1. When Myth Meets Reality: The Role of Third Parties in International Conflict Jonathan Wilkenfeld Department of Government and Politics Center for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland Ministry of Foreign Affairs December 2009

2. Myth Diverse societies are culturally dynamic, facilitating individual and collective identity, and fostering creativity, imagination, and invention.

3. Reality Diverse societies are culturally dynamic, facilitating individual and collective identity, and fostering creativity, imagination, and invention. But 1 in every 7 people is a member of an ethnic minority suffering some form of discrimination (political, economic, social or cultural).

4. Conditions Conducive to Ethnic Terrorism Organizations professing a democratic ideology are significantly less likely engage in terrorism Organizations with the following characteristics are more likely to engage in terrorism: –Separatism –Rhetoric justifying violence –Foreign Support –State Repression Organizations that do not have a democratic ideology and have all the factors above have an 89% likelihood of engaging in terrorism

5. Global Ethnic Militancy Countries with at least one militant, ethnically based organization

6. Myth The international community has played an increasingly important role in the settlement of armed conflicts.

7. Global Trends in Active Conflict, 1946-2007 Number of Conflicts

8. Reality The international community has played an increasingly important role in the settlement of armed conflicts. But of the 39 conflicts that became active in the last 10 years, 31 were conflict recurrences – instances of resurgent, armed violence in societies where conflict had been largely dormant for at least a year.

9. New and Recurring Conflict, 1946-2007 Number of Conflict Onsets

10. Recently Terminated Conflicts and Prospects for Recurrence, 1946-2007 Number of Recently Terminated Conflicts

11. Myth The international community has been successful both in increasing the pot of international development aid, and in directing it to the places where it is needed the most.

12. Reality The international community has been successful both in increasing the pot of international development aid, and in directing it to the places where it is needed the most. But development aid is outpaced by the economic cost of state instability, fragility, and failure by a factor of almost 4 to 1.

13. Costs of State Failure Global estimated cost of state failure: $270 billion* * Anke Hoeffler, Peace and Conflict 2010

14. Ranking States on Risk of Instability, 2008-2010

15. Highest Risk

16. High Risk

17. Moderate Risk

18. Some Risk

19. Low Risk

20. Crisis Vulnerability

21. Myths The significant increase in the number of democracies among the states of the international system, coupled with a decrease in the number of autocracies, bodes well for a more tranquil international system – the democratic peace.

22. Reality The significant increase in the number of democracies among the states of the international system, coupled with a decrease in the number of autocracies, bodes well for a more tranquil international system – the democratic peace. But the transition from autocracy to democracy is the period most fraught with potential instability and conflict.

23. Trends in Democratization, 1946-2007 Number of Countries

24. Prescriptions Monitoring and early warning

25. Peace and Conflict Ledger What does the Peace and Conflict Ledger measure? The risk of an instability event occurring in a country in the next three years.

26. Some Key Details The focus is on how structural attributes of states influence the risk of instability Four domains of government activity (economics, politics, security, and social) Estimated a statistical model on data from 1950-2003 (training data) Obtain country risk estimates by inputting 2007 values for all countries

27. Indicators – The Usual Suspects EconomicsPoliticsSecuritySocial GDP per capitaExtent of factionalismState repression of citizens Male secondary enrollment GDP annual growth rate Citizen participation in selecting gov ’ t Size of military budgetInfant Mortality GDP 3-year growth rate Gov ’ t revenues as % of GDP Number of active armed personnel Access to water supplies/ sanitation CPI annual changeDuration of present regime Peace DurationYouth literacy rates Primary commodity dependence Regime ConsistencyConflict in contiguous states Immunization rates Ratio of trade to GDPLevel of DemocracyConflict in regionMale/female literacy ratio Poverty ratesExecutive ConstraintsNumber of IDPsCultural or religious discrimination Change in foreign investment Legislative Effectiveness Intensity of internal armed conflicts Male/female life expectancy ratio

28. Risks of Instability, 2008-2010

29. Significant Increase in Risk DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO Transition to partial democracy Poor performance on other indicators DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO Transition to partial democracy Poor performance on other indicators BURUNDI Democratic transition begins in 2005 Renewed fighting in neighboring DRC (2007) BURUNDI Democratic transition begins in 2005 Renewed fighting in neighboring DRC (2007) NIGERIA Renewed fighting in neighboring Chad (2005) and Niger (2007) NIGERIA Renewed fighting in neighboring Chad (2005) and Niger (2007) MAURITANIA Tenuous democratic transition begins in 2005 Continued low-intensity violence in Mali and Algeria MAURITANIA Tenuous democratic transition begins in 2005 Continued low-intensity violence in Mali and Algeria

30. Sources of Increased Risk? Democratization Recurring Armed Conflict

31. New and Recurring Conflict, 1946-2007 Number of Conflict Onsets

32. Recently Terminated Conflicts and Prospects for Recurrence, 1946-2007 Number of Recently Terminated Conflicts

33. Conclusion Devastating costs of state failure Diagnostic tools for policy-makers to support effective policies to mitigate conflict risks

34. Prescriptions Monitoring and early warning Intervention matching circumstances

35. Third Party Intervention Mediation as a special case

36. Mediation in Crisis - Styles Facilitation: act as a channel –Helps reduce uncertainty –Helps reduce perceptions of mutual hostility Formulation: suggest/coordinate solutions –Helps by setting focal points –Helps by highlighting areas of compromise Manipulation: offer incentives (+ and -) –In particular: security guarantees –Helps by changing real costs and benefits

37. Mediation in Crisis Outcomes of interest: –Mutual compromise –Formal agreement –Post-crisis tension reduction

38. Results: Mediation Style, Compromise, and Agreements Manipulation has largest positive effect on crisis termination point outcomes –Especially when it involves arrangements for or provision of security guarantees Formulation has slightly lesser but still powerful positive effect Facilitation has little effect –Pure facilitation has negative effect on compromise

39. Results: Mediation Style and Post-Crisis Tensions Formulation has largest positive effect on post-crisis tension reduction Facilitation has lesser but still significant positive effect Manipulation is ineffective at reducing tensions, post-crisis –Even when security guarantees are involved. This finding contrasts w/ previous studies.