1. Do Networks Facilitate Collective Action? John T. Scholz Florida State University

2. Collective Action Problems: Great Cities from Dismal Swamps

3. Collective Action Cures: Authority

4. Collective Action Cures: Enlightened Self-Interest

5. Collective Action Cures: Collaborative Institutions

6. Collective Action Cures: Self-Organizing Federalism Feiock and Scholz, eds., Cambridge Press, 2010 HobbesMill Ostrom

7. Networks as Cures Bonding Bridging Relationships Relationships COOPERATION: Trust and commitment Strong ties Reciprocity, transitivity COORDINATION: Information Weak ties Centrality, closeness, brokerage

8. Field Study Evidence Berardo and Scholz 2010 Stakeholders seek Bridging Capital

9. Field Study Evidence Bridging, Not Bonding, Increases Level of Collaboration Scholz,Berardo and Kile 2008 Degree (log).36**(.06) Betweenness Centrality.22**(.04) Egonet Density-.06*(.03)

10. Agent-Based Modeling Evidence Scholz and Wang 2006 Bridging increases the evolution of cooperation

11. Experimental Evidence VOLUNTARY DILEMMA- Subjects play repeated prisoners dilemma, but with a choice of partners 14 subjects per session Subjects propose to any number of potential partners, and play PD if both partners propose in the period. Repeat for 20 rounds (known in advance).

12. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 1

13. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 2

14. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 3

15. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 4

16. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 5

17. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 6

18. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 7

19. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 8

20. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 9

21. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 10

22. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 11

23. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 12

24. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 13

25. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 14

26. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 15

27. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 16

28. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 17

29. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 18

30. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 19

31. Cooperate (red) and Defect (black): Period 20

33. The Network Century for Collective Action??? Utilize multiple research methods and designs Develop additional methods of field observation Email and agency contact lists Media Archives and issue networks Internet Crawlers and social media Utilize Measures directly related to concepts Nature of the problem (credibility vs resource flows) Extent of effects (ego network, alter network, full network)

34. John T. Scholz FSU

35. Cooperation is favored when b/c>k Ohtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman and Nowak, Nature 441: 502 (May 2006)

36. Bonding Relationships Cooperation games with risk of defection Bonding relationships enhance commitment, trust, norms, providing social capital to resolve Collective Action Problems as represented by prisoners’ dilemma, public goods, common-pool resources Tie Strength => Strong, frequent, intense, multidimensial interactions with strong affinity for partner Network Structures => Reciprocity, transitivity, redundant, overlapping ties.

37. Bridging Relationships Coordination games with low risk of defection Matching, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt Tie Strength => Weak, infrequent as needed, unidimensional, with many partners and little affinity Network Structures, flows => Degree, Reach, Closeness, non-redundant, overlapping ties. Network Structures, Brokerage => Betweenness, structural holes, brokerage

38. Experimental Evidence Cooperative communities emerge when cooperators successfully find each other Clusters do not change behavior, at least in the short run. Remaining challenge: Can clustering enhance long-term cooperation when none exists???