1. Terrorism

2. Reflections on terrorism We could just focus on what our readings and our model tells us. But, then we have the issue of the general culture in the U.S. being immersed in a war on terror. How do we make the link?

3. Trends: War is on the decline, but when it occurs, it is very bloody. Terror attack style (especially suicide ones) are very much part of that The assertion of sovereignty wins over global norms

4. Global history shows… That people can be mobilized very quickly around ideas. These combine with trends and processes, and with the changes that inevitably occur within a culture and people (a nation) One of these in our time is the mobilization of people in the Middle East and Asia around a particular version of Islam

5. Understanding terrorism History matters – “decades of terror” Definitional debate has always been deeply imbedded into the discussion of terrorism “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” Boston Tea Party – An act of terrorism! Defining “causes” and the idiosyncratic or global scope Assessing the place (and the role) of the state

6. Understanding terrorism (cont.) The more transnational the terror, the more the scope of transnational control…that is, the spread of the problem solidifies the resolve to deal with it via global governance. Until recently the majority (but not all) of terrorism has been within the dual target modus vivendi…that is – there is an instrumental (innocent) target that is damaged, threatened, “terrorized” in order to extract concessions from the primary, political target. In such a system, threat, bargaining and uncertainty are important.

7. Operationally, then, terrorism’s goal was… To force a crisis/confrontation with authorities and extract concessions and to “win” power; To achieve publicity and reap its impact; To provoke repressive counter-terrorism by a national government; To punish a “guilty” party (through terror means, e.g. kidnap a relative; kill an associate)

8. Three dominant cases of post-1945 terrorism: Ireland – of course pre-1945 as well, in the drive to Irish independence, etc. Then the emergence of (religious) factionalism The success of the Algerian “revolution” – The Battle of Algiers Middle East: (a) The Stern Gang 1944ish – 49 (b) Palestinian Revolution/War/Resistance 1960s – Palestinian Council takes new view after Arab states lose 1967 war

9. Post-1945 terrorism (cont.) In addition – lots of “terrorism” unfolding as local violence between those challenging the state and the state itself: 1 st decade of terror: 1968 – 78. Heavy in the Europe as Middle East battleground; air hijacking; Munich 2 nd decade of terror: 1978-88 – More in the Middle East itself; rise of state support

10. Who were the terrorists of 1 st decade? What led to their development? Pre-eminence of local conditions Notability of ideology – nihilism or Marxism or fascism Primarily between 18 and 35 years old The “rise” related to three “T’s”: telecommunications, technology, toleration

11. Examples of groups and states: Tupamaros – Uruguay Monteneros, ERP – Argentina M-19 – Colombia Shining Path – Peru Tamil Tigers – Sri Lanka Japanese Red Army IRA & Provos – N. Ireland ETA – Basque country, Spain Baader-Meinhof Gang – West Germany Red Army Brigades – Italy South Molluccans – Netherlands Utashe - FRY PLO, Black September, PFLP – Middle East FLQ – Quebec Weathermen - USA

12. Successful groups had: Tight ideology and organization Target vulnerability and style of response Limited and achievable goals of a group Deteriorating socio-economic environment Degree of transnational support Good results from activity on all five above

13. What is “new” about the “new terrorism” of the 1990s? Driven by anti-Western, anti- globalization sentiments rooted in religion – or a narrow interpretation of religion Participants are transnational with low loyalties to any nation; their view is “global”

14. The “new terrorism” of the 1990s (cont.) They have access to resources, especially training and material. High value in casualties and attacks on icons of society or the West.

15. Thus, what has changed? Terror moves from a tactic of a movement to terror being the defining aspect or quality of the movement Old terror was a means to an end…less so in our day

16. And along comes bin Laden: Has resources to use cost-mix favorably Has a safe haven and an existing network to supply weapons and new recruits Then develops state-network relations so that the former is beholding to the latter Has powerful ideology; mastery of the cell system gone transnational Uses well “conditions of people” throughout the Islamic world Sees inflicting massive damage as the goal Seeks weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

17. Some questions: So, how serious is this threat compared to others we have faced? Does it demand extraordinary methods? What kind of measures and methods are most useful? What are the dangers of some methods over others? Are those who worry about the ethics or legality of the methods just weenies? What are those who value religion to do and to understand about this trend?

18. Questions, cont. How and where do considerations of peace enter into the dialogue about what to do about terrorism, or directly regarding the “war on terror”? What should any literate person know about suicide bombings?

19. Roots - Roots causes lie in attitudes, not circumstances; networks that offer a way to act against regimes deemed repressive or anti-religious; 95% occur under “occupation” - Exploring those attitudes reveals an anti-U.S., anti-Western sentiment regarding foreign policies in Muslim societies - Such folks are recruited in the short and are near to event time period, especially if rewards are promised to their families

20. There is considerable dispute and discussion… in al-Qaeda (Ayman al-Zawahiri & Abu Masab al-Zarqawi letters) especially in the Muslim world about targeting and about suicide bombing itself and large discussion about terrorism as a technique Foreign Policy article: 9/11+5