1. Assessment of BMD Global capabilities Missile Defence as a Factor in Establishing a New Security Environment International Conference Moscow, 3-4 May 2012 Colonel-General V.V. Gerasimov

2. Briefing Objectives Presenting the findings from the assessment of global BMD capabilities Highlighting the available tech opportunities to respond to missile threats in a joint manner

3. BMD Information Capabilities

4. BMD Global Information Capabilities modernizing the deployed missile warning radars fielding mobile BMD radars increasing the capabilities of low orbit satellite grouping tapping into the information resources held by allies and partners

5. Deployment of BMD Information Assets

6. Conclusions The deployed information subsystem covers the entire territory of the Russian Federation Impediments are about to emerge and block the employment of Deterrence Forces Subsystem’s capacities can be further enhanced Comprehensine applications of the deployed information assets solidly beef up the BMD efficiency

7. BMD Weapons

8. Conditions Missile launch lines feature research purposes Targets’ positions are hypothetical, though close to reality BMD assets performances get estimated through processing the available data and running comparative analyses No use of BMD penetration aids Calculations are built on computer models developed by the Ministry of Defense experts

9. Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the West

10. Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the Center

11. Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the East

13. Conclusions Concept for a BMD posture is global in character BMD assets in Europe and in Asia Pacific Region are elements of the global BMD system primarily intended for protection of selected sites in the US territory BMD assets pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force based across Russia Deployed BMD assets already have the capability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles

14. BMD Assets in Poland Capabilities Assessment

15. Baseline Data Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios Launch area – south Missile range – up to 11000 km Targeting – east coast of the USA BMD interceptor positions: –Poland (shooters featuring Phase 3 and 4 capabilities) –Russia (south)

16. Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories appear to be outside of the killing zone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception is impossible.

17. Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone for fourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception in possible.

18. Capabilities That Can Threaten Russia Conclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone for fourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception is possible.

19. BMD Assets in Romania Capabilities Assessment

20. Baseline Data Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios Launch area – south Missile range – up to 3000 km Targeting – South and Central Europe BMD positions: –Romania (shooters featuring third-phase capabilities) –Russia (south)

21. Conclusion. South Europe-bound trajectories fall within the killing zone for third-phase BMD interceptors. Interception is possible.

22. Conclusion. Part of the Western Europe-bound trajectories happen to be outside of the killing zone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception is partial.

23. Conclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing fourth-phase BMD killing zone. Interception is possible

24. Conclusions Romania-based BMD shooters featuring first and second-phase performances will have limited capabilities to assure protection of South Europe against missiles launched from the south Poland-based BMD shooters featuring third-phase performances would pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force, while failing to assure protection of the entire Western Europe against the threat of missile strikes from the south Close-to-Russia sea-launched BMD shooters would be posing a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force There is room for cooperation aimed at developing an effective European-wide BMD system (development of the joint defense area)