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Overview of the HVAC system of the Accelerator tunnel Duy Phan Accelerator Safety Engineer Reviewed by Mikael Kelfve (CF) www.europeanspallationsource.se.

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Presentation on theme: "Overview of the HVAC system of the Accelerator tunnel Duy Phan Accelerator Safety Engineer Reviewed by Mikael Kelfve (CF) www.europeanspallationsource.se."— Presentation transcript:

1 Overview of the HVAC system of the Accelerator tunnel Duy Phan Accelerator Safety Engineer Reviewed by Mikael Kelfve (CF) www.europeanspallationsource.se 2nd July 2015

2 Agenda Main topics addressed Current design of the Accelerator HVAC system… Proposed upgrade of the design with respect to safety considerations… On-going and foreseen safety studies… Planning for the Accelerator HVAC system…

3 Accelerator HVAC system Introduction European Spallation Source (ESS) Operations, ES&H and QA ES&H DivisionQA Division Project support & Administration Directorate Machine Directorate Accelerator Division Target Division Integrated Control System Division Science Directorate Conventional Facilities Division Design Group Construction Group Energy Group ESS Organization chart (simplified) ①② ① Specifies the Safety requirements for the design of the HVAC system (e.g. fire control philosophy, minimum air renewal for workers, minimum air flush before access, etc.) ② Specifies the performance requirements for the design of the HVAC system (e.g. temperature and humidity control) and provides support for the mitigation of the safety issues (e.g. CFD simulations, hazard analysis, etc.) ③ Designs the HVAC system according to the requirements provided by the Accelerator and ES&H Divisions Main stakeholders in the design of the Accelerator HVAC system ③ *

4 Accelerator HVAC system Introduction Overview of the Accelerator areas Main requirements  Dissipate heat loads from the LINAC  Maintain a negative pressure with respect to the outdoors and the klystron gallery  Provide necessary fresh air for occupants during maintenance  Control the smokes in case of a fire G02: Klystron gallery G01 FEB: Front-End Building AT: Accelerator Tunnel HLB: HEBT Loading Bay A2T: Accelerator to Target BD: Beam Dump G01 HLB BD A2T AT FEB ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS

5 Accelerator HVAC system Current Design Air supply system Climate control system Air exhaust systemSmoke extraction system T° LINAC tunnel 22,5°C ± 2,5°C 4 Ventilation modes ① « Beam mode » ② « Flush mode » ③ « Access mode » ④ « Fire mode » ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : M.KELFVE

6 Accelerator HVAC system Current Design ① BEAM MODE Proton beam Air inlet: 4320 m3/h Air outlet: 7200 m3/h Recirculating air (4 units): 18 000 m3/h ΔP = -10 Pa with respect to the Klystron gallery ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : M.KELFVE, E.VAENA, U.ANDERSSON, B.YNDERMARK

7 Accelerator HVAC system Current Design ② FLUSH MODE Air inlet: 57 600 m3/h Air outlet: 60 480 m3/h ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : M.KELFVE, E.VAENA, U.ANDERSSON, B.YNDERMARK

8 Accelerator HVAC system Current Design ③ ACCESS MODE Air inlet: 22 320 m3/h Air outlet: 22 320 m3/h ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : M.KELFVE, E.VAENA, U.ANDERSSON, B.YNDERMARK

9 Accelerator HVAC system Current Design ④ FIRE MODE Max air inlet: 90 000 m3/h Smoke extraction: 5 X 18 000 m3/h ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : M.KELFVE, E.VAENA, U.ANDERSSON, B.YNDERMARK ≈ 135 m between 2 emergency exits Closing of the sealed damper

10 Accelerator HVAC system Proposed upgrade of the Design Air supply system Air exhaust system Main motivations for removing the climate control system  Reduce exposure to contamination coming from ventilation filters and condensate  No elevated ground water activation level Main motivations for removing the smoke extraction system (currently under consideration)  No systematic intervention of the Fire Brigade in case of a fire  No monitoring and filtering of the emissions from the LINAC tunnel + Fire suppression system? 2 Ventilation modes ① « Beam mode » ② « Access mode » (③ « Flush mode ») (④ « Fire mode »)

11 Accelerator HVAC system On-going Safety studies ODH preliminary assessment  Simple analytical model (CERN & FERMILAB)  Homogenous mixture of helium with atmosphere in case of a cryogenic discharge  Assessment of the O2 concentration with respect to “normal ventilation system” and smoke extraction Objective: Provide help to Conventional Facilities (CF) in the design of the HVAC system Responsibility: Accelerator Division

