1. 1000 Hackers in a Box Problems with modern security scanners

2. What is a scanner? Collects data and deduces possible problems on your hosts a “visibility” tool expensive product misunderstood product

3. What can scanning do? Visibility Software bugs & Installation bugs Protocols & Topology Public Services & Versions

4. History of scanners SATAN in 1995, now SANTA ISS Ballista, now NAI cybercop (CSC) Asmodeus, now commercial (Webtrends) HackerShield NetSonar (now cisco)

5. Scanner Propaganda Virus scanner of the 90’s We have 3 million tests The “Best” reporting We “Enforce” your policy

6. Patching bugs won’t make you secure.

7. Signature Scanning The attack domain is not confined Scanner’s Signature Coverage The Real World is infinite

8. Skilled UBER Underground Distro Network Script Kiddies Patch Level

9. False Sense of Security I ran a scan, now I’m safe I patched the program, now I’m safe I have a firewall, I’m safe I have an IDS, I’m safe I had a consultant scan me, I’m safe I use crypto, I’m safe

10. Just because you have a scanner doesn’t make you a Hacker 1000 Hackers in a Box (NOT) Doesn’t synthesize attacks based on available data –(hackers don’t just go down a checklist) Cannot find new problems based on programming flaws

11. You are buying a service not a product Secretary reads bug newsgroups for you Version and Patch checking w/ vendors Is your scanner making you lazy? Reactive, not Proactive Mean time to notification 10 steps behind the hacker

12. The Shiny Red Button There is always a root compromise in your network You cannot remove it You can only place controls over it –Redundancy (backups, fast recovery) –Visibility (forensics & tripwires) –Deterrence (traps, prosecution, & retaliation)

13. A Scan is NOT an Audit Doesn’t ENFORCE Policy Doesn’t WRITE Policy Scanners “break” in - not “fix”

14. Ineffective Relies on Inference & Deduction Very little “Verification” Banner Strings Registry Settings & SNMP “Black Box” Lazy when deep detection is possible

15. External vs Internal scanning Ineffective if scan filters are in place force scanning takes longer run both and compare

16. False Positives Generalizations lack of version coverage this is a QA Hell Assumptions about patch level

17. How to really screw up a Scanner Ping and UDP scan tricks –(create extra work) –make everything listen on UDP port 1 –filter ICMP unreachable messages –don’t allow ping (must force scan) Deception Toolkits (Honey-Pot tool) touch all your files

18. Scanners suffer from security bugs too! The imports for several common scanners have calls to (do you trust this code?): –strcpy –wsprintf –getenv –system –exec Banner overflows Service Requests (http, smtp …)

19. The Good Stuff is Free The Port Scanner –nmap (www.insecure.org) The Software Scanner –Grinder (rhino9.ml.org) –Banner Scanner (netcat & perl anyone?) –Nessus Registry scanner –Chronicle OS Detection –QueSO (www.apostols.org) The Integrity Checker –tripwire (www.tripwiresecurity.com) Deception Toolkit –http://all.net/dtk/dtk.html

20. A bit better scanner Verify policy A “configuration manager”

21. A bit better scanner Model Authentication Show authentication systems and domains Show relationships between authentication system and services Show what each entity can and cannot access

22. A bit better scanner Process to Process Show inter-process relationships File & Registry access IPC channels Databases Close the “window of trust”

23. A bit better scanner Deep Detection Get *as much* data as possible drill down into exploited resources more data is better more data means better analysis

24. A bit better scanner Replay Presentation Replay an attack in slow motion, in realtime, in a format that is easy to understand sniffer tty snoop scanner is educational

25. A bit better scanner Use Host Based technology Easier to verify versions and patches using file hashes less work/less specialized programmers needed more data easier = better analysis (and faster)

26. A bit better scanner Focus on general security issues, not line item bugs verify confidentiality of information verify authentication systems verify IDS working properly verify trusted/untrusted relationships

27. A bit better scanner Model protocol usage since applications may depend on protocol security, show these relationships show encapsulation

28. A bit better scanner Auto-patching wizard gets patches verifies file hashes Wizard helps build patch script patches are automatically deployed verifies installation is secure afterwards