1. SCIT Minimizing Losses from Zero Days – A New Layer of Defense (SCIT) Next Generation Server Security Technology Arun Sood Ph. D. Dept of Computer Science & International Cyber Center, SCIT Labs Inc http://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit http://www.scitlabs.com +1703.347.4494 Game-Change Concepts: Moving Target + Exposure Management

2. SCIT Multi-National Security Breach http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7118452.stm “A huge campaign to poison web searches and trick people into visiting malicious websites has been thwarted.” If a user searched Google for terms such as –"hospice", "cotton gin and its effect on slavery", "infinity" and many more –The first result pointed to a website from which malicious software was downloaded and embedded on user system. Criminals in country A created domains that were mostly bought by companies in country B and hosted in country C. Tens of thousands of domains were used. These domains tricked the indexing strategy of Google to believe that these web pages were good and reliable source of information. Our focus: targeted and organized attacks.

3. SCIT Anatomy of an Hack Foot print analysis Who is NSLookup Search Engines Enumeration Scanning Machines Ports Applications Exploitation Buffer Overflow Spoofing Password DOS Damage “Owning” IP Theft, Blackmail, Graffiti, Espoinage Destruction Analyze publicly available info. Set scope of attack and identify key targets Check for vulnerabilities on each target Attack targets using library of tools and techniques Foot print analysis Who is NSLookup Search Engines Enumeration Automated Scanning Machines Ports Applications Deliver Payload Custom Trojan Rootkit Damage “Owning” IP Theft, Blackmail, Graffiti, Espoinage Destruction Attack targets using installed software Richard Stiennon, May 2006, http://blogs.zdnet.com/threatchaos/?p=330 Manual Approach Automated Approach Identify Target Install Malicious Code Hack Other Machines Take over Domain Controller

4. SCIT Attacking a Multi-tier Architecture Web-App-DB-Domain Controller Step 1: Identify Target –Network address ranges –Host names –Exposed hosts –Applications exposed on those hosts –Operating system and application version information –Patch state of both the host and of the applications –Structure of the applications and back-end severs Step 2: Initial Compromise –Web pages are always exposed – opportunity for ingress Step 3: Elevate Privileges –Become a privilege user – like internal user on the target system Step 4: Hacking Other Machines –Own the network. Step 5: Take over Domain Controller Jesper Johansson and Steve Riley, Protect Your Windows Network: From Perimeter to Data, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2005.

5. SCIT The Problem Verizon Business (DBIR2009): 285 M records compromised for 90 sites. Customized malware hard to detect. Intrusion persists for days, weeks, months. –Network Solutions, Wyndham Hotels. Symantec produced 920,000 malicious signatures in 2009. 50% of all vulnerabilities in web apps. Half of disclosed vulnerabilities had no fixes. Recovery from a breach is costly: $6.3M [Ponemon Inst] Focus on targeted and organized attacks. Current reactive approaches are inadequate. We introduce intrusion tolerance – a new paradigm.

6. SCIT Verizon (DBIR2010): Time Frame

7. SCIT 8/26/20157 SCIT provides Intrusion Tolerance for servers… Enterprise Server Firewall Hacker (Actual Photo) SCIT Virtual Server SCIT Virtual Partition Every minute SCIT software cleans and restores the virtual server to its pristine state The SCIT Solution …using virtualization to restore the OS and application to a pristine state after attack!

8. SCIT Defense in Depth Approach to Security Multi layered Approach to Security: Best if layers operate independently Firewalls depend on inspection of incoming packets IDS/IPS depend on inspection of incoming and outgoing packets –With increasing bandwidth and more matching requirements, the cycles devoted to packet inspection will keep increasing Threat independent approaches are needed for protection against zero-days Other approaches should be included in the mix, including approaches that do not rely on packet inspection and have potential for threat independent performance: –White list of software –Time-dependent recovery-based intrusion tolerance Cross Sector Cyber Threats Strategy

9. SCIT The SCIT Solution Static Servers Converted to Dynamic Environment –Facilitates Incorporation of Diversity Threat Independent Rapid Recovery: Work Through an Attack Mission Resilience Emphasize Temporal Dimension Virtualization as a New Framework for Server Security Cross Sector Cyber Threats Strategy

