1. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation CRaTER Pre-Ship Review (I-PSR) MISSION ASSURANCE Brian Klatt January 3-4, 2008

2. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation MISSION ASSURANCE SLIDES PAIP COMPLIANCE SYSTEM SAFETY RFAs, ACTION ITEMS, AND COMMENTS TRACKING NON-CONFORMANCES, MRBs, AND FAILURE ANALYSIS WAIVERS FORMAL INSPECTIONS QUALIFICATION VEERIFICATION

3. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation PAIP Compliance Reliability Analysis Submitted to GSFC Parts Stress Analyses Analysis Submitted to GSFC Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Analysis Submitted to GSFC Critical Items ListSubmitted to GSFC Parts Stress Analyses Analysis Submitted to GSFC Reliability Assessments Submitted to GSFC Analysis of test DataTrend Analysis submitted; MGH & BNL results presented Software AssuranceCRaTER does not employ any flight software Ground Data System RequirementsCRaTER and LRO Ground Data Systems are compatible Risk Management Requirements Analysis Submitted to GSFC Integrated Independent Review RequirementsPeer reviews on Electrical, Mechanical, and FPGA GSFC System Review RequirementsPDR, CDR, PER, and PSR conducted by NASA IRT Performance and Environmental Verification PlanSubmitted to GSFC Performance Verification Matrix Submitted to GSFC Environmental Test Matrix (ETM) Submitted to GSFC Verification Procedures Submitted to GSFC Instrument Verification Reports89 required; 83 completed Structural & Mechanical RequirementsAnalysis and Environmental tests demonstrate safety margins Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) RequirementsTests perform at Chomerics in Woburn, MA Vacuum, Thermal and Humidity RequirementsThermal balance and Thermal vacuum tests were successful WorkmanshipAll certified per NASA STD 8739.X New/Advanced Packaging TechnologyNo advanced packaging employed

4. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation PAIP Compliance (continued) Materials, Processes and Lubrication RequirementsMIUL and As-Built M & P lists submitted to GSFC Material Selection MIUL and As-Built M & P lists submitted to GSFC Shelf-Life-Controlled Materials and Limited Life ItemsMaterial shelf life is monitored; No limited life items Materials identification and usage list (MIUL) Submitted to GSFC FastenersThe largest fastener used is #6 LubricationCRaTER does not have any mechanisms, thus no lubricants Procurement RequirementsAll flight procurement reviewed by Mission Assurance Purchased Raw MaterialsChemical and Physical test results are documented Raw Materials Used in Purchased ProductsNot applicable EEE Parts RequirementsIn accordance with EEE-INST-002 Part Control Board (PCB)PCB coordinated with GSFC (Rich Williams) Parts Selection and Screening In accordance with EEE-INST-002 Parts Selection Criteria In accordance with EEE-INST-002 Custom DevicesCRaTER does not use any custom devices Parts Stress Analysis and Derating In accordance with EEE-INST-002 Radiation Hardness In accordance with EEE-INST-002 Destructive Physical AnalysisPre-seal source inspection in lieu of DPA Failure AnalysisPerformed to establish root cause of failure Parts Age Usage In accordance with EEE-INST-002 Parts ListPAPL submitted frequently to GSFC (Rich Williams) Parts Traceability Control In accordance with EEE-INST-002 Parts ReuseParts are not reused AlertsResearched and responded to all Alerts and Notices

5. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation PAIP Compliance (continued) Contamination Control RequirementsTQCM change during T/V was in the single digits Electrostatic Discharge Control (ESD) All certified per NASA STD 8739.7 Configuration ManagementConfiguration Management Process submitted to GSFC Preservation and PackingPreservation, Packing, and Handling is documented Data RetentionDesign, fabrication, and test data is retained at MIT FOREVER

6. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation System Safety System Safety Program PlanContained in PAIP (Approved) Safety AnalysesSubmitted to GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Preliminary Hazard Analysis Submitted to GSFC (Chuck Peterson) System Hazard AnalysisPerformed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Operations Hazards Analyses (OHA) Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Operating and Support Hazard Analysis Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Software SafetyNot Applicable Safety Compliance Checklist Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Safety Assessment Report Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Missile System Prelaunch Safety PackageInputs submitted to GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Safety Verification Tracking Log Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Ground Operations Procedures Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Safety VarianceNot Applicable Support for Safety MeetingsAs Required Orbital Debris AssessmentCRaTER Input submitted to GSFC Launch Site safety Support Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) Mishap Reporting and InvestigationNone were required Miscellaneous Submittals for Range UseNone have been requested

7. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation ACTION ITEMS AND COMMENTS

8. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation ACTION ITEMS AND COMMENTS (CONTINUED)

9. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation ACTION ITEMS AND COMMENTS (CONTINUED)

10. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation NONCONFORMING MATERIAL REPORTS

11. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation WAIVERS One waiver was submitted to fly a commercial, unqualified thermistor, which is used only during ground test and integration. The waiver was withdrawn when a suitable part mounting was not available

12. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation FORMAL INSPECTIONS ALL HYBRID MICROCIRCUITS (100%) USED IN FLIGHT HARDWARE WERE PRE-SEAL VISUALLY EXAMINED AT THE MANUFACTURER'S FACILITY. ALL ASSEMBLY AND TEST OPERATIONS ON THE DETECTORS (100%) WERE WITTNESSED BY MIT

13. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation QUALIFICATION TWO (2) EEE PART TYPES WERE SUBJECTED TO QUALIFICATION TESTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH EEE-INST-002 INTERFET P/N SNJ90347(IF9030) PASSED EEE-INST-002 QUALIFICATION TESTS ON 4/5/07 KEMET 1000V, 0.022UF CERAMIC CHIP CAPACITOR FAILED QUALIFICATION LIFE TEST. THE PART WAS DESIGNED OUT OF THE SYSTEM IN FAVOR OF A QUALIFIED CALRAMIC CAPACITOR

14. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation SCIENCE PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION

15. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation SCIENCE PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION (continued)

16. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation DATA INTERFACE VERIFICATION

17. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation ELECTRICAL INTERFACE VERIFICATION

18. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation MECHANICAL INTERFACE VERIFICATION

19. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation THERMAL INTERFACE VERIFICATION

20. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation CONTAMINATION VERIFICATION

21. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation ENVIRONMENTAL VERIFICATION

22. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation VERIFICATION KEY

23. C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation