1. 1 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Michigan State University Intelligence Program The Changing Shape of Intelligence Led Policing David L. Carter, Ph.D. School of Criminal Justice Michigan State University

2. 2 Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Topics to Be Covered Intelligence Led Policing Public-Private Partnerships Homeland Security (All Hazards) Intelligence Baseline Capabilities for Fusion Centers Intelligence Requirements Information Sharing Environment Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) Controlled Unclassified Information National Open Source Enterprise FBI Strategic Execution Teams (SET) Privacy and the intelligence function Intelligence training and technical assistance Online resources

3. 3 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Intelligence Led Policing Definitions Executive implementation of the intelligence cycle to support proactive decision making for resource allocation and crime prevention The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats

4. 4 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University SIMILARITIES OF COMPSTAT AND INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING There are important lessons learned from CompStat that can be applied to ILP Both have a goal of prevention Commitment to the concept by the Chief Executive is essential Analysis serves as the basis for operational responses Processes for constant raw information flow for analysis must be in place Community engagement is critical for reporting suspicious activities Intervention activities are driven by definable evidence of crime and threats Administrative and organizational flexibility are required Research and lessons learned serve as the basis for creative intervention Managers and supervisors are held demonstrably accountable W HILE PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES ARE SIMILAR, THERE ARE ALSO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES CompstatIntelligence Led Policing Intra-jurisdiction Incident driven Analysis based on known facts from reported crime data and investigations Focuses on crime sprees and incident trends with intent to apprehend specific offenders Relies on crime mapping; incident analysis; Modus Operandi analysis Time sensitive (24 hour feedback/response) Predominant focus on “street crime” (burglary, robbery, homicide, assault, theft etc.) “Reported criminal incidents” drive collection and analytic parameters Multi-jurisdiction Threat driven Analysis based tips, leads, suspicious activity reports and information collection Focuses on “root causes” and conditions that contribute to serious crime and terrorism Relies on link analysis; commodity flow; transaction analysis; association analysis Strategic (inherently long-term) Predominant focus on “criminal enterprises” (terrorism, organized crime, violence, etc.) “Intelligence Requirements” drive collection and analytic parameters

5. 5 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Intelligence Led Policing Some agencies are struggling with ILP because: They have not taken the time to learn it It is conceptual, not prescriptive or “plug and play” It is requires a commitment to change Agencies must: Identify problems and strategic priorities Conduct a self-assessment of policies and resources Re-allocate resources Amend operating policies to meet new needs ILP helps meet new challenges and responsibilities Michigan State University ILP Self Assessment

6. 6 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Mature 4+ 5+ 12+ 13+ 14+ 15+ 19+ 13-18 11-14 9-13 Advanced8-12 7-10 Basic 6-8 8-11 1-8 5-7 4 4-7 1-6 Minimal Capacity 1-5 2-31-4 3 1-3 2 1 1 Commitment Training Infrastructure Operations Records Analytic Information Management Capability Sharing

7. 7 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Public-Private Partnerships & National Plans Virtually all initiatives and sources support public-private partnerships Integration of the private sector with government initiatives is critical for effective homeland security Information sharing must be two way All public-private information sharing must take measures to protect privacy and civil rights Public sector must be cognizant of the need to protect private sector information

8. 8 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University The Community and Private Sector - Issues Sharing information Law enforcement agencies sharing Personal Information about individuals with private sector partners Private sector sharing proprietary information with law enforcement What unique expertise is possessed by the private sector that would be of value to law enforcement? Terrorism Liaison Officer/Intelligence Liaison Officer program Civil libertarians opposed to public-private partnerships with law enforcement because of privacy issues Providing community education BJA Communities Against Terrorism Program

9. 9 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Homeland Security/All Hazards Intelligence The collection and analysis of information concerned with non-criminal domestic threats to critical infrastructure, community health and public safety for the purpose of preventing the threat or mitigating the effects of the threat. Examples: Bird Flu, natural threats, vulnerable infrastructure Developing areas include: Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Public Health/Medical Intelligence Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource (CIKR) Intelligence

10. 10 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Homeland Security/All Hazards Intelligence Challenges Thinking about and addressing issues that have law enforcement implications but have not been traditional priorities Requires law enforcement to learn about new disciplines In some ways, it “goes against” traditional law enforcement occupational culture Training becomes a critical element to deal with these issues

11. 11 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Baseline Capabilities for Fusion Centers Minimum operational standards for fusion centers Meeting these standards “is considered to have reached a baseline level of capability” Standards include: Approved: Law Enforcement/Criminal Intelligence Drafted: CI/KR In Development: Public Health In Development: Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise

12. 12 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Baseline Capabilities “Achieving the baseline level of capability ensures that a fusion center has the necessary structures, standards, and tools in place to support the gathering, processing, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism information, homeland security information, and law enforcement information.” Set performance criteria for the Intelligence Cycle Capabilities include establishing “intelligence requirements”

13. 13 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Intelligence Requirements A “requirement” is information that is needed to: Answer a question related to a terrorist or criminal threat or Make a decision It is information you do not have and are “required” to get in order to: Better understand the threat or To make a more informed decision

