1. GNEP: A Proliferation Risk or a Solution to the Nuclear Waste Problem? Allison Macfarlane George Mason University Senate briefing June 23, 2008 Allison Macfarlane George Mason University Senate briefing June 23, 2008 Calvert Cliffs plant, MD (Baltimore Sun)

2. Proliferation risks in the nuclear fuel cycle  Main Problem:  Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons share the same basic materials to power them  Two routes to proliferation  Front end: through uranium enrichment  The Iran controversy  Back end: via reprocessing to extract plutonium  The issue with GNEP  DOE shares this concern  Vowed not to separate plutonium by itself  Main Problem:  Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons share the same basic materials to power them  Two routes to proliferation  Front end: through uranium enrichment  The Iran controversy  Back end: via reprocessing to extract plutonium  The issue with GNEP  DOE shares this concern  Vowed not to separate plutonium by itself

3. Once-through cycle: More proliferation resistant  Once-through cycle  Direct disposal of spent fuel  What US does now  Plutonium in spent fuel is self-protecting  High levels radiation from spent fuel  Closed cycle (reprocessing)  Separates plutonium  Easy to divert for nuclear weapons  Relatively “safe” to carry away on one’s person  Even mixed with other actinides, it can still be used to make a nuclear bomb  Once-through cycle  Direct disposal of spent fuel  What US does now  Plutonium in spent fuel is self-protecting  High levels radiation from spent fuel  Closed cycle (reprocessing)  Separates plutonium  Easy to divert for nuclear weapons  Relatively “safe” to carry away on one’s person  Even mixed with other actinides, it can still be used to make a nuclear bomb

4. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership  Proposed to deal with  Nuclear waste problem  Proliferation of nuclear weapons  Nuclear energy expansion  Development of other countries’ nuclear energy programs  “have a seat at the table”  Proposed to deal with  Nuclear waste problem  Proliferation of nuclear weapons  Nuclear energy expansion  Development of other countries’ nuclear energy programs  “have a seat at the table”

5. NAS Committee View of GNEP  Rush to commercial-scale deployment of facilities unacceptable  Should be replaced by a less aggressive research program  Similar to AFCI  Rush to commercial-scale deployment of facilities unacceptable  Should be replaced by a less aggressive research program  Similar to AFCI

6. NAS Committee Findings  Waste, security, resources needs don’t justify rapid commercial-scale deployment  State of knowledge of GNEP technologies too young for early commercial-scale deployment  No economic justification for early commercial-scale deployment  Fuel cycle proposed (UREX+ and Na-fast reactors) not reliable and well-understood  Qualification of multiple-recycled fuel far from demonstrated  Waste, security, resources needs don’t justify rapid commercial-scale deployment  State of knowledge of GNEP technologies too young for early commercial-scale deployment  No economic justification for early commercial-scale deployment  Fuel cycle proposed (UREX+ and Na-fast reactors) not reliable and well-understood  Qualification of multiple-recycled fuel far from demonstrated

7. NAS Committee Recommendations  DOE do a technical and economic analysis of proposed fuel cycle that is peer-reviewed  DOE put more effort into qualification of recycled fuel  DOE compare technical & financial risks with benefits of chosen cycle  DOE bring together all relevant US agencies, industry, other nations before any decisions are made  Defer the Secretary’s 2008 decision - current schedule isn’t credible  DOE do a technical and economic analysis of proposed fuel cycle that is peer-reviewed  DOE put more effort into qualification of recycled fuel  DOE compare technical & financial risks with benefits of chosen cycle  DOE bring together all relevant US agencies, industry, other nations before any decisions are made  Defer the Secretary’s 2008 decision - current schedule isn’t credible

8. Dissenting View: Gilinsky & Macfarlane  At this point in time, there is no reason (economic, resource-based, or other) to pursue a costly R&D program in reprocessing & recycling spent fuel  Reprocessing & recycling spent fuel won’t solve waste and proliferation problems  DOE is wrong agent for developing commercial technologies  At this point in time, there is no reason (economic, resource-based, or other) to pursue a costly R&D program in reprocessing & recycling spent fuel  Reprocessing & recycling spent fuel won’t solve waste and proliferation problems  DOE is wrong agent for developing commercial technologies

9. Dissenting View: Gilinsky & Macfarlane  Waste  GNEP plan will exacerbate waste problem  Many new waste streams compared to once- through  Still need a repository program and add additional programs for intermediate and low-level waste disposal  What about spent fuel take-back portion of GNEP plan?  Who will do it?  Waste  GNEP plan will exacerbate waste problem  Many new waste streams compared to once- through  Still need a repository program and add additional programs for intermediate and low-level waste disposal  What about spent fuel take-back portion of GNEP plan?  Who will do it?

10. Dissenting View: Gilinsky & Macfarlane  Proliferation  Mixing Pu & Np does not significantly increase barrier to theft or use in a nuclear bomb  Basis of GNEP plan: no reprocessing technology secure enough for all countries to use  Therefore, only a few countries should have this ability  This perpetuates the unacceptable situation of haves and have-not states  Proliferation  Mixing Pu & Np does not significantly increase barrier to theft or use in a nuclear bomb  Basis of GNEP plan: no reprocessing technology secure enough for all countries to use  Therefore, only a few countries should have this ability  This perpetuates the unacceptable situation of haves and have-not states

11. GAO Report on GNEP (4.08)  Do domestic plants proposed in GNEP meet DOE’s objectives?  Did not examine merits of reprocessing  DOE’s rush to commercial-scale facilities is misguided  Should build engineering-scale facilities after adequate R&D analysis  Other highlights  All industry proposals to DOE suggest either  Unproven reprocessing technologies or  Established technologies that separate plutonium by itself  Govt. would bear high costs for this program  Do domestic plants proposed in GNEP meet DOE’s objectives?  Did not examine merits of reprocessing  DOE’s rush to commercial-scale facilities is misguided  Should build engineering-scale facilities after adequate R&D analysis  Other highlights  All industry proposals to DOE suggest either  Unproven reprocessing technologies or  Established technologies that separate plutonium by itself  Govt. would bear high costs for this program

12. Alternative Waste Solutions  It’s not a choice between a geologic repository and reprocessing  Will need a repository no matter what  Yucca Mountain  Not clear whether it will be approved  Capacity an open question  We need to be working on a viable solution for nuclear waste in the US  It’s not a choice between a geologic repository and reprocessing  Will need a repository no matter what  Yucca Mountain  Not clear whether it will be approved  Capacity an open question  We need to be working on a viable solution for nuclear waste in the US

13. Conclusions  GNEP doesn’t solve the problems it sets out to  Will increase the proliferation risk  No real “proliferation proof” reprocessing technologies  Exacerbates waste issue  Need different solution to the waste problem  Need to consider alternate sites  Need to have multiple repositories  Ensures that burden perceived to be shared  Ensures that nuclear power can expand without constraints of waste  Need another organization to manage the waste program  GNEP doesn’t solve the problems it sets out to  Will increase the proliferation risk  No real “proliferation proof” reprocessing technologies  Exacerbates waste issue  Need different solution to the waste problem  Need to consider alternate sites  Need to have multiple repositories  Ensures that burden perceived to be shared  Ensures that nuclear power can expand without constraints of waste  Need another organization to manage the waste program