1. 8/29/2015 Complying by the rules in absence of surveillance: The impact of a group-interested versus self-interested authority Laetitia Mulder, University of Groningen Rob Nelissen, Tilburg University

2. 8/29/2015 Structural solutions: undoing the dilemma ›Privatization ›Leaders ›Rules ›Sanctions

3. 8/29/2015  Compliance? Not always (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Michael, 2006; Mulder et al., PSPB 2006; Tenbrunsel et al., 1997)  Compliance in absence of surveillance?  Rule should convince people that cooperation is good for all / “awareness” of social dilemma

4. 8/29/2015 When does a rule/sanction get “internalized”? ›Little research ›Sanctions, sanction severity, punishment versus reward (Thogersen 1997; Mulder et al., 2009; Mulder, 2008) ›Who installs the rule

5. 8/29/2015 Leaders / authorities ›Impact leaders in group behavior: Trust, self- sacrificing leadership, legitimacy, procedural justice (Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler, 1997; Tyler et al, 2000; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2003)  Group versus self interested leader

6. 8/29/2015 Leader installs a rule or sanctions Leader perceived as group-interested Leader perceived as self-interested “cooperation is good for all / morally correct” etc. “cooperation is something that the leader wants, nothing more” Compliance, even without supervision No compliance, or only compliance when supervised

7. 8/29/2015 Study 1: experimental, real interactions ›Bogus leadership style questionnaire: e.g. “If I am a group leader I strive for what is best for everyone”, If I am a group leader I strive for what is best for myself”  “group score” and “self score” ›Public good dilemma (groups of 4, each 20 x 20cent coins, coins contributed to group multiplied by 1,5 and divided equally) ›Leader: another participant. Either high group score and low self score (group interested leader condition) or the other way around (self interested leader condition). ›Leader could fine other group members with €2 (Leader + sanction pre-programmed. Fine was distributed when contribution was lower than 12).

8. 8/29/2015 Results

9. 8/29/2015 Study 2: 2 (leader) x 2 (rule) fishing vignette experiment (group-benefitting leader condition:) You live in a village that is governed by a leader who is known for somebody who would do anything for the inhabitants: He paid several amenities out of his own pocket. In other words: a leader who, in your eyes, puts his the interests of the inhabitants first. (self-benefitting leader condition:) You live in a village that is governed by a leader who seems to care little about the welfare of the inhabitants: With every new amenity he raises taxes a couple of percentages. In other words: a leader who, in your eyes, puts his own interests first. The village depends on an adjoining lake in which a considerable population of catfish lives. The catch of these catfish is of vital importance as it provides for the primary necessities of life. The catch has also became important for trading (which supplies income for the inhabitants) because, in a similar lake in another village, abundant catch has drastically diminished the fish population. For you it is also important to catch catfish. The more catfish you catch, the better it is for you welfare. At the moment you catch 14 kilos catfish a month. By catching this amount, you don’t exactly make a fortune, but you can manage well enough. (Only in rule-condition) At a certain moment, the leader of the village, as mentioned above, installs a rule: Every inhabitant of the village may only catch a restricted quantity of catfish, namely 10 kilos per inhabitant per month.

10. 8/29/2015 Results: Caught fish in kilos Group benefitting leader Self-benefiting leader No rule13,90 a 13,28 a Rule10,94 b 12,52 a Post-hoc: paired comparisons within columns

11. 8/29/2015 Study 3: 2 (leader) x 3 (rule) shop vignette experiment You work in a shop and this job is very important for you. The shop has decreasing sales and is in danger of bankruptcy, so you and your colleagues’ job is therefore in danger. (group-benefitting leader condition:) The boss of the shop cares, in your eyes, a lot about the welfare of the shop employees and is considerate of their interests. An example of this is that, in the past, he has put aside extra profit particularly as a financial buffer so that he would be able to keep paying the employees in bad times. (self-benefitting leader condition:) The boss of the shop cares, in your eyes, little about the welfare of the shop employees and seems to put his own interests first. An example of that is, in the past, he mainly used extra profit for himself in the form of junkets. For you and your colleagues it is customary to have a break for about half an hour. (No-rule condition) - (Rule without supervision): Your boss has installed the rule that the breaks shop employees take should be shorter, namely 15 minutes. Imagine that your boss is present at work today and is supervising... (Rule without supervision): Your boss has installed the rule that the breaks shop employees take should be shorter, namely 15 minutes. Imagine that your boss is not present at work today and is not supervising...

12. 8/29/2015 Results: Intented duration of break in minutes Group benefitting leaderSelf benefitting leader No rule26.00 a 27.00 a Rule with supervision 15.80 b 18.10 b Rule without supervision 17.35 b 24.50 a Note: Within columns, cells that do not share a letter in the superscript differ significantly, planned comparison, p <.05.

13. 8/29/2015 Study 4: 2 (leader) x 3 (rule) lab experiment ›PG dilemma: pts typed in choice and explanation ›Resource dilemma (different groups): - 5 persons, one of which the leader (random) and 4 “normal group members” - leader able to impose self-chosen rule - information on leader: choice + explanation in previous PD game. - Group benefitting leader condition: contributed 100 Self-benefitting leader condition: contributed 0. “I just went for the group interest (my own self interest). If I (the group) would earn less by doing that, I don’t mind very much. By donating everything, the group (I) simply earns (earn) the most.”

14. 8/29/2015 Study 4: 2 (leader) x 3 (rule) lab experiment ›Pool of 40 lottery tickets (“owned by leader”) ›Each “normal” group member could take from pool (0-10) ›What was left in pool: doubled and equally divided among all 5. ›Rule manipulation: No-rule condition: Leader did not install a rule Rule condition: Leader: “I install the rule that you do NOT take any tickets from the pool. So, the rule will be: leave all tickets in the pool.” ›Rule condition: some leaders able to supervise, some are not. Rule with supervision: your leader has the opportunity to supervise group members’ decisions Rule without supervision: your leader does not have the opportunity to supervise group members’ decisions ›Decision on number of lottery tickets to take (0-10)

15. 8/29/2015 Number of lottery tickets taken (n = 90) Group- benefitting leader Self- benefitting leader No rule5.34 a =7.19 a Rule with supervision 2.17 b =3.75 b Rule without supervision 2.20 b <5.18 ab

16. 8/29/2015 Leader installs a rule or sanctions Leader perceived as group-interested Leader perceived as self-interested “cooperation is good for all / morally correct” etc. “cooperation is something that the leader wants, nothing more” Compliance, even without supervision No compliance, or only compliance when supervised

17. 8/29/2015 Conclusions ›Successfulness of rules/sanctions depends on who installs them. ›Let rules or sanctions be imposed by authorities who have built credits, with a pro-social appearance, etc. ›Structural solutions may fail to make structural changes