1. Judgment Aggregation and Moral Responsibility Frank Hindriks University of Groningen LSE-Groningen Workshop 2009 Models of Value and Opinion February 12-14, 2009

2. 2 The Doctrinal Paradox & the Discursive Dilemma Employee Safety pqr p  q  r Serious danger? Effective Measure? Bearable Loss? Pay Sacrifice? ANoYes No BYesNoYesNo CYes No MajorityYes No

3. 3 Theorem (List and Pettit 2002) Let the agenda contain at least two distinct atomic propositions and their conjunction, or their disjunction, or their material implication. Then there exists no aggregation rule satisfying the conditions of ‘universal domain’, ‘collective rationality’, ‘systematicity’ and ‘anonymity’.

4. 4 Pettit Groups have minds of their own Corporate responsibility (CR) cannot be reduced to individual responsibility (IR)

5. 5 Corporate Responsibility. Myth or Reality? Contents 1.Pettit’s Argument 2.An Observation 3.A Critique 4.Towards an Alternative

6. 6 1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation 3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative Irreducible Corporate Responsibility Thesis: [ICRT]It is sometimes impossible to fully distribute the responsibility of a corporate agent to the individual members of that agent.

7. 7 1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation 3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative Excuse Condition: [E] An individual member of an organization cannot be blamed for a decision made by that organization if s/he disagrees with it.

8. 8 1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation 3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative The premise-based and conclusion-based procedures are strategically equivalent  Pettit’s argument fails for the case of outcome-oriented preferences

9. 9 1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation 3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative Reasons for disagreement [E*] An individual’s disagreement with the decision the organization of which s/he is a member affects the extent to which s/he can be blamed for that decision only if s/he disagrees with it for the right reasons.

10. 10 1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation 3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative Reason-sensitive control Culpable quality of will, faulty self-governance Normative reasons

11. 11 1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation 3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative Friend in distress examples: -“busy” -“reputation” -“school play” Information requirements From the individual to the collective level

12. 12 Dictatorship Preemptive War pqr (p  q)  s s WMDs?Sufficient Power? Just War?Preemptive War? ANoYes No

13. 13 Dictatorship Preemptive War pqr (p  q)  s s WMDs?Sufficient Power? Just War?Preemptive War? BYesNoYesNo

14. 14 Dictatorship Preemptive War pqr (p  q)  s s WMDs?Sufficient Power? Just War?Preemptive War? CYes No

15. 15 Oligarchy Preemptive War pqr (p  q)  s s WMDs?Sufficient Power? Just War?Preemptive War? ANoYes No BYesNoYesNo CYes No MajorityYes No

16. 16 1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation 3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative A recipe for distributing responsibility Check the fault(s) of the corporate agent Trace them to individuals

17. 17 1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation 3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative Collectivizing reason Member and role responsibility Corporate Responsibility (CR) -(ir)reducibility  a false dilemma

18. 18 Conclusions 1.Information about normative reasons and faulty self-governance can be used for “tracing back” CR to IR. 2.A bottom-up approach to CR