10. SCIT How Does SCIT Provide Additional Security? SCIT servers –Regularly restored to a known state and remove malicious software installed by attackers. –Provide protection while manufacturer is developing a patch, i.e. SCIT servers are protected in the time period between vulnerability detection and patch distribution. –Gives data center managers an additional level of freedom in developing a systematic plan for patch management. SCIT DNS servers –Domain name / IP address mapping is protected from malicious alteration, thus avoiding improper redirection of the traffic. SCIT Web servers –Protect the corporate crown jewels, front ends for sensitive information, e.g. customer or employee data sets, IP, and informational web sites. –Regularly restores the sites to known states, and makes it difficult for intruders to undertake harmful acts such as deleting files. –Avoid long term defacements. –Reduces the risk of large scale data ex-filtration.

11. SCIT Key Intrusion Tolerance Approaches OASIS (DARPA)MAFTIA (EU)SCIT (GMU) Fault Tolerance Based: Intrusion Detection FirstRecovery Based Structure Based Time Dependent Packet InspectionYes No Voting AlgorithmYes No DeterministicNo Yes Performance ImpactYes DiversityRequired Optional. Diversity will make scheme more robust Recovery Performed upon detecting intrusion. Built in automatic periodic recovery. See IEEE Security and Privacy paper for details

12. SCIT 8/26/201512 Comparison of IDS, IPS, SCIT IssueFirewall, IDS, IPSIntrusion tolerance Risk management.Reactive.Proactive. A priori information required. Attack models. Software vulnerabilities. Reaction rules. Exposure time selection. Length of longest transaction. Protection approach.Prevent all intrusions. Impossible to achieve. Limit losses. System Administrator workload. High. Manage reaction rules. Manage false alarms. Less. No false alarms generated. Design metric.Unspecified.Exposure time: Deterministic. Packet/Data stream monitoring. Required.Not required. Higher traffic volume requires. More computations.Computation volume unchanged. Applying patches.Must be applied immediately. Can be planned.

13. SCIT 8/26/201513 Server Rotations Example: 5 online and 3 offline servers Server Rotation Offline servers; in self-cleansing Online servers; potentially compromised Servers -Virtual -Physical

14. SCIT 8/26/201514 Server Rotations Example: 5 online and 3 offline servers Server Rotation Offline servers; in self-cleansing Online servers; potentially compromised Servers -Virtual -Physical

15. SCIT 8/26/201515 Server Rotations Example: 5 online and 3 offline servers Server Rotation Offline servers; in self-cleansing Online servers; potentially compromised Servers -Virtual -Physical

16. SCIT 8/26/201516 Server State Transitions Additional States Planned for Analysis and Archiving Current

17. SCIT 8/26/201517 SCIT Supports Session Persistence SCIT does not require changing the application server or application code SCIT servers support session persistence but do not migrate state Session data is stored in shared memory or shared by multicasting among the virtual servers Session info is data and not executable

18. SCIT 8/26/201518 SCIT - Intrusion Tolerance Approach Increase security by reducing exposure window –Exposure window is the time a server is online between rotations –Optimizes application-specific exposure windows to servers Decreasing available time for intrusion, reduces potential losses No packet inspection; No signatures; No detection SCIT does not eliminate vulnerabilities or prevent intrusions, but makes it difficult to exploit the vulnerability Additional layer of defense –Integrated system: prevention, detection, tolerance Reduce managed services cost Adaptive SCIT Increase availability – reduce down time for upgrades – fewer reboots T T Cost

19. SCIT Transaction Length in Multi-tier Architecture LayerImplementationTransaction Length Client LayerWeb site, DNS serviceShort Middle LayerAuthentication, Single Sign OnShort VPN, Streaming MediaLong Back End LayerTransaction ProcessingShort File AccessMixed Complex Database QueriesLong

20. SCIT Exposure Time Reductions ApplicationCurrent ServerSCIT Server Websites – Windows Server1 day to 3 month60 seconds Websites – UNIX Server1 month to 6 months60 seconds DNS services – Linux Server3 months to 1 year30 seconds In the following slides we show that: Reducing Exposure Time Significantly Reduces Expected Loss