12 Accelerator HVAC system On-going Safety studies Calculation of the Derived Air Concentration (DAC)*  Use of the ISO 17873 standard – not strictly required but implemented to harmonise the approach regarding HVAC systems at ESS in contaminated atmosphere Objective: Definition of the architecture of the ventilation system and the necessary under- pressure Responsibility: ES&H Division  Assessment of the radiological impact of air releases from the Accelerator tunnel during normal and off-normal operations * It is the amount of contamination in air, which, if breathed for 2 000 h, would result in the Annual Limit of Intake (ALI). The ALI has to be calculated using reference conversion factors given by IRCP for each radionuclide. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : D.ENE C2 between -80 Pa and -100 Pa

13 Accelerator HVAC system Next Safety studies Studies to come  Hazard analysis of the design of the ventilation system  identification of the safety functions  Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) of a helium discharge in the tunnel ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : A.NORDT, M.PUCILOWSKI Objective: Provide help to Conventional Facilities (CF) in the design of the HVAC system Responsibility: CF & Accelerator Division

14 Accelerator HVAC system Next steps HVAC timeline 1 Update of the design regarding climate control July 2015 2 Fire strategy regarding the tunnel July 2015 Final drawing of the detailed design of the HVAC system Dec. 2015 7 6 Procurement phase Jan. 2016 Installation phase Feb.-May 2016 8 Commissioning phase Aug. 2016 5 Risk analysis Nov. 2015 3 Outline design review Sept. 2015 4

15 A ny Q uestions…? Discussion

16 Back-up slides

17 ODH case-study Accelerator tunnel Smoke extraction VS normal ventilation system ① ② OROR

18 ODH case-study Accelerator tunnel Case 1: full length – normal ventilation 600 m Volume available: 4410 m3 Ventilation rate: 12 600 m3/h (1 ACH) Volume available: 4410 m3 Ventilation rate: 12 600 m3/h (1 ACH) During release: After release: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS (ESS)

19 ODH case-study Accelerator tunnel Case 2: section between 2 exits – normal ventilation 135 m Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 12 600 m3/h (1 ACH) Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 12 600 m3/h (1 ACH) 1,2 s 31,2 s after the release started 02 ≥ 18% 02 < 18% During release: After release: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS (ESS)

20 ODH case-study Accelerator tunnel Case 3: section between 2 exits – 1 smoke extractor* 135 m 1,2 s 22,3 s after the release started 02 ≥ 18% 02 < 18% During release: After release: *considering a quasi-immediate trigger of the smoke extraction Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 18 000 m3/h (1,4 ACH) Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 18 000 m3/h (1,4 ACH) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS (ESS)

21 ODH case-study Accelerator tunnel Case 4: section between 2 exits – 2 smoke extractors* 135 m Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 36 000 m3/h (2,8 ACH) Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 36 000 m3/h (2,8 ACH) 1,2 s 11,5 s after the release started 02 ≥ 18% 02 < 18% During release: After release: *considering a quasi-immediate trigger of the smoke extraction ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS (ESS)

22 ODH case-study Accelerator tunnel Case 5: section between 2 exits – 1 smoke extractor* 135 m Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 18 000 m3/h (1,4 ACH) Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 18 000 m3/h (1,4 ACH) 1,2 s 50,5 s after the release started 02 ≥ 18% 02 < 18% During release: After release: *considering a trigger of the smoke extraction after 30 s ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS (ESS)

23 ODH case-study Accelerator tunnel Case 6: section between 2 exits – 2 smoke extractors* 135 m Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 18 000 m3/h (1,4 ACH) Volume available: 992 m3 Ventilation rate: 18 000 m3/h (1,4 ACH) 1,2 s 40,9 s after the release started 02 ≥ 18% 02 < 18% During release: After release: *considering a trigger of the smoke extraction after 30 s ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS (ESS)

24 ODH case-study Accelerator tunnel Summary table Case Length of the tunnel Ventilation system Trigger time Time needed to reach 18% O2 1600 mNormalN/AAlways above 18% 2135 mNormalN/A31,2 s 3135 m 1 smoke extractor immediate22,3 s 4135 m 2 smoke extractors immediate11,5 s 5135 m 1 smoke extractor After 30 s50,5 s 6135 m 2 smoke extractors After 30 s40,9 s NOT REALISTIC

25 ODH Safety process Preliminary ODH assessment Method n°1 (CERN approach) Objective: assess in a simple way consequences of the full loss of an asphyxiant fluid in a given volume without considering any ventilation and time parameter Room parameters Fluid parameters O2 concentration (perfect mixture) + Height of the gas layer (stratification) ODH Level (O2≥18% OR O2<18%)

26 ODH Safety process Preliminary ODH assessment Method n°2 (Fermilab approach) Objective: assess in a simple way the consequences of a leak of an asphyxiant fluid in a given volume considering the ventilation rate and the time evolution Room parameters Fluid + scenario characteristics ODH parameters: Fatality rate Probability of fatality ODH class O2 evolution during fluid discharge Part 1/2

27 ODH Safety process Preliminary ODH assessment Method n°2 (Fermilab approach) Objective: assess in a simple way the consequences of a leak of an asphyxiant fluid in a given volume considering the ventilation rate and the time evolution Contact persons O2 evolution after fluid discharge Part 2/2

28 ODH control measures Which ones are relevant? S implication of the approach to meet ESS needs… OK To be discussed ES&H ? “If this approach is taken, the ventilation system must now be treated as a safety system with appropriate controls and redundancies” – John Weisend, January 2015 PSS? IEC 61508? Applicable?