14. 14 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Intelligence Requirements Threat requirements Standing requirements – information that needs to be collected on an ongoing basis to monitor known threats Case requirements – information that is needed to determine the existence and character of a threat based tips or SARs Legal requirements – evidence that is needed to establish reasonable suspicion to create an intelligence record on an individual or organization Remember: The reason that law enforcement can be in the “intelligence business” is based on their statutory authority to enforce the criminal law

15. 15 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Information Sharing Environment Mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 Intent: To increase two-way sharing of terrorism information between intelligence community, law enforcement at all levels and private sector Critical elements: Local intelligence capacity Designated state fusion center A “consistent lexicon”

16. 16 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University

17. 17 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) ISE-SAR: Information Sharing Environment-Suspicious Activity Report Limited to terrorism and crimes with a terrorism nexus Suspicious Activity - “observed behavior that may be indicative of intelligence gathering or pre-operational planning related to terrorism, criminal, or other illicit intention” “Other illicit intention” must be criminal The focus is on behavior SAR –Official documentation of the observed behavior

18. 18 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Issues Should there be SARs for “all crimes”? Is a SAR a “criminal intelligence record”? SAR process must: Avoid “profiling” Ensure privacy Have a criminal nexus Critics claim that SARs are an excuse to record and retain expressive activity In some cases this has happened It has been the basis for lawsuits and complaints

19. 19 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Sensitive But Unclassified Information (SBU) Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information – information that does not meet the standards and control requirements of classified information, but should not publicly disseminated for a variety of reasons Two broad types: Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) – may be shared with anyone in law enforcement who has the “right to know” and “need to know” For Official Use Only (FOUO) – may be shared with anyone who has the “right to know” and “need to know” 100+ SBU labels among all federal agencies

20. 20 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Transition to Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) As part of the ISE, new guidelines have been developed for SBU information Dissemination – sharing information on purpose Controlled – Making certain information is not inadvertently shared; protecting information SBU is being replaced with “Controlled Unclassified Information” (CUI) Recipient must have the “Right to Know” and “Need to Know” the information

21. 21 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Controlled Unclassified Information Controlled with Standard Dissemination – information must use standard safeguarding procedures and may be shared may be shared with anyone who has the “right to know” and “need to know” Controlled with Specified Dissemination – information must use standard safeguarding procedures and may be shared may be shared with anyone who is in the specified dissemination category (i.e., designation of “right to know”) and “need to know” Controlled Enhanced with Specified Dissemination – information must use enhanced safeguarding procedures and may be shared may be shared with anyone who is in the specified dissemination category (i.e., designation of “right to know”) and “need to know”

22. 22 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University CUI Policy Issues The local, state, or tribal law enforcement agency must implement a privacy policy consistent with the Information Sharing Environment privacy guidelines While CUI cannot be mandated for adoption by state, local and tribal governments, it will become a de facto protocol Presents new policy and training challenges The National Archives and Records Administration is responsible for managing CUI http://www.archives.gov/cui/

23. 23 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Open Source information Open Sources – Information that is lawfully obtained that does not require legal process or consent Note: Criminal predicate rule applies to open source information that identifies individuals or organizations National Open Source Enterprise (NOSE) All members of the Intelligence Community required to develop open source exploitation http://www.opensource.gov

24. 24 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University FBI Strategic Execution Team (SET) Enhances Field Intelligence Groups A more intelligence-driven national and regional approach to the FBI’s criminal investigations More FBI intelligence reports about criminal matters Intelligence-based uniform structures, positions, and processes across all FBI field offices, making it easier to work with the FBI Increased tactical and strategic intelligence assessments for dissemination to local agencies Overall, more FBI intelligence products

25. 25 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Privacy Issues “Privacy” actually includes: Protection of civil liberties Restrictions on government power e.g. First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments) Protection of civil rights Rights and privileges of citizenship e.g., Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection clauses Personal information (both that which identifies individuals and that which describes individuals’ behaviors)

26. 26 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Privacy Issues and ILP Public concerns Transparency of intelligence activities Safeguards to protect rights Accountability for intelligence activities Application of 28 CFR Part 23 to a criminal intelligence records system Federal lawsuits under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, Civil Action for Deprivation of Civil Rights against a law enforcement agency's intelligence practices, including intelligence records

27. 27 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Intelligence Training & Technical Assistance Master Criminal Intelligence Training Calendar http://mastercalendar.ncirc.gov/ Michigan State University Intelligence Program http://intellprogram.msu.edu State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) http://slatt.org Fusion Center Technical Assistance Program Accessible via http://www.llis.dhs.govhttp://www.llis.dhs.gov National White Collar Crime Center http://www.nw3c.org Federal Law Enforcement Training Center http://www.fletc.gov International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts http://www.ialeia.org

28. 28 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Intelligence and ILP Resources BJA National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center Accessible on RISSNET Portal and LEO http://www.ncirc.gov Global Intelligence Working Group http://it.ojp.gov Lessons Learned Information Sharing http://www.llis.dhs.gov National Criminal Justice Reference Service http://www.ncjrs.gov Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment http://www.ise.gov Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit http://leiu-homepage.org/index.php

29. 29 Michigan State University Intelligence Program Copyright 2009 © Michigan State University Michigan State University Intelligence Program QUESTIONS and COMMENTS David L. Carter, Ph.D. School of Criminal Justice Michigan State University carterd@msu.edu