1. Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs
Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs. (EBAO) Effects Based Approach to Operations
LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.) DCOS, Chief Operations 25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry Brigade Hungarian Home Defense Forces Tata, Hungary

2. CV
EDUCATION:
Ph.D. in Security Policy, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, Hungary Dissertation with Summa Cum Laude: “The Five Central Pillars of the European Security”
#1 Master of Arts in National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA Thesis: “The role of the Partnership for Peace Program and the State Partnership Program in the Process of NATO Enlargement. The Case of the Hungarian-Ohio Cooperation”
#2 Master of Arts in International Security and Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA Thesis: “Regulating the Intelligence System and Oversight in the Hungarian Constitutional Democracy”
#3 Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, Hungary Thesis: “Social Psychological Methods for Cognition of a Personality”
Miklós Zrínyi General Staff Collage with concentration in Intelligence, Hungary
#1 Bachelor of Arts in Intelligence with concentration in Long Range Special Operations and
#2 Bachelor of Science in Military Automotive Engineering, Lajos Kossuth Military College, Hungary Thesis: “Development of Military Intelligence”
ASSIGNMENTS:
Chief Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, 25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry Brigade, Hungarian Home Defense Forces, Tata, Hungary
Strategic Representative, Office of the Hungarian Military Representative to NATO and EU, NATO HQ, Brussels
Chief Consultant, Defense Policy Department, Ministry of Defense
Postgraduate Student, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA
Deputy Head, Partnership Cooperation Branch, Ministry of Defense
Deputy Head, NATO Relations Branch, Ministry of Defense
Senior Military Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence Office
Graduate Student, National Defense University
Long Range Reconnaissance Special Team Commander, Hungarian Defense Forces
COMMISSIONS:
Dean, NATO Military Committee Strategic Representatives, NATO HQ, Brussels
Chief Coordinator in Scientific Development
Deputy Chief of Hungarian Transformation
Chief Coordinator in NATO/EU-Russia, NATO/EU-Ukraine, Mediterranean Dialogue, EUROMED and Iraq affairs
Chief Coordinator of the Political-Military Steering Committee, NATO HQ, Brussels
Hungarian Representative to PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Strategic Studies Institutes
Chief Coordinator of the NATO Membership Action Plan, Ministry of Defense
Chief Coordinator of the Western European Union, Ministry of Defense
Hungarian Representative to Intelligence Working Group on NATO Enlargement, NATO HQ, Brussels

3. OUTLINE Introduction ACT-video Basic points (ppt)
Forum-like discussion
Pointing out key elements
Escalating problems
Suggesting ways out

4. TIMELINE
2002 – Prague Summit > NATO Transformation > Capabilities
2005 – CPG > §17 Effects Based Planning
2006 – Riga Summit > CA
2006 June 6 – Concept on EBAO by NATO MC/ACT
2008 – Bucharest Summit > Plan of Action and CA
2009 – Strasbourg-Kehl Summit > Progress Report
Planning and conduct of operations
Lessons learned, training, education and exercises
Enhancing cooperation with external actors
Public messaging
Stabilization and reconstruction

5. ”CA vs./& EBAO” Other Elements of Power (political, economic, civil)
Operational spectrum
Other Elements of Power
(political, economic, civil)
Comprehensive Approach
Level of involvement
Military Power
Effect Based Approach to Operations
War fighting
Security
Stability
Reconstruction

6. INTEGRATED ”END STATE” APPOACH

7. BASIC MODEL Mechanism (Cause) Action (Tasks) Effect (Result)

8. COMPLEX MIL. STRAT. MODEL
Visualization
Assessment
Collaboration
Improved
Information Superiority
and Knowledge Management
Better identification of key PMESII nodes and linkages within Area of Operation
Better prediction of PMESII reactions and behaviors within Area of Operation
Better identification of actions / capabilities required for desired effects
Better dialog and interaction among relevant PMESII experts (Hq staff, JIACG, COEs)
Situation
Awareness
Better identification and articulation of key PMESII effects
More accurate and faster development of node-effect- action matrix
Better prediction of 2nd, 3rd-order effects and unintended consequences
Situation
Understanding
PROCESS
Improved Effects-Based
Planning Process
Better prioritization and linkage of nodes-effects-actions with Command Intent
Better synchronization of effects and actions across DIME options
Decision Making
Greater % of targets and effects within Daily ETO contribute to Command Intent
Lower % of targets and effects within Daily ETO lead to unintended outcomes
More Effective
and Synchronized ETO
Command and
Control Agility
More effective and efficient use of military force
Focused Combat Power
Force
Agility
OUTCOME
Greater synergy in achieving National Security Objectives
”Transformational”
Perspective
”Network Centric” Perspective
”Dictatorial”
Perspective

9. THEORY OF PLANNING VS. EXECUTION

10. DYNAMIC ”NC” MODULE APPOACH

11. GRAVITATIONAL MODEL

12. CAPABILITY APPOACH

13. CIV. VS. MIL. STRUCTURES

14. ”EFFECTS BASED TRANSFORMATION”
Transition Period
Effects-Based,
Collaborative, Network Centric and Interdependent
Deconflict Services & Cultures
Stitch Nation Seams
Integration of NRF Capabilities
Land Forces
Air Forces
Land Forces
Air Forces
SOF
Maritime
Forces
Land Forces
Air Forces
SOF
Maritime
Forces
SOF
Maritime
Forces
Deconflicting
Coordinating
Integrating
Coherence
Attributes of a Transforming NATO Force

15. CASE STUDY ”SERBIA” …desired behavioral outcomes.
Plan
Disrupt
Delivery of POL
Effect
Destroy Bridge 4
Destroy Bridge 6
Tasks
…desired behavioral outcomes.
Bridge 4 Destroyed
Global
Situation
Awareness
CRISIS
Objectives
Tasks T A S K L E V N Y I
Now
Air & Space
Control
Force
Support
Application
Enhancement
Indicators
Bridge 6 Destroyed
Physical effects that lead to…

16. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 1
Expansion West -
2005
Expansion South
Jul 2006
Expansion North
Dec 2003
Start
Kabul
Dec 2001
Finish
Expansion East
2006 ?
Oct 2006

17. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 2
Source: CSIS Burke Chair, “Developments in NATO and ISAF” Forces available from:

18. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 3
Source:

19. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 4
Source:

20. CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 5
2011 ???
Expansion West -
2005
Expansion South
Jul 2006
Expansion North
Dec 2003
Start
Kabul
Dec 2001
Finish
Expansion East
2006 ?
Oct 2006

21. CASE STUDY ”IRAQ VS. AFGHANISTAN”

22. ”…oooops”

23. ”…now watz da plain?”

24. SUGGESTIONS
Both military and non-military capabilities must be transformed
Definition of ”Engagement Space”
Lack of political will will kill both CA and EBAO
An effects based approach to the Comprehensive Approach is imperative
EBAO is part of CA
Understanding multinationality and sectorial differences (resources, cultures) in CA/EBAO
Overall integrated CA/EBAO is needed

25. The End
LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.) Chief Operations, DCOS 25th György Klapka Infantry Brigade Hungarian Home Defense Forces Tata, Hungary
Phone:

26. ”Strategy is the art of making use of time and space
”Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. Space we can recover, lost time never.”