1. EU STRUCTURE, EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONS
Prof. dr. Tamara Ćapeta
Prof. dr. Iris Goldner Lang
Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb

2. MOTIVES FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Peace and stability and desire to keep Germany under control by its integration within Europe
Creation of a single market
Economic prosperity
Independence in relation to new world powers (USA/USSR)
New European democratic identity as opposed to totalitarism and nationalism
- Which motives stayed the same, which have changes and which have been achieved?

3. CHURCHILL’S SPEECH - ZÜRICH, 1946
“The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single State less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by a contribution to the common cause.

4. SCHUMAN DECLARATION 9 MAY 1950
French foreign minister
“The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.”

6. FOUNDING TREATIES
1951 European Coal and Steel Community (expired in 2002)
1957 European Economic Community
1957 European Community for Atomic Energy (Euratom)
1992 European Union(Treaty of Maastricht)

7. AMENDING THE FOUNDING TREATIES
Intergovernmental Conference – Heads of States and Governments of EU Member States decide on and sign amendments
Amendments enter into force only if ratified by all Member States
Ratification Procedure – according to Constitutions of respective Member States

8. AMENDING THE FOUNDING TREATIES
Single European Act, 1986
in force 1 July 1987
Maastricht, 1992
in force 1. November 1993
Amsterdam, 1997
in force 1 May 1999
Nice, 2001
- in force 1 February 2003
Lisbon, 13 December 2007
- in force 1 December 2009

9. EU ENLARGEMENT WAVES
1951 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,(ECSC)
(1957 EEC and EURATOM)
1973 Denmark, Ireland and the UK
1981 Greece
1986 Portugal and Spain
1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden
2004 Cyprus , the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia
2007 Bulgaria and Romania ?

10. PERIODS OF PROGRESS AND CRISES
1950S – mid 1960s – beginning
(ECSC → abandonment of EDC&EPC → EEC and Euratom)
Mid 1960s – 1986 – crisis
(“Empty chair crisis” 1965 → Luxembourg compromise 1966 → Single European Act 1987)
1986 – 1993 – success
(Treaty of Maastrichta – creation of the EU)
1993 – 2005 – enlargement, consolidation
2005 – 2009 – consitutional/identity crisis
(failure of Constiutional Treaty after the French and Dutch referenda → Treaty of Lisabn 12 June 2008 Irish “no” )
… - Treaty of Lisbon

11. TREATY ON THE CONSITUTION FOR EUROPE SIGNED ON 29 OCTOBER 2004

12. Treaty on the Constitution for Europe rejected by French citizens on 29 May 2005 and by Dutch citizens on 1 June 2005

13. After the Failure of the Constitutional Treaty
31 December 2007 – Lisbon Treaty signed:
Elimination from the text of state-like rhetoric: flag, hymn, certain terms, such as Minister of European Law
Content, although differently organized, mostly unchanged
Old technique for amending Treaties, by amendments on amendments, used

14. Result: same content in A less understendable package
Still, this enabled Member States to ratify the LisbonTreaty without referenda
All, but Ireland …

15. IRELAND: 12 JUNE 2008

16. IRISH “NO”
It is not linked to unpopularity of the EU in Ireland (Eurobarometer 69 June 2008 – 82% of Irish voters said their country had benefited from EU membership)
What about the functioning of institutions? – 42% of Irish “no” voters and 33% of “yes” voters thought that EU institutions would not be blocked

17. POSSIBLE OPTIONS 1) Renegotiate Lisbon Is there political will?
Changing the text would require new ratifications
2) Abandon it
3) Another Irish vote

18. CONCESSIONS
– 76% of Irish “no” voters and 38% of “yes” voters supported the view that the “no” vote would allow the Irish government to renegotiate “exceptions” within the Treaty
a) Commissioner for each MS (6% of “no” voters)
Art. 17(5) EU: “As from 1 Nov. 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of members, including its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this number.”
 Status quo might go in favour of the power of the Commission but not efficiency