21. SCIT Security Risk Assessment Follows SecurityFocus.com (Symantec), Microsoft

22. SCIT Risk Shaping by Exposure Time

23. SCIT Multi Tier Example

24. SCIT SCIT vs Traditional Cumm Single Loss Expectancy SCIT Exposure Time Reducing Exposure Time Significantly Reduces Expected Loss Multi Tier Architecture Web server DNS server Content Manager Database server

25. SCIT Avoidance is Better Than Cleaning You cannot clean a compromised system by –patching it. –removing the back doors. –using some vulnerability remover. –using a virus scanner. –reinstalling the operating system over the existing installation. You cannot trust –any data copied from a compromised system. –the event logs on a compromised system. –your latest backup. The only proper way to clean a compromised system is to flatten and rebuild. CLEANING COMPROMISED SYSTEMS IS DIFFICULT. IT IS BETTER TO AVOID HACKING.

26. SCIT Case Study: Payment Card Industry Cost per exposed accounts (legal and professional fees, customer contact, post event clean up and improvements) –More than 1M accounts compromised: $50 per account –Few (1500) accounts compromised: $1500 per account Cost for protecting data – 100,000 customers Bottom Line: Cost of exposed accounts >> Cost of protection Reducing Exposure Time provides additional layer of defense - makes it more difficult to exploit vulnerabilities and steal data. Method$ per customerComments Year 1Recurring Encrypt data at rest$5$1Application Changes Host IDS$6$2False Alarm management Continuous security audits$3 - $4 Vulnerability scanning Source: Rapid 7 – Vulnerability Management Trends. Also Gartner Group

27. SCIT Sample Requirements Met by SCIT Servers Web site should not be defaced longer than 1 minute DNS tables should be restored within 1 minute System should reduce data ex-filtration – when combined with IDS the volume of data that can be maliciously retrieved can be computed To ensure clean servers, remove malware every minute Change the face of the website every minute

28. SCIT Randomized Defensive Strategies Current servers are static and overexposed -almost sitting ducks Randomly change the exposed face of the target –Hide, obscure, alter, move target Develop approaches that are effective in server farms and at the point of the spear Issues to address: –Impact on system administration –Scalability

29. SCIT Comparing 4 Architectures IDS NIDS + HIDSNIDS + SCIT SCIT

30. Results of Simulation Parameters used in the simulation Simulation MetricsValue (units) Number of queries used 50,000 Intruder Residence Time (IRT) 0 minutes to 2 months Mean IRT – Pareto distribution 48 hours Exposure Time – 2 cases 1.4 hrs 2.4 mins Data Ex-filtration rate675 records/breach Results of the simulation CaseTotal damage (records) No. of breaches Mean Damage (records/ breach) NIDS245,962 (100%) 1921,281 SCIT: ET 4hrs SCIT: ET 4 mins 55,364 (23%) 1,015 (0.4%) 508 109 2 NIDS + HIDS210,578 (86%) 1641,284 NIDS + SCIT (ET 4 hrs) NIDS + SCIT (ET 4 mins) 20,931 (9%) 383 (0.16%) 191 110 2

31. SCIT Target Applications E-Commerce payments – long session of multiple short transactions Streaming media VPN Complex Database Queries Back end processing Transaction Length Long Short Low High Value for Exposure Window Management Web servers DNS services Single Sign On Firewalls Authentication (LDAP) Transaction Processors File Transfer (size dependent)

32. SCIT 8/26/201532 Collaboration with Systems Integrators Lockheed Martin –Testing and validation of SCIT servers. –Funded SCIT research Northrop Grumman –Testing and validation of SCIT servers. –Matching partner – Virginia CTRF project Raytheon –Collaborated on SBIR proposal

33. SCIT Overall The SCIT platform does reduce exposure time and confuses attacker efforts. There is a slight performance degradation as exposure time is reduced. ComponentTest ObjectivesFindings Basic Web Server with Session persistence Defacement (recovery) System Compromise (limit effects) Data Corruption (recovery) Data ex-filtration (limit effects) The resilience of the underlying VM architecture proved effective at thwarting any long term or permanent damage to the platform as a result of malicious activity. E-Commerce ApplicationDefacement (recovery time) System Compromise (limit effects) Data Corruption (recovery) Data ex-filtration (limit effects) Shopping Cart Price manipulation The findings were the same as the basic web server and the shopping cart was not subject to manipulation Single Sign-OnSQL injection System Compromise Unauthorized access Due to effective firewall and authentication input filtering the SSO architecture proved immune to O/S Corruption and Database Exploitation attack vectors. The underlying rotation of SSO Virtual Machine instances proved transparent throughout the entire course of testing. Testing by Northrop Grumman

