1. Midterm Eval of Teaching Get out piece of paper Do NOT put your name on it What should Prof. Mitchell – Start doing? – Stop doing – Continue doing

2. Readings Young and Osherenko Koremenos et al.

3. Young and Osherenko: Institutional Formation Power-based: hegemony; other power consts Interest-based: leadership; terms of inst Knowledge-based: shared; epi-coms Contextual factors: broad shifts, crises Process: substitutions; interactions

4. Koremenos et al. Predictions

5. Koremenos et al. Predictions re: Institutional Design Distribution – Prediction: distribution problems => HARDER to resolve Enforcement – Prediction: enforcement problems => HARDER to resolve Number of actors – Prediction: more actors => HARDER to resolve Uncertainty about: – Behavior of other actors – Preferences of other actors – State of world Norms Broader context

6. Distribution issues Distribution matters because power matters Not all issues pose same distributional issues – Harder: territorial disputes, satellite slots, resource access – Easier: free trade, human rights Matters most when states in “relative gains” mode Prediction: distribution problems make it HARDER to reach agreement

7. Enforcement issues How much do states care about enforcement? – How readily do violations come to light? – If they come to light, will actors stop? – How “violation tolerant” are others? Issues pose different enforcement problems – Harder: nuclear weapons, free trade – Easier: environment, human rights Enforcement matters more for “high politics” issues Prediction: enforcement problems make it HARDER to reach agreement

8. Number of actors Differs from membership: how many important actors needed to resolve problem – Harder (many): human rights, trade – Easier (few): river basins, satellite slots Prediction: More actors (usually) make it HARDER to reach agreement Types of actors also matter: is problem due to states, corporations, individuals, society? Relationship of gov’t to actor causing problem.

9. Uncertainty Behavior of Others Can victim tell what perpetrator is doing? Does technology offer promise or does transparency require their cooperation? – Harder: military problems, NTBs, human rights, corruption – Easier: tariffs, satellite orbits, radio spectrum, climate change Prediction: behavioral uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

10. Uncertainty State of World What are consequences of individual or collective actions Scientific knowledge – Harder: environmental problems, health problems – Easier: trade, arms control Prediction: state of world uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

11. Uncertainty Preferences of Others Does each side know preferences of other? Are domestic politics obvious to others? – Harder: non-democracies, monetary policies, environmental policy, divided domestic politics – Easier: health policy, air traffic control Prediction: preferences uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

12. Norms Is the issue itself normative at all? – No: communication, trade VS. – Yes: environment, human rights Are states trying to change existing norms or reinforce them? – Reinforce: trade (today) VS. – Change: environmental protection, new human rights Who/how many support new norm? Prediction: institutions EASIER to create when consistent with existing norms

13. Broader context Regional variation – Degree of interdependence, shared values, etc. Time variation – Cold War, end of Cold War, War on Terror Linkage of issue with other issues – Trade as one issue vs. not – Sustainable development

14. My take on Institutional Formation My structure Bring in Young/Osherenko ideas and Koremenos et al. ideas

15. Review of Variables Variable: something that can vary (it varies between different values) Values: what a variable varies between E.g., – Variable: color – Values: ROYGBIV DV: Dependent variable – what you want to explain IVs: Independent variables – what you use to explain the DV

16. Review: DVs for the Course Always start with the DV – need to know what you are going to explain before you can figure out how you will explain it DVs for the course – Whether institution forms or not – What are the features of the institution – Behavior of states

17. Institutional formation Basic DV and question: do states (or other actors) form an institution? Variable: institutional formation Values: yes or no IVs: features of problem structure

18. Institutional formation States do NOT always create solution to problems Four assumptions of institutional design – States are rational – Future gains are large enough to support cooperation – International institutions are costly – States are risk averse Two obstacles to formation: distribution / enforcement

19. Does international institution exist or not? Institutions form when powerful actors responsible for a problem become convinced that a situation is suboptimal and that taking action to resolve it is in their interests Conflict that involves deadlock: no institutions Exogenous shocks or crises Shared concern re: problem and need for action Leadership matters Contextual factors also matter

20. Theoretical predictions Easiest to Hardest (and why) Epistemic problems: coordinating and standardizing research Coordination problems: hard distribution problems Positive externalities plagued by incapacity: convincing capable states to contribute Collaboration problems: distribution AND enforcement problems Normative problems: getting states one wants to influence to join Upstream/downstream problems: getting upstream state to join

21. Institutional Design Institutional type Membership Primary rule system Information system Response system

22. Institutional type Let’s make some predictions

23. Institutional type Regulatory – Coordination, collaboration, and upstream/downstream problems Procedural – Epistemic/knowledge problems Programmatic – Positive externalities plagued by incapacities Generative – Normative problems

24. Membership Capacity issues: if some actors can prevent others from bad behavior, membership limited to capable Limit membership if enforcement problems and uncertainty about preferences Inclusive membership if distribution problems or symmetric problems

25. Primary rule system Ambitiousness – Vague/specific – Depth of cooperation Basic type of rules – Proscriptions/prescriptions – Incentive issues – Capacity issues Scope: broad/narrow Common vs. differentiated obligations

26. Information system Strength of information system – Strong: collaboration, up/down, normative, and low inherent transparency – Weak: coordination, high inherent transparency Type of information system – Centralized? – Self-reporting / monitoring / verification – Enforcement school vs. management school: what is “behavioral model” and how is info to be used

27. Response system Response strategies – Altering consequences Deterrence: increase expected costs of violation Remuneration: increase expected benefits of compliance – Altering opportunities Generative: create new opportunities to comply Preclusive: remove opportunities to violate – Altering perceptions Cognitive: provide new information that changes perception of best choice Normative: re-educate regarding values Reciprocity of response: diffuse / specific Strictness of response: violation tolerance Sources of “institutional crises” Enforcement school vs. management school: what is “behavioral model” and how does response play