19. CONCESSIONS b) Irish military neutrality (6%)
c) Protecting the tax system – low corporate-tax rates (6%)
d) Gay marriages, abortion, euthanasia (2%)
e) Avoiding an influx of immigrants (1%)

20. IRELAND: 2 OCTOBER 2009
67% YES VOTES

21. EUROPEAN UNION BEFORE LISBON
institutions
EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
supranational
organisation
ECSC (expired)
EUROATOM
COMMON FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY
(CFSP)
intergovernmental
cooperation
POLICE AND
JUDICIAL
COOPERATION IN
CRIMINAL MATTERS
(PJC)
Intergovernmental
cooperations
Area of freedom, security and justice

22. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (I. pillar)
Free movement of goods, workers, services and capital
Agriculture
Visas, asylum, migration
transport
Competition, taxation and approximation of laws
Economic and monetary union
Employment
Common commercial policy
Customs cooperation
Social policy, education, vocational traiing and youth
Culture
Public health
Consumer protection
Trans-Euroepan networks
Industry
Economic and social cohesion
Research and technological development
Environment
Development cooperations
Euratom

23. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (II pillar)
Foreign policy
E.g.preserve peace, human rights, democracy, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, relations with third countries
Security policy
EU security,disarmament, financial aspects of defence, long-term security measures

24. POLICE AND JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (III pillar)
Prevention and combating of racism and xenophobia
Prevention and combating of crime, especially terrorism, trafficing in human beings, sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime

25. EU LAW BEFORE LISBON European Community law (I pillar) II pillar law
III pillar law

26. CHARACTERISTICS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
Transfer of sovereign powers of Member States on the Community
Legal system sui generis
Direct effect
Supremacy of EC law

27. CHARACTERISTICS OF II PILLAR AND III PILLAR LAW
Intergovernmental cooperations
No direct effect
No supremacy of EU law
Weaker power of EU institutions

28. TREATY STRUCTURE NICE - Lisbon
Treaty on European Union
Treaty on European Community
Treaty on European Energy Community
Treaty on European Union (TEU)
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
Treaty on European Energy Community

29. The most important Lisbon changes
EU Structure – elimination of pillars, disappearance of the EC
Clarification of the vertical division of powers
Institutional changes
Changes in Procedures and instruments of decision-making

30. EU according to Lisbon II I III EU Institutions CFSP
Former EC competences
+ PJC II I
III

31. STRUCTURAL CHANGES
First and third pillars merged, by submitting third pillar to supranational methods as well
EC does not exist any more (Euratom continues)
EU acquires legal personality and becomes subject in international relations

32. NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Institutional deficiency (Maastricht/Amsterdam/Nice)
- Institutional reform needed to keep up with the EU’s deepening and widening
- Improvement of: decision-making efficiency, EU representation, transparency/legitimacy and achievement of EU goals
Supranational vs. Intergovernmental method
- Supranational representation  Commission
- Intergovernmental representation  Council

33. EU INSTITUTIONS European Parliament Council (of the European Union)
European Commission
Court of Justice of the European Union
Court of Auditors
European Council (institution after Lison)
Other bodies: Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, European Central Bank, European Investment Bank
Europol, Eurojust, agencies, etc.

34. EUROPEAN COMMISSION I pillar - initator of the legislative process
II and III pillar – legislative initiative shared with MSs
Principal policy-maker in the EU
Overseas the implementation of the EU law in Member States (“guardian of the Treaties”)
Politically responsible to the EP
27 Commissioners

35. EUROPEAN COMMISSION POST-LISBON
Promotes “the general interest of the Union”
Driving force of EU integration (deepening & widening)
Exclusive right of legislative initiative  legislative proposal is in the general interest of the EU
It can achieve these goals only by cooperating with the EP and the MSs BUT:
1) Does this challenge its independence
2) Would the Lisbon abandonment of the system of one Commissioner per MS have reduced the power of the Commission and its President?
3) Does acting in the “general interest of the Union” require representation of each MS?

36. PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
 Prominent role internally & externally
Art. 17(6)(b) TEU: “The President of the Commission shall decide on the internal organisation of the Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body.”
 appoints Vice-Presidents and makes a member resign - Post-Lisbon slightly strengthened role – no College approval needed
Competing powers (post-Lisbon):
1) President of the European Council
2) High Representative

37. WHO WILL OBAMA CALL? European President?
? ? ?
European President?
European Commission President?
High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy?

38. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Legislative institution
Different formations – 1 representative from each MS at ministerial level (e.g. GAC, ECOFIN)
Levels of decision-making
MinisterialCOREPER I and II working groups
Presided by the the rotating Presidency
Except: Council of Ministers of Foreign Affaies – presided by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy
Decision-making: qualified majority (255 out of majority of MSs + 62% of population as a blocking mechanism), simple majority, unanimously

39. EUROPEAN COUNCIL “Summit”
Defines general political directions and priorities
Heads of State or Government of MSs, together with its President and the President of the Commission – post-Lisbon High Rep. takes part in its work
Meets at least 4 time a year
Post-Lisbon: recognized as an EU institution

40. PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
New function! Attributed to an individual for 2,5 year
Herman Van Rompuy

41. PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Reaction to the weaknesses of the rotating six-months depersonalised Presidency of the Council
The Presidency of the Council/European Council was, at the start, intended mostly for internal purposes, but over the years it acquired a central role externally in CFSP
Post-Lisbon: Individual Presidency of the European Council remains contrasted to MSs’ Presidency of he Council
Role: chair meetings of the European Council; ensure its functioning; present a report to the EP; ensure external representation of the Union in CFSP at his/her level and in that capacity (15(6) TEU)
 Will the President of the European Council become the most prominent figure internally and externally? Is his external role competing with that of High Representative?

42. HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY
Union Minister of Foreign Affairs (Constitution)
Amsterdam: High Representative for CFSP (18(3)EU)
Catherine Ashton

43. HIGH REPRESENTATIVE Roles:
1) Presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council
2) Commission Vice-President
Duties (Art. 18 TEU):
1) Conducting the EU CFSP
2) Responsible for external relations in the Comm.
3) Ensuring the consistency of EU external action

44. COMMISSION PRESIDENT VS.
HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
High Representative  Commission Vice-President
Unlike other Vice-Presidents, not appointed by the Comm. President but by the European Council
In case of conflicting responsibilities, the Council role prevails:
Art. 18(4) TEU:“In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3.”
Abandoning of the previous independent Comm. initiative:
Art. 30 TEU: “Any MS, the High Representative, or the High Representative with the Commission’s support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals …”
 Commission loses?

45. COMMISSION PRESIDENT VS. PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Verhofstadt (College of Europe, 18 Nov. 2002):
“Can one person express consensus of Europe when Europe rather seldom reaches consensus on burning international issues?... Presidentialism of the EU does not seem to me an appropriate option for Europe’s future institutional structure.”
Prodi (EP, 5 Dec. 2002): “Such a position would open a rift in our institutional structure.”
The influence of the President of the European Council largely depends on the individual holding the position
 Commission loses

46. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Legislative institution 736 MEPs (max. 751)
Minimum 6, maximum 96 per MS
Direct elections every 5 years; number of MEPs distributed according to national quotas
Last elections: June 2009
Croatia will have 12 MEPs

47. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
MEPs grouped according to political affiliation, not national
Largest party: EPP, followed by S&D; Greens …
Eurosceptics also represented
(EFD – 32)
President: Martin Schulz

48. CONCLUSION Why do we need institutional changes & are they good?
 The Treaty of Lisbon - institutional improvements?
1) Further integration (deepening and widening)
2) Decision-making efficiency  EU efficiency in general
3) Transparency & democracy  EU legitimacy
4) Union representation  President of the European Council, High Representative or Commission President?
Any institutional change might change the institutional balance + balance among MSs – to whose advantage?
1) Commission  supranational/integration interests
2) Council/MSs  intergovernmental/national interests
3) EP  more transparency and democracy, but not necessarily more efficiency in decision-making