34. SCIT Lockheed Testing The overall security features of the SCIT system performed as advertised. This tool is very effective in ensuring application availability and the integrity of the web server itself. It provides a stable platform on which an enterprise can host web applications. “…The evaluators found that the first step, port scanning, was successfully accomplished. However, the Nessus software just hung when establishing sessions with the open ports it found. This was probably because the rotation of the servers deleted the session information that Nessus left on the servers. “ Recovery from DoS attack –Verify that the system will automatically recover from a website defacement attack. –Verify that the system will automatically recover if the service is made unavailable. Resiliency –Verify that if the vulnerabilities were executed they would not seriously impact the overall system SCIT does not fix app/OS vulnerabilities; does not protect against the integrity, and confidentiality of the user’s session and sensitive data; these properties are the same as that of the application. Current SCIT implementations do not change the application code.

35. SCIT Quick Review + Road Map SCIT: Why? How? Scope. Independent Validation. Performance. DOD Network. Specific Server: SCIT – DNS. Scalability. Plans. Demo

36. SCIT 8/26/201536 Performance & Functionality Stress Tests Workload: number of user sessions/minute (50,100,125) User session: –Series of request and response from server –Select item from drop down list and add it to persistent storage OpenSTA is used to generate workload –3 runs per case. Duration of run = 3 * Exposure time for the run –each VM is tested at least once Workload consists of N requests every 10 secs. Exposure times of 2,3 and 4 minutes, No Rotation Stand alone web server for Non-SCIT test.

37. SCIT 8/26/201537 Performance Test Results SCIT Server Environment Entry Level DELL System Dual processor – 4 cores each Memory: 4 GB Slackware OS Apache, Tomcat, Shopping Cart (Java) Exp Time (minutes)User SessionsAvg. Response Time (secs) STD Dev 2 m506.160.07 2 m1006.240.01 2 m1256.270.02 3 m506.100.04 3 m1006.150.02 3 m1256.310.05 4 m506.080.04 4 m1006.150.02 4 m1256.140.02 No Rotation506.030.01 No Rotation1006.030.00 No Rotation1256.040.00

38. SCIT 8/26/201538 Sustaining Networks SCIT provides additional layer of defense. Tactical Networks SCIT provides continuity of operations, automatic recovery. SCIT and DoD Networks NetworkRelative SizeFrequency of Change Security Support Staff Sustaining Network Many servers. Worldwide. Slowly changing.Large & talented support Tactical Network Fewer servers. Smaller region. Potential for rapid change. Limited support. Frequent staff rotations.

39. SCIT 8/26/201539 DODI 8500.2 Enclave and Computing Environment Integrity ECID-1 Host Based IDS Host-based intrusion detection systems are deployed for major applications and for network management assets, such as routers, switches, and domain name servers (DNS). Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Consumer Data Protection Requirement Compensating Control Standards and Compliance Requirements

40. SCIT 8/26/201540 Web site/ Ecommerce Commercial Data Centers Government Critical Infrastructure sites (e.g. Emergency preparedness) Database server protection DNS servers SSO servers Cloud Computing Services Potential Target Audience

41. SCIT 8/26/201541 DNS & DNSSEC & SCIT-DNS DNS is an essential part of Internet. –Used where names are used – web, email, web services, etc –DNS was designed for trusted environment. DNSSEC adds end-to-end security to DNS. –OMB has mandated DNSSEC. –“.. represents an infinitesimal presence.” (http://dns.measurement-factory.com/surveys/200910.html) –Particularly challenging in some environments, like tactical. SCIT – DNS –DNSSEC is the preferred solution. –SCIT-DNS provides near DNSSEC trust with DNS convenience –Focus of Army SBIR

42. SCIT 8/26/201542 SCIT – DNS

43. SCIT 8/26/201543 SCIT in Server Farms Scalability Issues Can SCIT be incorporated in Enterprise environments? –Many servers –Many applications Can SCIT work in a multiple apps per server environment? Can SCIT VMs be distributed across the server farm? Can SCIT effectively exploit multi-core architectures? Version 1 Objectives System Admin Function –Many apps and servers –Monitoring of the system state –Diagnostics Deployment of VMs –App related VMs are assigned to the servers Distribute after testing at a staging server System captures VM map to facilitate deployment Distributing the sever load –Prelim simulation model –Resource Allocation model

