1. Agenda Central Political Objectives: 2000 – 2007 Key Military Operations and Political Consequences Lessons Learned – Israeli Perspective Implications for the US Military What Israel Should Learn From US Experience in Iraq Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

2. Central Political Objectives: 2000 - 2007 Finalize Peace Deal with Palestinian Authority Gain Local and International Recognition of Borders Dramatically Improve Security for Civilian Population Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

3. Key Military Operations Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007 2000Withdrawal From Lebanon. Limited Military Operations in the West Bank and Gaza 2000-2002Limited Military Operations in the West Bank and Gaza 2002Operation Defensive Shield 2002-2005Maintaining Tight Military Control Over West Bank and Gaza 2005Withdrawal From Gaza 2006Medium-Scale Operations in Gaza and Lebanon

4. 2000: Unilateral Withdrawal From Lebanon Desired Political End-State Decrease local and international criticism of continued military presence in Lebanon Local and International recognition of border with Lebanon To increase security for Israeli citizens in North To weaken Hezbollah political rationale To strengthen Lebanese central government Military Operations Withdrawal of Israeli forces from Security Zone in May. Monitor border with patrols and sensors End-State Achieved Internationally recognized border with Lebanon. Shebaa Farms still disputed locally Security for Israeli citizens in North is neither diminished nor increased Hezbollah perceived victor and deploys even further south along border with Israel Lebanese central government is not significantly strengthened Lebanese government doesn’t restore effective authority in southern Lebanon (SCR 425) Possible that withdrawal influenced Arafat decision to ignite second Intifada in September Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

5. 2000: Limiting Operations During Negotiations Desired Political End-State Comprehensive peace agreement with Palestinian leaders Local and international recognition of established borders End of large-scale, organized Palestinian terrorism against Israeli civilians Establishment of a democratic, secular Palestinian state Military Operations Israeli military remains withdrawn from Palestinian population centers Limited operations in Area B and C – checkpoints, ambushes, arrests, and intelligence activity In Gaza, primarily protect Jewish communities and monitor border Limited joint patrols and ongoing coordination with Palestinian security services End-State Achieved Frequency of terror attacks against Israeli civilians continues upward trend started in 1993 Breakdown of negotiations at Camp David in July. Attempts to re-start negotiations fail Al-Aqsa Intifadah begins in September Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

6. 2000–2002 : Limiting West Bank & Gaza Operations Desired Political End-State Comprehensive peace agreement with Palestinian leaders Local and international recognition of established borders End of large-scale, highly-coordinated Palestinian terrorism against Israeli civilians Establishment of a democratic, secular Palestinian state Military Operations Israeli military remains withdrawn from Palestinian population centers Limited operations in Area B and C – checkpoints, ambushes, and intelligence activity In Gaza, protect Jewish communities and monitor border End-State Achieved After Camp David, subsequent negotiations at Taba fail to achieve political progress Al-Aqsa Intifadah leads to dramatic spike in terror attacks against Israeli civilians Israeli public is substantially less willing to continue Oslo Peace Process Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

7. 2002 : Operation DEFENSIVE SHIELD Desired Political End-State To eliminate terrorist infrastructure and mitigate ability to strike Israeli civilians Limited international criticism of operation and support from key allies like the US To de-legitimize Palestinian Authority leadership To increase international support for Israeli political position that emerged at Camp David Military Operations Re-establishing military control over all Palestinian population centers in West Bank Large-scale joint military and intelligence operation designed to kill or capture known terrorists Continue pin-point attacks against terrorists in Gaza and maintain control over border Keep Hezbollah from opening an additional front along the northern border End-State Achieved Established military control over the West Bank with minimum loss of life Dramatic reduction in terror attacks in Israel Negligible pressure on Israel to pull back forces at end of operation Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

8. 2002-2005 : Tight Control Over West Bank and Gaza Desired Political End-State To limit international criticism of new status quo and support from key allies like the US To de-legitimize Palestinian Authority - internationally and locally To increase support for Israeli political position that emerged at Camp David and US Road Map To cripple terrorist ability to strike Israeli civilians and decrease popularity of radicals Military Operations Monitor and mitigate terror activity in Palestinian population centers in the West Bank Conduct operations to kill or capture known terrorists and create impression of “ever-presence” Creating correlation between terror attacks on Israelis and consequences for Palestinian civilians Continue pin-point attacks against terrorists in Gaza. Construction of security fence system End-State Achieved Maintain military control over the West Bank with minimum loss of life Dramatic reduction in terror attacks sustained over time and pre-1993 normalcy gained in Israel Negligible pressure on Israel to either pull back forces or limit breadth of ongoing operations Radical Islamic groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad become more popular Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

9. 2005 : Disengagement From Gaza Desired Political End-State Unilateral implementation of Israeli vision of two-state solution To decrease international criticism and increase support from key allies like the US Local and international recognition of southern border Unchanged or reduced ability of terror groups to strike Israeli civilians Military Operations Monitor fenced border and coastline. Arrest or kill individuals attempting breach of border Conduct pinpoint operations against known terrorists with commando units and IAF Maintain tight control over West Bank End-State Achieved Decrease in international criticism and increased support from key allies like the US Dramatic increase in the number of attempts to breach fence and fire Qassam rockets Nearly six months later, Hamas wins Palestinian parliamentary elections Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

