P.I. Marc Sageman - P.I. Justin Magouirk - Principal Case Architect.

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Presentation on theme: "Case 1 – Jemaah Islamiyah Network Evolution Global Jihadist Database Project Scott Atran - P.I. Marc Sageman - P.I. Justin Magouirk - Principal Case Architect."— Presentation transcript:

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