29 ODH control measures Other possible solutions… Solution 1 Solution 2

30 Practical cases Accelerator tunnel – Method n° 1 Scenario: Helium discharge from the safety relief device of the insulating vacuum vessel from 1 High-β Cryomodule Cause: leak from junctions/welds from the cavities Volume of LHe: 1 x 4 x 0.048 m3 Temperature of LHe: 2K Pressure: 1,9 bara Tunnel: 12 600 m3 x 35% (full volume) Volume of gas discharged: 174 m3 O2 concentration after discharge (homogeneous mixture) : 20,17% Height of gas layer (stratification) : 0,05 m ODH level: “SAFE” Steady state ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : J.FYDRYCH (ESS)

31 Scenario: Helium discharge from the safety relief device of the insulating vacuum vessel from 1 High-β Cryomodule Cause: leak from junctions/welds from the cavities Volume of LHe: 1 x 4 x 0.048 m3 Temperature of LHe: 2K Pressure: 1,9 bara Tunnel: 4200 m3 x 35% (1/3 of the total volume) Volume of gas discharged: 174 m3 O2 concentration after discharge (homogeneous mixture) : 18,52% Height of gas layer (stratification) : 0,14 m ODH level: “SAFE” 200 m Practical cases Accelerator tunnel – Method n° 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS, J.FYDRYCH (ESS)

32 Scenario: Helium discharge from the safety relief device of the insulating vacuum vessel from 1 High-β Cryomodule Cause: leak from junctions/welds Leak rate: 475 200 m3/h (ref. WP5_SafetySizing__nt-safety-devices-2015-01-14.docx)WP5_SafetySizing__nt-safety-devices-2015-01-14.docx Duration of the leak: infinite (not realistic) Ventilation rate: 1 vol/h (12600 m3/h) Tunnel: 12 600 m3 x 35% (full volume) FORBIDDEN AREA Control measures need to be taken Steady state Practical cases Accelerator tunnel – Method n° 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : J.FYDRYCH (ESS)

33 Scenario: Helium discharge from the safety relief device of the insulating vacuum vessel from 1 High-β Cryomodule Cause: leak from junctions/welds Leak rate: 475 200 m3/h (ref. WP5_SafetySizing__nt-safety-devices-2015-01-14.docx)WP5_SafetySizing__nt-safety-devices-2015-01-14.docx Duration of the leak: infinite (not realistic) Ventilation rate: 1 vol/h (12600 m3/h) Tunnel: 4200 m3 x 35% (1/3 of the total volume) FORBIDDEN AREA 200 m Control measures need to be taken Practical cases Accelerator tunnel – Method n° 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS, J.FYDRYCH (ESS) Worst case scenario but maybe not realistic

34 Practical cases Compressor bldg. – Method n° 2 Alternative approach Thanks to Philipp Arnold !!! No constant max flow rate  average flow rate 95 292 m3/h  26 379 m3/h No infinite leak  time needed to empty the content ∞  180 s

35 ODH case-study Where to find the ODH tools and results? Safety Wiki https://ess-ics.atlassian.net/wiki/display/ASR/Cryogenic+Safety

36 Practical cases Where to find the ODH tools and results? ESSShare ODH Tutorial ready…

37 CERN LHC spill test Lessons learnt (from a Safety point of view) 1. The drop of O2 content cannot be related to the visible formation of mist in the flow 2. Exclusions zones have been increased 1. No personnel access to the tunnel while sectors are cooled down or warmed up or powering tests are performed of He cooled magnets 2. Access conditions for personnel redefined such that no exposure to a MCI larger than 0,1 kg/s 3. At kneeling height (0,5 m) O2 can drop to 11% 4. No safe zone available to put on the self-rescue mask CERN LHCESS Distance between rupture disks 200 m? Exclusion zonesYesNot applicable? ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : T.KOETTIG (CERN) – REFERENCE: CONTROLLED COLD HELIUM SPILL TEST IN THE LHC TUNNEL AT CERN

38 I s there any need for a CFD simulation at ESS…in particular in the tunnel? Open question ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS (ESS), E.DA RIVA (CERN)

39 W hich Most Credible Incident (MCI) should be chosen? Open question During Access to the tunnel Mass Flow? No Access to the tunnel Beam loss? Proton beam Air inlet ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : J.FYDRYCH (ESS) Scenario?

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