10. 2006 : Medium-Scale Operations in Gaza & Lebanon Desired Political End-State To restrict growing political strength and military activity of Hamas and Hezbollah Palestinian & Lebanese populations blame Hamas and Hezbollah for instigating conflict To encourage Lebanese and Palestinian central governments to act against terror groups To mute international criticism and maintain support from key allies like the US Local and international recognition of established borders To strengthen Israeli deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, Hezbollah, and Middle Eastern nation states Military Operations New strategy – hold central governments responsible for terror group actions Limited ground invasion to clear border of terrorist emplacements and infrastructure End-State Achieved At outset, Arab nations like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Lebanon voice understanding Lebanese military deploys along Israeli border and takes more active stance against radicals Palestinian Authority President Abbas stands firm in opposition to Hamas Question over legal ownership of Shebaa Farms re-opened. Impact on deterrence debatable Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

11. 2007 : Political Consequences of 2006 Operations Palestinian Authority Palestinian Authority President Abbas loses control of Gaza to Hamas Abbas must choose between civil war or accept a more Islamic Palestine and relinquish power Israel Israeli leaders prepare public for more conflict and increase military spending Israeli population unwilling to support further unilateral withdrawals Government decision-making is limited by a population less ready to embrace risks for peace Lebanon Central government defeats a small militia, Fatah al-Islam. Possible signal to Hezbollah Lebanese government deploys military in South, but does not fully assert authority Hezbollah political position is not improved, but increases capabilities and presence in south Syria & Iran Strengthens public resolve against US and Israel. Increased coordination between two nations Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

12. 2007 : Consequences of Divergent Perspectives Israeli Perspective Palestinian Authority will be flexible, since they need support to face growing Hamas threat Hezbollah (Syria and Iran) are preparing for and will instigate another round of violence Palestinian Perspective Israelis can’t defeat Hamas or Hezbollah. PA is in strong political position as only viable partner Vision of a primarily secular, democratic Palestine is under attack from radical Islamic groups Lebanese Perspective Radical groups like Hezbollah and Fatah al-Islam endanger central government and civilians Over Next Six Months PA hardens political stance & anti-Israel rhetoric. Nov. conference doesn’t improve negotiations Hamas fight with PA intensifies. Hamas steps up attacks on Israel to demonstrate significance Israel focuses on Hamas & Islamic Jihad in West Bank. Gaza ops only change after major attack Lebanese government does not take on Hezbollah. Hezbollah prepares for next round with Israel Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

13. Lessons Learned – Israeli Perspective Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007 2000: Limiting military operations leads to dramatic increase in number of attacks 2002- 2005: Extensive military operations decrease attacks, but also prevent political progress. 2005: Unilateral actions don’t improve prospects for peace 2006: Momentary intensification of conflict can jump start political progress 2007: First international conference since 2001 will take place in November. Attack frequency increases

14. Lessons Learned – Israeli Perspective Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007 Peace Process Begins IDF Loosens Controls. Terrorism Spikes Ability to Compromise Reduced on Both Sides. Negotiations Fail to Progress Attacks Intensify. IDF Dismantles Terror infrastructure Relative Calm Creates Conditions to Restart Negotiations Peace Process 1.Remove military from Palestinian population centers as confidence building measure. Number of attacks increase dramatically 2.In response to spike in attacks, Israeli military conducts pin-point operations. Ability of both sides to compromise is hindered. Momentum of negotiations is slowed to a near halt 3.As terror attacks increase in frequency or a successful large-scale attack takes place, the Israeli military response reduces terror capabilities, but also returns Israeli-Palestinian relations to status quo prior to peace process

15. Lessons Learned – Israeli Perspective Throughout negotiations with Palestinians, extensive Israeli military operations are required Withdrawing military without political agreement empowers radicals and leads to more attacks Information operations are as important as ground operations - fully integrated part of strategy Terrorist infrastructures can be destroyed, but requires deployment of significant ground forces Need “Strategic Privates” who think critically and understand how their actions impact strategy Must keep constant vigilance and be prepared for enemy successes that undermine status quo A conflict between Israel and multiple Arab nations is more likely today than it was 20 years ago Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

16. Implications for US Military Reduction in violence depends on perception of military “ever-presence” and response to attacks Must establish and maintain security for civilian population to achieve political objectives Holding a host responsible for non-state actors makes preventative action a national interest You don’t need to win hearts and minds to dramatically reduce attacks Reducing military operations as quid pro quo during political negotiations leads to more violence Strategic Privates who think critically and understand how their actions impact strategy are vital Don’t let need to focus on today’s urban fight keep you from preparing for tomorrow’s war By enabling establishment of PA, Israel transformed non-state actor (PLO) into proto-nation - Palestinian population is relatively homogenous, educated, secular, and economically stable - Strong primary self-identification as Palestinian over ethnic, religious, or other kin group - If difficult for Palestinians to achieve critical nation-building milestones, harder for Iraq - Empower leading non-state actor did not halt rise of successors - Islamic Jihad and Hamas Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007

17. What Israel Should Learn from US Experience in Iraq Assume knowledge transfer and integrate US Lessons Learned into IDF planning and training More fully integrate information operations into overall strategy, planning, and execution Core Middle East conflicts – Sunni-Shi’a, Secular-Islamic, Arab-Persian – are intensifying Collaboration with central government against militias – force multiplier and strategic IO tool - Move beyond inevitable confrontational and adversarial approach of peace process - Establish an Israeli-Palestinian alliance against radical groups based on shared interest - Israeli soldiers train Palestinian military and conduct joint operations - Economic development for West Bank and Gaza jointly administered by PA and Israel - PA ends public incitement against Israel and stops celebrating terrorism - IO value of Israeli-Palestinians conducting joint raid broadcast on Al-Jazeera Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Experience, 2000-2007