44. SCIT Staging Server 8/26/201544 Library Select OS Select SCIT App Select 3 rd Party Apps Pristine Image VM Controller VMDispatcher VM Staging Server GUI Controller IP Dispatcher IP # of VMs Cloned Pristine Image VM 01 Manual Tuning SCIT Configuration & Construction

45. SCIT 8/26/201545 Current Status Validated the scalability of SCIT: Developed SCIT Infrastructure System (SIS) –Monitor server farm from a single point –Diagnostics from a single location –Automate the staging, testing and deployment of SCIT apps Pristine images, clones, dispatcher, controller Specified the key management requirements Configuration –Simulation of SCITized multiple application server farm Independent validation at Lockheed units –Testing at Gaithersburg, Omaha, Rockville –Capture new use cases: upload and download of files taking 3 to 4 minutes: Share Point Independent validation at Northrop Grumman Triad Labs - Colorado Moving target defense SCIT DNS SCIT SSO – SAML compatibility Community of interest: pubs, invited presentations and workshops Parallel Effort: Development, Quantitative, Simulation

46. SCIT 8/26/201546 Way Ahead Further Validation and Certification –Seeking Pilot project opportunities Examine long duration applications –Up to 5 minute uploads SCIT improvements –Dispatcher is static; can this be rotated; what about apps distributed across server boxes –Dynamism enables diversity in deployment: OS, App, Memory Image –Multi-level rotations: apps, OS, hardware SCIT reconnaissance SCIT in cloud computing, Virtualized Desk Top Infrastructure Multiple apps per server Adaptive SCIT; Memory image based IDS; Hardware Enabled SCIT

47. SCIT 8/26/201547 IP Protection and Recognition Issued Patents: " Self-Cleaning System“, US 7549167. Issued 6/16/2009. Inventors: Yih Huang and Arun Sood "SCIT-DNS: Critical Infrastructure Protection through Secure DNS Server Dynamic Updates", US 7680955. Issued 03/16/2010. Inventors: David Arsenault, Yih Huang and Arun Sood. “Single Use Server System", US 7725531. Issued May 25, 2010 Inventors: David Arsenault, Yih Huang and Arun Sood. Pending Patents "Data Alteration Prevention System", Utility Patent Application No.: 11/419,832, 5/23/2006, Docket No.: GMU-05-037U. Inventors: David Arsenault, Yih Huang, and Arun Sood. Two additional patents applied in 2010. Research Support: Army (TATRC), NIST/CIPP, SUN, CTRF/Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin Awards: Winner Security Technologies for Tomorrow – GSC and CNI-Expo competition 2 June 2010. 2 nd place GSC Cyber Security Challenge 13 Novermber2009. GSC=Global Security Challenge, associated with London Business School. SBIR: Army – SCIT DNS with focus on tactical environment.

48. SCIT 8/26/201548 Benefits of SCIT SCIT removes malware every minute without detection –“.. 85 percent of the 285 million records breached in the year were harvested by custom-created malware.” Verizon. SCIT reduces data ex-filtration –Data ex-filtration is slow gradual process to avoid IDS detection & SCIT interrupts the flow every minute SCIT does not rely on signatures and is threat independent –IPS / IDS depend on signature matching and focus on known threats. SCIT relies on exposure time control. SCIT automatically recovers from defacement or software deletion attacks: mission resilient SCIT reduces intrusion response (alerts) management cost –SCIT provides an additional dimension to separate false alarms.

49. SCIT SCIT: Additional Capability Apply hot patches –Operating Systems –Applications Potential for fast recovery from bad patches Technology that converts a static system (“sitting duck”) into dynamic system –Different types of diversity: admin cost – security trade off Explicit use of time in secure system design

50. SCIT 8/26/201550 SCIT Publications + Contact Info SCIT technical publications Links to media reports Links to demo videos http://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit http://www.scitlabs.com Questions? Arun Sood {asood@scitlabs.com, asood@gmu.edu} +1703.347.4494